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 1 Introduction
 1.1 The purchasing of maintenance services 
by Dutch housing associations
 1.1.1 Introduction
Well-maintained housing can have a positive effect on society. Ensuring that 
buildings are attractively kept and function properly can significantly add to 
tenants’ appreciation of their living space.
The construction of new buildings receives a lot of attention, both in theory 
and in practice. The quality of the housing stock as a whole, however, is much 
more influenced by maintenance and improvement activities. Not only are 
the results important, but also the process of maintenance plays a key role. 
Maintenance service delivery is an opportunity for interaction with tenants. 
It is an important opportunity for housing associations to promote tenant 
satisfaction and to visibly prove that they care for their tenants. Despite this, 
maintenance was, until recently, predominantly perceived as a technical and 
financial issue. While housing associations would like to use maintenance 
to increase tenant satisfaction, they appear to have had difficulties succeed-
ing in this. Part of the responsibility for service delivery has been transferred 
to external service suppliers. Despite this, housing associations appear to 
be dissatisfied with the quality of service delivery, which in turn, can have a 
negative impact on tenant satisfaction. This indicates a need to improve the 
purchasing of maintenance. The desire for professionalisation is underpinned 
by the recent and ongoing consolidation of the social rented sector, which is 
leading to greater demand for rational decision-making. Because of the need 
for further professionalisation of maintenance purchasing in the social rent-
ed sector of housing this research focuses on the linkage between purchasing 
(part of the discipline of business administration), construction and housing 
sciences. The scientific relevance of this research thus lies in the application 
of business administration in these two fields of research.
Before introducing the research aim and questions, we look at the key 
concepts used in this thesis. First, we offer an overview of the significance of 
housing associations and maintenance. Next, we turn to the focal (mainte-
nance) services and markets, after which the concepts of maintenance and 
purchasing are introduced.
 1.1.2 Housing associations
The significance of this study is underscored by the significant size of the 
Dutch social rented sector, and the large amounts of money spent on main-
taining it. In 2006, 492 housing associations were affiliated with Aedes, the 
branch association of Dutch housing associations. These housing associa-
tions are together responsible for managing more than 2.4 million dwellings, 
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and have a total annual turnover of around 13.5 billion euros. Together, Dutch 
housing associations spend over 4 billion euros annually on maintenance and 
improvement of dwellings (CFV, 2006); 2.8 billion euros is spent on mainte-
nance per year. 65% of this is related to planned maintenance, and the re-
maining 35% to reactive maintenance and void repairs. External suppliers ac-
count for approximately 89%. 96% of planned maintenance is conducted by 
external services suppliers; for reactive maintenance and void repairs, this 
amounts to 82% (Vijverberg and Straub, 2003).
In the Netherlands, the Housing Act of 1901 provides the public framework 
for housing associations’ activities. These social enterprises fulfil a public 
function combined with what are more-or-less commercial activities. This 
public function is not only related to housing individuals and families with 
modest incomes and other special groups, but also to fostering variety in the 
housing stock and reducing spatial segregation.
With a market share of about 33% of the entire Dutch housing stock, the 
size of the Dutch social rented sector is gradually decreasing (CFV, 2007). 
Nonetheless, relatively speaking, it is the largest in the European Union, fol-
lowed at a distance by Denmark (27%), Sweden (24%) and the United Kingdom 
(21%) (Norris and Shields, 2004).
 1.1.3 Housing services and markets
This research focuses on the owners, the users and the ‘adaptators’ of the 
housing stock. The housing market, the housing services market and the 
maintenance market are different concepts. In order to get a good under-
standing of the position of the different markets within the overall housing 
market, a brief overview will be given, based on Priemus (1984). See Figure 
1.1 for an overview of the relevant markets for housing associations’ mainte-
nance services.
A first distinction can be made between the housing market and the hous-
ing construction market. The concept of the housing market is related to the 
current housing stock. The housing market refers to the totality of demand 
and supply relations that occur between (candidate) owners and (candidate) 
occupants of once-realised dwellings, where demand and supply of housing 
services and dwellings (properties) meet each other.
The concept of the housing construction market is used to indicate de-
mand and supply relations related to housing construction capacity. With re-
gard to the housing construction market, depending on the type of construc-
tion, a distinction can be made between:
the building of new dwellings;
the housing improvement market;
the housing maintenance market.
■
■
■
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According to this arrangement (Priemus, 1984), maintenance is part of the 
housing construction market. Section 2.2 below examines the characteristics 
of the maintenance sector. Together, maintenance and housing improvement 
are often defined as technical management.
Priemus (1984) divides the concept of the housing market into a market 
where dwellings are traded, and a housing services market. Housing services 
are traded in the housing services market, and customers in the social rented 
sector are part of this market. For owner-occupiers, the markets for property 
and housing services are combined.
Within the housing services market, Priemus (1984) makes a further dis-
tinction between the mobile housing services market and the immobile hous-
ing services market. A mobile housing services market is a market with more 
proprietors, with unoccupied dwellings and more residents (candidate ten-
ants). In principle, this implies some competition between proprietors as well 
as between residents. Priemus (1984) indicates that the market situation is 
essential, creating either pressure or suction. In the case of pressure, supply 
exceeds demand, and proprietors have to compete for tenants. In the case of 
suction, demand exceeds supply, and candidate tenants have to compete for 
housing (Kornai, 1971). Given the restrictedness of the market to a specific ar-
ea, and the low mobility of residents, Priemus indicates that the mobile hous-
ing services market can be best referred to as an oligopoly. Moves by residents 
implicate adaptations to the mobile housing services market.
When a tenant occupies a dwelling, there are many barriers to his or her 
residential mobility. Priemus (1984: 34) therefore indicates that because of 
these barriers, ‘this immobile housing services market could be theoretically 
and practically distinguished from the mobile housing services market (low 
cross elasticity)’. According to Priemus (1984), market relations in an immo-
bile housing services market are centred on negotiations concerning mainte-
nance and rent developments.
Maintenance affects the mobile housing services market and is part of the 
immobile services market. Good maintenance can positively affect a dwell-
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ing’s market position, and thus the mobile housing services market. In this 
thesis, attention will primarily be given to the immobile housing services 
market. This implies we explicitly consider service delivery (the process of 
service supply), and do not deal with maintenance carried out during turno-
ver of tenants (void repairs).
Although we refer to housing services as such, most housing services are 
also strongly related to the characteristics of goods. Given the challenges 
posed to technical management services by this combination of goods and 
services, the management of such services needs to have an understanding 
of both the technical and the social interaction aspects of such services.
The primary reason for the existence of housing associations is related to 
the delivery of housing services. Technical management services, including 
maintenance services, are an important aspect of these housing services.
 1.1.4 Maintenance
Technical management relates to construction activities for the building 
stock; that is, the distinctive activities of maintenance and improvement. On 
the contrary, construction activities for new buildings involve replacement 
and additional building. Wordsworth (2001) defines these various construction 
activities as follows:
maintenance: work necessary to keep or restore a building to an accept-
able standard, including minor associated improvements;
alterations: work involved in providing improved facilities to make a prop-
erty more suitable for existing use;
conversions: work involved in rearranging internal spaces and/or providing 
new facilities to make a building suitable for a new functional use;
replacement: erection of a new building of the same functional type as one 
demolished, usually on the same site;
additional: erection of a new building, usually on a virgin site.
■
■
■
■
■
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Figure 1.2 shows the classification of the different construction activities.
This research focuses on the maintenance of dwellings. Figure 1.3 shows 
the relationship between maintenance and improvement, which are together 
defined as technical management. Maintenance means the neutralisation of 
the loss of performance of a building due to ageing, use, and external causes, 
to the extent that this loss of performance is acceptable. Whether this loss 
of performance is ‘acceptable’ or not depends, in turn, on the demands set 
by the proprietor and the user (Straub, 2002). Over a period of time, the gap 
between the standards demanded by the user and those provided by the 
building is likely to widen, as shown in Figure 1.3. However, the representa-
tion is a very simplified one, as in reality, the relationship between the growth 
of user requirements and the deterioration of the performances of a building 
(dwelling) is usually non-linear. Moreover, cleaning activities may slow down 
the deterioration in performance. Acceptable performance loss and the im-
plementation of appropriate maintenance activities depend on legal require-
ments, technical and functional motives, and environmental motives. Dif-
ferent performance levels may apply to different target groups (such as the 
elderly or students) identified in the strategic stock policy (Straub, 2002). This 
assumes that there is a maintenance policy that is related to housing associa-
tions’ strategic (housing stock) policy.
Maintenance services can be divided into four organisational types:
planned maintenance;
reactive maintenance (also termed responsive maintenance) – mainte-
nance that is usually realised following tenants’ complaints;
void repairs – maintenance that is realised during tenancy turnover in or-
der to maintain the quality of the dwelling at a satisfactory level and to 
relieve tenants of the inconveniences of maintenance activities; and
service maintenance – tenants pay a fee to subscribe to a maintenance 
service.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Service maintenance, however, consists of either planned maintenance ac-
tivities, or reactive maintenance activities. In other words, it is included in 
planned and reactive maintenance. As we explained in Sub-Section 1.1.3, this 
research focuses on planned maintenance and reactive maintenance. These 
maintenance services form by far the majority of all maintenance expenses.
Planned maintenance often has a preventive purpose. It is undertaken to 
prevent problems in the performance of a building component or installation. 
Reactive maintenance (or responsive maintenance) is usually conducted after 
a breakdown.
More attention is given to differences between various maintenance serv-
ices in Chapters 3 and 7.
Responsibilities
Not all maintenance falls under the responsibility of housing associations. 
When it comes to maintenance in the Netherlands, how are the responsibili-
ties divided between tenants and housing associations? These responsibilities 
are set out in the ‘Besluit kleine herstellingen’ [Small repairs decree] (2003), 
derived from the Dutch Civil Code (7: 240). In general, tenants are responsible 
for small repairs. Tenants’ obligations regarding maintenance are conditional 
on the accessibility of the building component to be repaired, and restricted 
costs relating to the repair. All other repairs fall under the housing associa-
tion’s responsibility, with the exception of adaptations and additions made by 
tenants, and defects that are resolved by tenants. The tenant may ask a hous-
ing association to perform small repairs that fall under the tenant’s responsi-
bility (service maintenance). In that case, the housing association is allowed 
to charge the tenant for the costs of making these repairs. In order to stimu-
late housing associations to perform maintenance, the ‘gebrekenregeling’ [ar-
rangements relating to defects] was set up in 1999. This arrangement enables 
a rent committee – that is, an independent arbitration board that is in charge 
of settling disputes between tenants and housing associations – to decide on 
rent decreases in the case of a certain defect. These decreases may amount 
to 20% of the statutory maximum rent. The actual size of the rent decrease is 
dependent on the severity of the defects.
 1.1.5 Purchasing maintenance
This research uses the following general definition of purchasing: ‘obtaining 
from external sources all goods, services, capabilities and knowledge which 
are necessary for running, maintaining and managing the company’s primary 
and support activities at the most favourable conditions’ (Van Weele, 2002: 14). 
A distinction is made between primary purchasing and facility purchasing. 
The purchase of products and services for the benefit of primary processes is 
called primary purchasing. The purchase of the other remaining products and 
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services is called facility purchasing (Jongerius and Lennartz, 2000: 16). Hous-
ing maintenance is part of housing associations’ primary processes of hous-
ing associations, and is therefore considered a primary purchase.
In this research, the term ‘purchasing strategy’ relates to the specific ac-
tions the purchasing function may take to achieve its objectives (Carr and 
Smeltzer, 1997). For example, a management team might decide on a pur-
chasing strategy of establishing long-term relationships with its key suppli-
ers. More specifically, this research focuses on Dutch housing associations’ 
commodity strategies with regard to maintenance services. Handfield et al. 
(2005) define commodity strategy as follows: ‘The term “commodity” is used 
in supply chain management to refer to a general class of purchased items, 
so a commodity strategy covers the specific decisions concerning sources of 
supply, number of suppliers, number of stocking points and relationship with 
suppliers that a company makes concerning any single commodity, staying 
within the boundaries defined by the purchasing strategy.’
Why focus on Dutch housing associations’ commodity strategies relating to 
maintenance? Maintenance and improvement activities are, as in manufactur-
ing environments, often viewed as Maintenance, Repair and Operating services 
(MRO, purchased by an organisation to run its operations), rather than either 
production services (part of the production process for a (set of) product(s)) 
(Jackson, Neidell, and Lunsford, 1995) or component services (Axelsson and 
Wynstra, 2002, see Chapter 7). If maintenance services were to be considered 
component services in commodity strategy development, then this might in-
crease tenant satisfaction with maintenance service delivery.
 1.1.6 Purchasing process
Van Weele (2002) discerns six phases in the purchasing process. The specifica-
tion phase, the selection phase, and the contracting phase together form tac-
tical purchase decisions. The ordering phase, the expediting and evaluation 
phase, and the follow-up and evaluation phase together form the operational 
order function.
The tender process is an important part of tactical purchasing. The tender, 
which is part of the selection phase of the purchasing process, is a procedure 
by which a principal announces that an assignment is to be offered to poten-
tial suppliers. In this procedure, the principal demands that potential suppli-
ers provide a tender, that is, a proposal for service supply. Governments and 
other institutions (such as hospitals) have to publicly justify their expenses, 
and tenders are used for this purpose.
At a certain moment, the registration is closed and the principal selects a 
supplier to undertake the assignment, which is often the tendering firm with 
the lowest tender. This assignment is known as an allocation or allotment. In 
the case of public tenders, relatively large assignments can be involved. In the 
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case of smaller assignments, a restricted number of suppliers are usually in-
vited to submit a quotation (known as a private tender). Sometimes a simple 
invitation will be used to give an assignment directly to a supplier without 
first putting it to tender, and sometimes this will be followed by one-to-one 
negotiations. This is known as a single tender.
It is currently unclear whether European public procurement regulations 
are obligatory for Dutch housing associations.
 1.1.7 The purchasing of maintenance by 
Dutch housing associations
Forms of tendering
Vijverberg (2005) has studied the market shares of the different forms of ten-
dering. In 2004, 89% of Dutch housing associations used multiple private ten-
ders, the most popular form of tender. Of these, 20% put all planned main-
tenance to multiple tenders. 84% of housing associations use single tenders. 
However, not more than 20% of housing associations use a single private ten-
der for more that 50% of the entire load of planned maintenance. According 
to Vijverberg, public tenders are scarcely used by Dutch housing associations. 
Only 9% use public multiple tenders for parts of contracts, and only 3% use 
public multiple tenders for all planned maintenance.
Contracts
When an external party provides service delivery, it enters into a contract 
with the principal after the tender has closed. A wide range contract types is 
in use. Vijverberg (2005) has made an inventory of the use of different main-
tenance contracts. Contracts for breakdown maintenance, which is often re-
active maintenance, are the most frequently used contracts. Almost 75% of 
housing associations use such contracts. All-in contracts, including break-
down maintenance and preventive (often planned) maintenance, are used by 
54% of housing associations. Contracts for preventive maintenance of build-
ing components are used by 42% of housing associations.
Housing associations’ (executive) maintenance
Housing associations’ maintenance departments are responsible for 9% of 
housing associations’ total maintenance expenses. The work of housing asso-
ciations’ own maintenance departments is focused on non-planned mainte-
nance. Maintenance workers employed by housing associations conduct 18% 
of non-planned maintenance, whereas for planned maintenance, this figure 
amounts to only 4% (Vijverberg, 2005).
Why do housing associations choose to retain their own maintenance de-
partments? The following aspects are mentioned (Vijverberg, 2005: 36):
service to tenants (66%);■
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quick intervention is possible (65%);
image/reputation (47%);
flexibility (38%);
costs (15%);
quality (11%);
other (8%).
Most of the aspects listed above are related to the interaction between main-
tenance workers and the end-customer, the tenant. However, when one looks 
at why housing associations choose not to have maintenance departments, 
then one particularly encounters economic reasons (OTB, 2000; OTB, 2002). 
Obviously, housing associations’ maintenance departments appear to be 
more geared to the provision of high-quality services than external suppliers. 
When it comes to developing housing associations’ commodity strategies, it 
is a challenge to get high-quality service delivery for external service supply.
 1.2 Relevance
 1.2.1 Scientific relevance
The research of this thesis is primarily conducted in the discipline of busi-
ness administration. The focus is in particular on purchasing, marketing and 
service management, with the emphasis on the first. This research links busi-
ness administration with construction sciences and housing sciences. In this 
linkage lies the added value of this thesis.
Recent research has focused on purchasing for construction of new build-
ings. As such, it has been driven by both practice (e.g. De Ridder, Van der 
Klauw, and Vrijhoef, 2002; Egan, 1998; Latham, 1994) and by more theoretical 
approaches (e.g. Barrett and Sexton, 1998; Bennett and Jayes, 1995; Cox and 
Townsend, 1998; Edum-Fotwe, Thorpe, and McCaffer, 2001; Franks, 1990; Kelly, 
Morledge, and Wilkinson, 2002; Masterman, 2002; Walker and Hampson, 2003). 
However, attention to purchasing maintenance for existing buildings has 
been rather limited (e.g. Chanter and Swallow, 1996; Jongerius and Lennartz, 
2004; Marsh, 2003; Vijverberg and Straub, 2003; Vijverberg and Straub, 2004; 
Vijverberg, Straub, and Korse, 2003; Wood, 2003; Wordsworth, 2001), and has 
often been of a broad and practice-driven nature. In addition, such research 
has not focused on end-customer preferences relating to maintenance. This 
research aims to develop knowledge regarding end-customer preferences for 
maintenance and how Dutch housing associations’ commodity strategies for 
these services could maximise tenant satisfaction.
In addition to this broad indication of this research’s scientific relevance, each 
chapter has its own particular relevance, which is defined in each of the chapters.
■
■
■
■
■
■
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 1.2.2 Societal relevance
As with those in other European countries, the Dutch social rented sector has 
recently undergone major changes. A number of researchers have analysed 
the (primarily institutional) developments in European social housing (e.g. 
Priemus and Dieleman, 1997; Priemus and Dieleman, 1999; Priemus, Dieleman, 
and Clapham, 1999; Lundqvist, 1992), including:
The increasing orientation of property management towards the market 
demands of tenants and future tenants;
A shift from public responsibility towards privatisation, and increasing in-
dependence with respect to public authorities (financial risks are moving 
from central government to housing organisations, and aside from this, 
many mergers are occurring);
Changing housing markets, from suction to pressure: from a general short-
age to equilibrium, and even an over-supply in sub-markets;
A general decreasing market share for social housing, accompanied by a 
trend towards an increasing concentration of lower-income groups in so-
cial housing (Van Kempen and Priemus, 2002);
The increasing focus on occupants and target groups often leads to an in-
creasing differentiation in housing services, including housing environ-
ment activities (cleaning, greening, and surveillance to promote social 
safety) and various ‘care and cure’ arrangements.
These developments have – or should have – consequences for the organisa-
tion of maintenance management in social housing, including purchasing.
The outcomes of this research may contribute to discussions regarding the 
transition of the construction sector from a one-dimensional orientation to-
wards costs to process and value maximisation. In this transition, new rela-
tionships may have to be developed, which may influence all actors within 
the supply chain. Given the increasing professionalism of housing asso-
ciations and their increasing orientation towards their customers, scientific 
knowledge can facilitate the management of these new relationships for the 
sake of both tenants and citizens. The new needs of housing associations and 
other customers will demand other competences from the construction in-
dustry, as well as a change in tendering and cooperation practices. This may 
reduce opportunities for collusion.
In November 2001, evidence was made public in the Netherlands regard-
ing collusive behaviour, bid-rigging and corrupt practices among construc-
tion companies and civil servants (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2003). 
Many companies within the construction sector had not modified their prac-
tices to the adaptations demanded by the Cartel and Collusion Rules of 1992. 
This led to mass malpractices and, finally, to extensive investigations by the 
Dutch Cabinet, the Department of Justice and the Dutch Competition Author-
■
■
■
■
■
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ity. It also gave rise to a parliamentary inquiry. Lack of product differentia-
tion and one-dimensional, price-oriented competition have been mentioned 
as important drivers for this collusion (Dorée, 2004). This pleads for purchas-
ing methods that do include the non-price dimensions of competition, such 
as quality, speed, and reliability. The Toekomstperspectief bouwsector (EZ, VROM, 
and V&W, 2003) report mentions that being a professional customer, which is 
crucial for successful building projects (including maintenance and improve-
ment), starts with ‘a meticulous and commercial purchasing policy’. Including 
customers’ (in this case, housing associations’) preferences in the purchasing 
of maintenance, instead of only taking cost-related aspects into consideration, 
will add new demand-related dimensions.
In addition to this broad indication of the societal relevance of this re-
search, each chapter has its own particular relevance. This is defined in each 
of the chapters.
 1.3 Problem definition
 1.3.1 The aim of this research
The aim of this research is twofold: (1) to improve our understanding of Dutch 
housing associations’ commodity strategies regarding maintenance services; 
and (2) to provide insights into development opportunities for commodity 
strategies relating to maintenance, enabling housing associations to make 
choices that will increase tenant satisfaction in relation to maintenance.
 1.3.2 Research questions and chapters
The aim of the research will be attained through the formulation of three pri-
mary research questions, which are addressed in Chapters 3-9:
To what extent do the different types and characteristics of maintenance services 
purchased by the Dutch social rented sector influence tenant satisfaction?
To what extent are current Dutch housing associations’ commodity strategies for 
maintenance tenant-focused?
Which commodity strategies facilitate the optimisation of tenant satisfaction with 
maintenance services?
The research questions are elaborated into (sub-)research questions (see Fig-
ure 1.4). The first research question is addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. These 
chapters focus on the important elements for end-customers in maintenance 
service delivery.
The second research question is dealt with in Chapters 3, 4, 7 and 8. Chap-
ters 3, 4 and 8 primarily focus on the nature of the purchasing of mainte-
1.
2.
3.
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nance services by Dutch housing associations. In Chapter 7, research ques-
tions 1 and 2 are both considered, and a connection is made between the two. 
Chapter 9, meanwhile, focuses on the third research question.
A further elaboration of the subjects to be addressed in the chapters can be 
found below.
Chapter 2: Rules of the game, and tools for analysis
This chapter elaborates on the rules of the game of purchasing, as set by the 
characteristics of the maintenance industry and regulatory constraints. Fur-
thermore, we introduce a set of tools of analysis for optimising commodity 
strategies (which are applied in Chapter 9). This chapter was published in an 
adapted form in a Dutch Habiforum report under the title Inkoop van onder-
houd en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007b).
The following three (sub-)research questions are addressed in this chapter:
What effect do the maintenance market’s characteristics have on maintenance pur-
chasing optimisation possibilities from the end-customer’s perspective?
Which new institutional economics concepts and theories are useful for analysing 
and developing coordination mechanisms for the maintenance client-contractor re-
lationship?
What effect do existing procurement regulations and trends in the regulations have 
on maintenance purchasing optimisation possibilities from the end-customer’s per-
spective?
Chapter 3: Purchasing of Dutch housing associations’ technical 
management services: state of the art and a decision framework
This chapter is based on an article that was published in the journal Prop-
erty Management, under the title: Purchasing of Dutch housing associations’ tech-
nical management services (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007a). This chapter aims 
to provide an initial, systematic connection between the special institutional 
environment of the Dutch social housing sector, public tasks for the social 
housing sector, the organisational goals of housing associations, and their 
commodity strategies for technical management services.
Chapter 4: Comparing housing associations with other organisations in the 
public and private sectors: retail and municipality
Social enterprises such as housing associations have characteristics in com-
mon with both the private sector and the public sector. In this chapter, hous-
■
■
■
[  ]
  Most of the chapters were originally written for articles and can thus be read independently. This does influ-
ence the structure of the thesis: the composition of the thesis is not identical to the sequence of the research 
questions and (parts of ) the research sub-questions are dealt with in more than one chapter, and (parts of ) the 
sub-questions may overlap.
Figure 1.4 Overview of chapters and research questions1
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ing associations are compared on the one hand with retail, which is typical 
of the private sector, and on the other hand with municipalities, which be-
long to the public sector. Lessons are drawn that can be used in the optimi-
sation of commodity strategies. The sector comparison is structured through 
key factors that differentiate the environment of the compared supply chains. 
An adapted version of this chapter was also included in the Habiforum report 
Inkoop van onderhoud en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007b).
Chapter 5: The importance of maintenance services for tenants in social 
housing
The delivery of high-quality maintenance stimulates tenant satisfaction. Im-
proving service delivery can lead to higher tenant satisfaction with mainte-
nance. The research question addressed in this chapter is:
Which maintenance services are of primary importance for tenant satisfaction 
with maintenance?
Insights into this relationship can be used to make better decisions when 
prioritising maintenance services from the end-customer perspective. The 
data about end-customer preferences was collected by means of an exten-
sive questionnaire-based survey conducted among the tenants of large Dutch 
housing associations. This chapter is based on a paper written in co-opera-
tion with Sylvia Jansen (OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobil-
ity Studies, Delft University of Technology), which has been submitted to an 
international journal.
Chapter 6: Securing high-performance service delivery
The tenant questionnaire data is used again in this chapter. The focus now 
lies on the determinants of maintenance service quality, instead of mainte-
nance services as such. The contents of the widely-used performance meas-
urement instrument KWH are compared with the perceived importance of 
determinants of maintenance service quality from the end-customer perspec-
tive, as shown by the survey. For this chapter, the research question is:
Which determinants of maintenance service quality are of primary importance for 
tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance, and how can performance measure-
ment of maintenance service delivery in the social rented sector of housing encour-
age tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance?
An adapted version of this chapter will be published in the book Performance 
measurement in the Dutch social rented sector of housing, (edited by Van Mossel, 
Koopman and Straub), to be published by IOS Press.
■
■
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Chapter 7: Securing service quality through component service 
specifications
This chapter focuses specifically on the purchase of downstream services. The 
central objective is to identify the main drivers for end-customer satisfaction 
in a service supply chain. The research question is:
Which determinants of service quality are important for customer satisfaction 
when buying component maintenance services, and to what extent are these taken 
into account in the specification of these services?
Component services, such as maintenance, may have a high impact on end-
customer satisfaction, which should be reflected in the purchase process. 
Document analyses are conducted to find out whether, and how, this is ac-
counted for in the specification. This chapter is based on a paper written with 
Wendy van der Valk (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam/Technische Universiteit 
Eindhoven), which has been submitted to an international journal. Moreover, 
the results of these document analyses are presented in Chapter 8.
Chapter 8: The end-customer focus of maintenance service specifications 
for purchasing
Specifications are a crucial prerequisite for successful service delivery. Speci-
fications determine the service that is delivered and how this corresponds to 
customer preferences. This chapter examines purchasing specifications for 
maintenance, and how these are applied in the social rented sector. An adapt-
ed version of this chapter is also included in the Habiforum report Inkoop van 
onderhoud en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007b).
The research question is:
To what extent do maintenance service specifications cover the service aspects that 
are important to tenants?
Chapter 9: Optimisation of housing associations’ maintenance commodity 
strategies
This chapter considers the possibilities for optimisation of housing asso-
ciations’ commodity strategies with regards to maintenance. End-customer 
satisfaction is taken as the point of departure for the analysis. Commodity 
strategy is described in relation to five pillars: specifications, requirements 
of appropriateness of suppliers, award criteria, the relation between the pur-
chasing organisation and the service supplier, and contract-related incentives. 
As with Chapters 2, 4, and 8, an adapted version of this chapter is included in 
the Habiforum report Inkoop van onderhoud en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel 
and Straub, 2007b).
The research question addressed is the same as research question 3:
Which commodity strategies facilitate the optimisation of tenant satisfaction re-
garding maintenance services?
■
■
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A number of conclusions are drawn in relation to this research question.
Chapter 10: Conclusions and recommendations
This final chapter presents the study’s findings and offers recommendations 
for policy, management and further research.
 1.4 The research environment
The research was conducted at OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and 
Mobility Studies at TU Delft. This is an interfaculty research institute with-
in the University that involves the faculties of Architecture, Civil Engineer-
ing and Geosciences, and Technology, Policy and Management. The research 
formed part of the Delft Centre for Sustainable Urban Areas (SUA), and it 
formed part of the Sustainable Housing Transformations research programme. 
This thesis was prepared under the auspices of the Netherlands Graduate 
School of Urban & Regional Research (NETHUR). It relates to an earlier dis-
sertation on the technical management of social housing, Technisch beheer door 
woningcorporaties in de 21e eeuw – Professioneel, klantgericht en duurzaam [Tech-
nical management by housing associations in the 21st century – Professional, 
client centred and sustainable] (Straub, 2001).
The research was conducted within the framework of the Habiforum pro-
gramme on ‘Innovative Land Use’ (BSIK), and in particular, Corpovenista, a 
project that was carried out between 2004 and 2008. Corpovenista is a joint 
programme between Aedes – the branch organisation of Dutch housing asso-
ciations – a number of large Dutch housing associations, and research groups 
at Utrecht University, the University of Amsterdam and OTB Research Insti-
tute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies. The research formed part of the 
Corpovenista programme 3.6: Performance-based maintenance partnering by 
Dutch housing associations. A specialised steering committee from Corpoven-
ista and SBR (Stichting Bouwresearch) commented on the results during the 
project, which proved to be a valuable opportunity to gain expert appraisal for 
the empirical parts of the thesis (in particular Chapters 2, 4-6, and 7).
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 2 Supply, rules of the game, 
and tools for analysis
 2.1 Introduction
When it comes to options for optimising commodity strategies, the charac-
teristics of the supplying maintenance market are relevant. Housing associa-
tions are dependent on the supply market for important parts of their service 
delivery. The maintenance market characteristics are discussed in Section 2.2. 
Housing associations, however, face a number of possibilities when it comes 
to dealing with problems arising from market imperfections. The tools that 
can be used, particularly those related to the configuration of the client-con-
tractor relationship, are presented in Section 2.3. These tools are applied 
in Chapter 9. In addition, in order to draw on the supply market’s potential, 
housing associations have to take existing procurement regulations into ac-
count.
This chapter has three objectives:
to ascertain the impact of characteristics of the maintenance sector on 
maintenance purchasing;
to present analysis tools for the client-contractor relationship; these tools 
are based on concepts and theories from new institutional economics;
to establish the extent to which European and other procurement regula-
tions affect housing associations’ options for maintenance purchasing.
The following research questions arise from these objectives:
2.1 What effect do the maintenance market’s characteristics have on maintenance 
purchasing optimisation possibilities from the end-customer’s perspective?
2.2 Which new institutional economics notions and theories are useful for analysing 
and developing coordination mechanisms for the maintenance client-contractor 
relationship?
2.3 What effect do existing procurement regulations and trends in the regulations 
have on maintenance purchasing optimisation possibilities from the end-custom-
er’s perspective?
 2.2 Maintenance market characteristics
 2.2.1 Maintenance services
The maintenance market is traditionally divided into multiple sectors. For the 
purpose of characterising the maintenance market, these sectors are taken as 
our point of departure.
The Dutch Economic Institute for the Construction Industry (EIB) recog-
nises the following main groups: installation maintenance, finishing mainte-
nance and structural maintenance. Installation maintenance covers so-called 
plumbing maintenance, involving gas, water, and sanitary work, as well as the 
■
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maintenance of central heating and air conditioning systems, electrical and 
mechanical installations. As plumbing maintenance’s classification as instal-
lation maintenance is confusing, these are presented separately in Table 2.1. 
Finishing maintenance is subdivided into three categories. Paintwork, glass 
repair and wall finishing are in the first category, and are sometimes referred 
to as finishing maintenance. The second category, plastering maintenance, in-
cludes plastering, decorative plastering and wall insulation. The third mainte-
nance category is concerned with activities involving hard materials, such as 
natural stone, screeds, ceramic tiles and terrazzo work. General maintenance 
of building structures is categorised in the structural maintenance group (EIB, 
1998).
Domestic and other cleaning is not covered by the EIB maintenance defini-
tion. Both common parlance and academic usage sometimes class cleaning 
under facility services. The same applies to the maintenance of communal 
greenery.
However, ‘facility maintenance’ is often understood as supporting the pri-
mary process, and this is indeed often the case for non-residential buildings. 
For housing, on the other hand, facility services are provided around dwell-
ings, including the maintenance of communal greenery and paving, and the 
cleaning of shared areas, and these contribute directly to the value delivered 
to the customer. As being more than just a facility, then, it is an actual part of 
the primary process.
This thesis recognises sixteen different maintenance services. The catego-
ries are in line with previous research (Straub, 2001), with modifications made 
in response to recommendations from front- and back office housing asso-
ciation staff and tenants’ comments (respondents in the field research; see 
Chapter 5). The vertical axis in Table 2.1 shows the sixteen maintenance ser-
vices.
The main features of the maintenance sector are discussed without going 
into detail regarding the maintenance services recognised in the survey. It is 
important to note that several services exist within the same sector.
 2.2.2 The maintenance market
Fragmentation and a focus on costs
For the purpose of characterising the maintenance market, we consider the 
five sectors presented in Table 2.1. Structural maintenance, finishing mainte-
nance and plumbing maintenance are subject to considerable fragmentation. 
Although different suppliers usually take on planned maintenance and reac-
tive maintenance, the supplier market structures are comparable.
Many small suppliers operate in the market. These suppliers work not on-
ly for housing associations, but also for hospitals, schools, private individu-
als and companies. Some are specialised, whereas others combine multiple 
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disciplines. The high degree of fragmentation and lack of transparency in the 
market hinder the creation of long-term competitive advantage. Competition 
is mainly on costs and on personal contacts with clients, the latter being a 
condition for involvement in tenders or being awarded private contracts.
The considerable fragmentation is connected with the low entry barriers to 
the sectors, which, in turn, are linked to low levels of investment needed for 
a business start-up. The fact that labour takes a high proportion of the costs 
makes it difficult to achieve economies of scale. The substantial amount of la-
bour in the process and the relative simplicity of the implementation process-
es almost preclude improvements in productivity. Furthermore, each custom-
er has different maintenance requirements, which means that adjustment 
have to be made with every new contract. Certainly in the case of planned 
maintenance, almost every contract is unique, which hampers development 
and the repetition of methods and techniques. Neither may improvements 
in productivity be allowed to detract from service quality, which cannot be 
taken for granted in view of the front office’s major role in service provision 
(many workers are in contact with the residents). Transport costs are another 
relatively important factor in the maintenance process, binding services to a 
particular area, and further hampering economies of scale. Some sectors are 
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Table 2.1 EIB sectors and the sixteen types of maintenance recognised in this survey
Maintenance of
Structural 
maintenance
Finishing 
maintenance
Maintenance of electrical, 
mechanical, air conditioning 
and central heating systems
Plumbing 
maintenance
Other ‘facility 
maintenance’
Heating and water systems ×
Exterior paintwork ×
Communal greenery ×
Hinges and locks of windows 
and external doors 
×
Paving around the apartment 
or house
×
Roofs and gutters ×
Ventilation systems ×
Bathrooms × ×
Toilets × ×
Kitchens × ×
Drains × ×
Lighting in shared areas ×
Cleaning of shared areas ×
Entrance hall, galleries, 
corridors and/or stairs
× ×
Balconies × ×
Lifts ×
Source: EIB, 1998
also affected by cyclical and seasonal fluctuations, which is another obstacle 
to long-term investment. This means that there is no guarantee of continuity, 
forcing companies to keep fixed costs low. Finally, many maintenance compa-
nies are one-person or family businesses, meaning that there are emotional 
exit barriers in addition to purely commercial ones. Many factors thus explain 
the fragmentation of the sector.
Attempts are sometimes made to erect barriers to entry, particularly in 
specialised market sectors. This takes the form of process certification, such 
as that brought in for repairs to concrete (Certificeringsregeling Betonrepara-
tiebedrijven [Concrete Repair Companies’ Certification Arrangement]). Certifi-
cation acts both as a barrier to new entrants and a quality guarantee for cus-
tomers, i.e. housing associations.
With respect to structure, the maintenance sectors for electrical, mechani-
cal, air conditioning and central heating systems are largely comparable with 
those for structural maintenance, finishing maintenance and plumbing main-
tenance. Unlike structural, finishing and plumbing maintenance, however, 
clients’ technical knowledge of electrical, mechanical, air conditioning and 
central heating systems is usually limited. The suppliers involved are also rel-
atively large, in particular for the non-residential building market, which is 
not the focus of this survey.
Lift maintenance has a separate position in the sector. There are few sup-
pliers, and lift systems are often maintained by manufacturers. The use of 
microelectronic components makes it hard or impossible for third parties to 
gain access, which serves to protect the maintenance market.
Opportunities due to new entrants
The increasing popularity of integrated contract forms that link maintenance 
to new construction may open the way for large construction companies to 
enter the maintenance market, particularly for property maintenance. In fu-
ture, this may lead to more opportunities for a combined approach towards 
building elements and maintenance types (reactive maintenance, void repairs 
and planned maintenance). Until now, however, it has normally been the case 
that housing associations have separate departments responsible for con-
struction and maintenance. In addition, reactive maintenance and planned 
maintenance often lie under the responsibility of separate housing associa-
tion departments. In order to successfully integrate the purchasing of new 
construction and maintenance, and different types of maintenance, with the 
goal of improving processes and leading to a more efficient maintenance life 
cycle, some integration must occur between these separate parts of housing 
associations. In addition, few maintenance service suppliers – particularly in 
the finishing and structural maintenance sectors – are as of yet able to con-
duct both planned and reactive maintenance.
In order to optimise purchasing, housing associations must exploit the op-
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portunities offered by the maintenance market. In the next section, tools are 
discussed that can help housing associations to deal with the market charac-
teristics identified in this section.
 2.3 New institutional economics
This section discusses the tools provided by new institutional economics 
for analysing problems and opportunities in the client-contractor relation-
ship. Chapter 9 will describe the application of these tools. The following ap-
proaches will be discussed: the transaction cost approach, the property rights 
approach and the agency approach. Before this, however, we describe the core 
characteristics of new institutional economics.
 2.3.1 Market problems
The risks and uncertainties that accompany the structural characteristics 
of the maintenance sector, as discussed in Section 2.2 above, create several 
imperfections. There are many ways in which the current situation deviates 
from the ideal of full competition. Important examples include:
far fewer buyers than suppliers, such that the buying parties are able to 
influence the price;
a non-homogeneous service is involved;
the market is not transparent: there is a lack of information on the buyers’ 
side (information on possible solutions) and on the suppliers’ side (infor-
mation relating to the building to be maintained).
It would appear that institutions could play a critical role in moving the mar-
ket towards more positive outcomes.
 2.3.2 New institutional economics
The production function lies at the core of neoclassical economics. One part 
of the theory is concerned with the form of this function, while another is 
concerned with the implications of the function’s various forms for several 
economic phenomena. Neoclassical microeconomic theory is concerned with 
the operation of prices and markets. Coase (1937) identified some of the neo-
classical paradigm’s limitations for understanding relationships between 
firms. He argued that in order to understand what a firm does, one must un-
derstand why a firm exists and, therefore, which forces govern the organisa-
tion of economic activity (Hobbs, 1996).
New institutional economics can be thought of as an extension to tradi-
tional neoclassical economics, and microeconomics in particular. New institu-
■
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tional economics may provide explanations for various governance structures, 
in this case between clients and contractors. Importantly, the theory extends 
previous knowledge by incorporating the existence of transaction and infor-
mation costs into the analysis, and providing an explanation for the creation 
of public authorities, firms and institutions. Given the market problems iden-
tified in the previous section, new institutional economics is expected to have 
added value for determining optimal governance structures for maintenance 
service delivery.
The following three approaches can be identified within new institutional 
economics (See e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989; Mol and Verbon, 1993; Tijdink, 1996; Wolters and 
Verhage, 2001; Kim and Mahoney, 2005):
transaction cost theory;
property rights theory;
agency theory.
While each focuses on different problems, all three approaches are rooted in 
Coase (1937)’s original ideas (Hobbs, 1996).
 2.3.3 Transaction cost theory
The key question for transaction cost theory is: how can we choose between 
various methods of distributing resources? A large part of the answer to this 
question has consisted of analysing the conditions under which a hierarchy 
is a better way of coordinating multiple actors than a market (e.g. Williamson, 
1975; 1985). The applied coordination mechanism is expected to influence 
performance and thus, ultimately, tenant satisfaction. It should be noted that 
transaction cost theory, as such, does not focus on explaining performance 
(Kamann et al., 2006). Rather, it asks how transaction characteristics affect 
a transaction’s coordination mechanism. According to Kamann et al. (2006: 
31), ‘Roughly, the idea is that the characteristics of a transaction (…) affect 
the risks associated with a transaction. The risks then determine the way 
in which a transaction will be (or should be) governed. Hence, “governance” 
[the coordination mechanism] refers to the measures actors involved in an 
exchange use or implement in order to mitigate risks and therefore also im-
prove performance.’
Market operation and hierarchy
Economies have two basic mechanisms for coordinating the flow of materials 
and services through the multiple links in the supply chain: those of mar-
kets and hierarchies (see e.g. Williamson, 1975). Markets coordinate the flow 
through the forces of supply and demand, and external transactions between 
various individuals and firms. Market operation determines the design, the 
1.
2.
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price, the quantity and a delivery timetable for a given product (or service), 
which serves as input for a subsequent process the buyer of the product or 
service compares its many possible sources and makes a choice based on the 
best combination of attributes.
Hierarchies, conversely, coordinate the flow of materials and services by 
means of adjacent steps, by monitoring and giving instructions on a higher 
level in the managerial hierarchy. Management decisions, and not the inter-
action that accompanies market operation, determine the design, the price 
(if relevant), the quantity, and the delivery timetable, on which basis products 
and services are acquired in a given step in the supply chain for the next step. 
Buyers in a hierarchy do not select a group of potential suppliers, but work 
with a single, predetermined supplier (Malone et al., 1987).
Market operation and hierarchy: The maintenance market
What does this continuum imply for housing associations and maintenance? 
In an ultimate hierarchy, one of the housing association’s departments would 
conduct the maintenance activities. By contrast, in the ultimate market op-
eration situation, the housing association as a purchasing entity would evalu-
ate the various offers in the market. A hybrid form would apply in the case 
of cooperation between a housing association and a supplier for determining 
the characteristics of the maintenance service delivery.
Transaction cost theory relies on a number of key concepts (see e.g. Hobbs, 
1996): (1) bounded rationality, (2) opportunism, (3) asset specificity, and (4) in-
formation asymmetry.
1. Bounded rationality – Bounded rationality means that although people 
might have every intention of making rational decisions, there is a physical 
limit to their capacity to accurately evaluate all possible decisions (Simon, 
1961). Bounded rationality therefore implies that economic agents do not 
consistently optimise a fixed utility function. This manifests itself in habitual 
behaviour, routines, imitation of others, and short space and time horizons 
(Gelders, 2005).
Bounded rationality: The maintenance market – Maintenance projects can be com-
plex. When different types of activities are combined, such as not only paint-
ing and concrete repair but also planned and reactive maintenance, relatively 
high levels of logistical and technical complexity are involved. The number of 
stakeholders involved is another factor influencing the complexity. The more 
complex the maintenance is, the larger the gap will be between full- and 
bounded rationality.
2. Opportunism – Williamson (1979) defines opportunism as ‘self-interest seek-
ing with guile’. Opportunism harms the other party’s interests, as benefits are 
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created by means of selective or distorted information, or false promises (‘self-
disbelieved promises regarding future conduct’) (Williamson, 1975: 26). Two cir-
cumstances can lead to opportunism: information asymmetry and ‘lock-in’ (de-
pendency on the buying organisation).
Opportunism: The maintenance market – A contractor may exhibit opportunistic 
behaviour by surreptitiously offering suboptimal solutions within or outside 
the conditions of the contract, which may go unnoticed by the buying party. 
This conduct can have a negative impact on service quality, including for the 
end-customer. It can occur either with respect to the design of the solution, or 
its execution (e.g. an inferior choice of materials or application). Opportunistic 
behaviour may also manifest itself on the buying side, for example in the con-
cealing of existing (price) risks.
The presence of opportunistic behaviour has important practical implica-
tions. If there is a high risk of opportunism in a given relationship, consid-
erable resources must be spent on control and monitoring – resources that 
could otherwise be used for more productive purposes. The risk of opportun-
ism can also give rise to high opportunity costs in the form of ‘valuable deals 
that won’t be done’ (Calfee and Rubin, 1993: 164).
‘Lock-in’ occurs when a housing association is dependent on a contractor. 
In this situation, a contractor may use its position to unilaterally determine 
service quality, and therefore clients should avoid becoming dependent on 
suppliers in this way.
In a similar way to companies in other industries, maintenance companies 
may be tempted to behave opportunistically if given the opportunity. Hous-
ing associations thus put a lot of effort into monitoring maintenance service 
delivery.
Wathne and Heide (2000) offer some advice on how to deal with opportun-
ism. They present four ‘governance strategies’ (see Table 2.2), which will be 
discussed further in Chapter 9.
Monitoring relates to the configuration of the relationship (Section 9.4). 
Monitoring in maintenance is predominantly related to proving whether the 
execution or performance of maintenance activities complies with the re-
quirements. Selection is discussed in Section 9.3. This is an important tool 
for investigating whether, and to what extent, potential maintenance ser-
vice suppliers fulfil the necessary requirements and qualities for successfully 
completing maintenance. Socialisation is discussed in Section 9.4. Socialisa-
tion includes housing associations’ efforts to improve the fit between their 
own objectives and those of service suppliers. This tool is currently seldom 
used in the Dutch context. (Contract-related) incentives are discussed in Sec-
tion 9.5. Incentives can be used to stimulate maintenance service suppliers to 
achieve the agreed goals.
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3. Asset specificity – Asset specificity is usually defined as the extent to which 
the investments made to support a particular transaction have a higher value 
to that transaction than they would have if they were to be redeployed for any 
other purpose (McGuinness, 1994). Williamson (1975, 1985, 1986) argues that 
transaction-specific resources are physical and manpower investments that 
cannot be re-used, but are rather specialised and unique to a particular task. 
Williamson (1983) identifies four dimensions of asset specificity:
site specificity, e.g. a natural resource available at a certain location and 
only movable at great cost;
physical asset specificity, e.g. a specialised machine tool or complex com-
puter system designed for a single purpose;
human asset specificity, e.g. highly specialised human skills that arise in a 
‘learning by doing’ manner;
dedicated assets, e.g. a discrete investment in a plant that cannot readily 
be put to work for other purposes.
Malone et al. (1987) make an important addition to the above list:
time specificity: when the asset’s value is highly dependent on its reach-
ing the user within a specified, relatively limited, period of time. For ex-
ample, an input for an industrial process would be time-specific if it had to 
be timed to arrive at a specific point in the manufacturing process in order 
to avoid substantial costs or losses.
■
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Table 2.2 Strategies for managing opportunism
Governance 
strategy General purpose Prerequisites
Primary effects 
on opportunism Second-order effects
Monitoring Reducing information 
asymmetry
Facilitating the 
deployment of 
incentives
•
•
Identification of relevant 
criteria
Implicit or explicit 
contract that legitimises 
monitoring
•
•
Limited to information-
based opportunism
Most effective under 
existing circumstances
•
•
Selection effects•
Incentives Reducing payoffs from 
opportunism
Aligning interests
•
•
Ex ante bargaining power 
(hostages)
Direct costs (price 
premiums)
Information availability
•
•
•
Effectiveness under new 
circumstances is limited 
by range of self-enforcing 
contract
• Hostages as 
productive assets
Quality signal
•
•
Selection Reducing information 
asymmetry
Allowing for 
selfselection
•
•
Relevance of criteria
Imposing selection costs 
on partner
Risk of selfselection 
biases
Information availability 
(reputation)
•
•
•
•
Effectiveness depends 
on relevance of selection 
criteria
• Customer signal•
Socialisation Promoting goal 
convergence
• Completeness of 
socialisation efforts
• Effectiveness depends 
on applicability of role 
across situations
• Customer signal
Selection effects
•
•
Source: Wathne & Heide, 2000, p. 44
An asset’s degree of specificity has an impact on the optimum coordination 
mechanism in a client-contractor relationship. The greater an asset’s specific-
ity, the more plausible a hierarchical coordination mechanism becomes.
Asset specificity: The maintenance market – Asset specificity is involved in many 
areas of housing maintenance. For instance, maintenance solutions and co-
operation processes are specific, as are experiences with and knowledge of 
tenant preferences. In Section 9.4, more attention is given to asset specificity 
in maintenance and the consequences for commodity strategy development.
4. Information asymmetry – Information asymmetry is said to exist if one 
party (e.g. the service supplier) is better informed about aspects of a trans-
action than the other (MacMillan, 1990). Information asymmetry is a form of 
market imperfection that enables a supplier to act opportunistically without 
being detected. Two forms of opportunism are possible in this framework. The 
first is adverse selection. Adverse selection, or ‘anti-selection’ (Akerlof, 1970), 
refers to a situation in which the service supplier has an information advan-
tage regarding an exogenous variable. More specifically, it refers to a situation 
in which it is impossible for the buyer to observe or acquire exhaustive infor-
mation about the characteristics of the service supplier, or of the service to be 
purchased (Gallouj, 1997).
Information asymmetry: The maintenance market – The more complex the re-
quired maintenance solution, the more complex (the design and execution of) 
the maintenance will be. Alternatively, the less information there is regarding 
the pattern of complaints, the more likely it is that adverse selection will oc-
cur. For instance, it might be easier for maintenance companies to estimate 
risks (e.g. the probability of a leaking roof) than for housing associations to do 
so. One either needs experience with the company concerned, or information 
from fellow housing associations (reputation), in order to establish a mainte-
nance company’s capabilities .
Moral hazard refers to the abuse of freedom in a contract or partnership to 
falsify quality, or even to commit downright fraud. Another situation in which 
moral hazard occurs is when contractors set performance estimates higher 
than necessary (for example, when a proposed maintenance solution exceeds 
that which is required), and then subsequently bill in line with the higher lev-
el. Both situations point to the need for specifications and performance re-
quirements to reflect the actually-envisaged performance level. Furthermore, 
is it useful for a housing association to have knowledge about maintenance 
process and the ability to either estimate or assess solutions.
[ 0 ]
 2.3.4 Property rights theory
Property rights theory consistutes another aspect of new institutional eco-
nomics, and addresses the question of how economic actors use various (eco-
nomic) property rights to stimulate certain activities. ‘Property rights’ are de-
fined as the rights to use, to earn income from, and to transfer or exchange 
assets and resources (Libecap, 1989). It may be generally stated – ceteris pari-
bus – that more property rights allow actors to undertake a wider range of ac-
tions, and that the result is more efficiency for society as a whole. Hart (1995) 
emphasises the importance of possession. He concludes that the economic 
advantage of integration (or the assumption of tasks from the other party) de-
rives from the possessing party’s economic incentive for relationship-specific 
investment. This has to do with ‘residual control rights’ over parts of the con-
tract that are not completely specified (‘incomplete contracts’). In other words, 
a firm will receive a bigger surplus share of its relationship-specific invest-
ment, which is an incentive for investments of this kind.
The maintenance market
Following this line of argument, housing associations conducting their own 
maintenance would be the best guarantee for residual control rights. However, 
in many cases, maintenance does not constitute housing associations’ core 
business and they thus choose not to conduct it themselves. When it comes 
to outsourcing maintenance, it might be the case that maintenance service 
suppliers would provide a higher quality service if they were also to benefit 
from it. For this reason, housing associations might consider giving mainte-
nance service suppliers responsibility for, for instance:
designing the solution to the problem, i.e. the maintenance activities in 
combination with responsibility for executing maintenance works;
a sequence of maintenance activities which are dependent on each other; 
by improving the quality of service delivery at an early stage, the efforts of 
maintenance service suppliers in a later stage might be reduced;
tenant satisfaction with maintenance service delivery, including the ac-
companying investments for being able to customise services to individu-
als’ needs.
 2.3.5 Agency theory
An agent relationship can be defined as follows: ‘A contract under which one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to per-
form some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationships are utility 
maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always 
act in the best interest of the principal’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 5).
■
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The theory revolves around solving two problems that can arise in agent 
relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989):
the principal-agent problem that arises when the principal and the agent 
have conflicting wishes or objectives, and when it is difficult or expensive 
for the principal to verify what the agent actually does;
the problem of sharing risks that arises when the principal and the agent 
have different opinions on risk. The problem resides in the fact that the 
principal and the agent will prefer different actions as a result of their dif-
ferent risk preferences.
A specific contribution made by this theory is that information is treated as a 
product, or something that can be traded (Eisenhardt, 1989: 64). Organisations 
may invest in information systems in order to avoid agent problems (oppor-
tunism). Some examples of information systems include supervision, budget-
ing and joint management of a project.
In the standard economic treatment of the principal-agent problem, com-
pensation systems serve the dual function of allocating risks and rewarding 
productive work. A tension between these two functions arises when the 
agent is risk averse, as providing the agent with effective work incentives of-
ten forces him to bear unwanted risk (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Empirical research on agency theory equates effort with performance. 
Christen, Iyer, and Soberman (2006), however, note that effort and perfor-
mance are related, but effort does not guarantee performance (i.e., they are 
distinct concepts). Although the primary outcome for agency theory is perfor-
mance, the theory focuses on controlling the effort required to meet perfor-
mance standards.
The management of effort in the perspective of risk can be categorised by 
outcome-based and behaviour-based contracts (Choi and Liker, 1995; Eisen-
hardt, 1989; Lassar and Kerr, 1996; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). Complete reli-
ance on outcome-based efforts signifies an exclusive concern with bottom-
line results, regardless of how suppliers achieve them (Choi and Liker, 1995). 
Contrary to the concept of outcome that will be discussed in Chapter 7, speci-
fications of outcome-based contracts in the context of this section can be 
activity-based, while performance measurement is related to the outcomes 
of activities. As uncertainty becomes insignificant, an agency theory perspec-
tive supports outcome-based supply risk management efforts as appropriate 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Supply is more efficiently managed without unnecessary 
intervention into supplier operations on the part of the purchasing organisa-
tion (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003).
Contracts that are oriented towards behaviour, and therefore assume be-
haviour-based management, focus on processes, and emphasise tasks and ac-
tivities that lead to reducing risk relating to delivery (Eisenhardt, 1989; Logan, 
2000). This means that the efforts devoted to managing suppliers require sub-
1.
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stantial human and financial resources and close communication in order to 
improve processes, reducing the probability of risk materialisation (Celly and 
Frazier, 1996). Thus, when risks are high, close cooperation between the client 
and the supplier appears to be advisable for sharing and handling these risks.
Agency theory: The maintenance market
Outcome-based contracts (usually in the form of activity-based specifica-
tions) are the contract type most commonly used by Dutch housing associa-
tions. This also applies to cases where there is a significant level of uncer-
tainty, even though theory would suggest the use of behavioural contracts in 
such circumstances.
The manner in which the principal (the housing association) manages its 
relationship with the agent (the maintenance service supplier) affects the ser-
vice outcomes. As tenant satisfaction with maintenance is a service outcome 
and thus an outcome of the principal–agent relationship between the hous-
ing associations and the maintenance service supplier, paying close attention 
to the management of this relationship may result in increased tenant satis-
faction. See Chapter 9 for the application of this theory in the context of this 
research.
 2.4 Procurement customs and regulations
The tendering procedure consists of a client requesting suppliers to submit a 
tender for the performance of a project (based on ACA B&U, 2001). The Neth-
erlands has a long history of tendering rules. A Royal Decree of 1815 made 
public tenders compulsory for the Dutch Government. The purpose of the 
rule, even then, was ‘the efficient management of resources and to oppose 
the corruption of public servants’ (http://www.europeseaanbestedingen.eu, 
04-06-2007).
 2.4.1 The current application of instruments
Most tenders are unique, although many make extensive use of components 
previously developed by the housing association or the external party.
The tenders issued by housing associations are based on several general 
models. The UAV (the Dutch acronym for Uniform Administrative Conditions 
for the Execution of Works [Uniforme Administratieve Voorwaarden], 1989; al-
so referred to as UAV 1989) is a commonly-used resource, which forms the ba-
sis for general terms and conditions. The UAV 1989 is a set of rules that may 
be declared applicable to construction contracts. It was concluded following 
consultations between construction companies and the government. The UAV 
1989 was originally intended to apply to the government alone, but over time, 
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it has grown into a standard set of regulations and has gained almost uni-
versal acceptance across the construction industry, by from the government 
and from private parties. In Chapter 8, attention is given to the contents of 
the general conditions used by Dutch housing associations, which are often 
either based on the UAV or draw heavily upon them.
In addition to such conditions are the specifications, or contract documents, 
which are usually the standard specifications developed by STABU. STABU is a 
foundation based in Ede that publishes and manages the standardised classifi-
cation systems for residential and non-residential construction.
Standards have also been developed for tendering. As mentioned in the 
introduction, single private tendering is the most popular form of tendering 
for planned maintenance (Vijverberg, 2005). Multiple private tendering is less 
popular, and multiple public tendering is rare. Some housing associations 
have internal regulations, including thresholds, for the form of tendering to 
be used. Some housing associations apply the Uniform Tendering Rules (UAR) 
and, more recently, the Tendering Regulations for Works (ARW). The ARW 2005 
came into existence on 1 December 2005, and is a description of procedures 
for applying national and European public tenders (in accordance with the 
Public Contracs (Tendering Rules) Degree (BAO).
There is a conspicuous trend, particularly for larger housing associations, 
towards the creation and impostion of internal procedures. Furthermore, 
sharper internal financial monitoring also appears to be leading to more mul-
tiple tendering. Housing associations appear to be searching for new func-
tional frameworks, and European procurement rules may offer another pos-
sibility for housing associations in this respect.
 2.4.2 European regulations
The first European procurement rules appeared in the early 1970s, with the 
objective of achieving free and fair competition within the European internal 
market.
A number of European Directives apply to procurement. The main objec-
tives of these Directives are (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1999):
the creation of an internal market (the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and people);
the alignment of the legislation of the separate EU member states;
the promotion of free and fair competition within the EU by publishing no-
tices of (envisaged) contracts;
making savings for clients due to a more professional purchasing process.
The European Directive on Public Works Contracts and the European Directive 
on Public Supply Contracts date from 1993. A Directive on Public Service Con-
tracts had been adopted in 1992. The Directives were merged, simplified and 
■
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clarified in 2004 under the European Public Procurement Directive, which has 
been in force in the Netherlands since 1 December 2005. The European Pub-
lic Procurement Directive is Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of pub-
lic works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts. The 
Directive was implemented in the Netherlands in the framework Act for EEC 
regulations and the Public Contracts (Tendering Rules) Decree (BAO) in 2005.
Like the Directives it superseded, Directive 2004/18/EC aims to improve 
transparency in the common market for public procurement, and to prevent 
discriminatory procurement practices on the part of contracting entities in 
the European Union member states. It also intends to enhance market com-
petition. Instruments for achieving transparency include publication obliga-
tions; the prohibition of discrimination between contractors, suppliers and 
service suppliers; and the duty to specify neutrally the requirements for the 
public contract and the contractor, supplier or service supplier (Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken, 2005). The new Procurement Act is expected to come 
into force in the Netherlands in 2008, and will replace the current framework 
Act for EEC regulations. The BAO will serve under the new Procurement Act as 
the Order in Council with which the Directive is implemented in Dutch law. 
The Upper House of the Dutch Parliament debated the legislative proposal in 
November 2006, and further amendments to the legislative proposal cannot 
be ruled out. One of the issues currently being discussed is that of procedures 
for tenders that fall below the threshold, and whether additional thresholds 
with associated tendering procedures should be adopted.
Subject to tendering?
Are housing associations obliged to put (maintenance) contracts to European 
tender? The Netherlands has the following contracting entities, in the legal 
sense of the term:
state: ministries, civil service;
provincial governments;
municipalities;
district water boards;
municipal regulations;
bodies governed by public law.
The answer to the question of whether an organisation is obliged to put con-
tracts out to European tender depends on three criteria, all of which are must 
apply:
the organisation was established for the specific purpose of meeting needs 
relating to the general interest, and not having an industrial or commercial 
character;
the organisation has a legal personality;
■
■
■
■
■
■
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the organisation is financed, for the most part, by the state, or regional or 
local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law. Also covered are 
those organisations subject to management supervision by the state or 
those bodies and organisations with an administrative, managerial or su-
pervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by the 
state or those organisations (http://www.europadecentraal.nl, 04-06-2007b).
These criteria determine whether a housing association is a contracting enti-
ty for the purposes of European procurement Directives. The first two criteria 
are clearly applicable, whereas the applicability of the third criterion is debat-
able. It is open to question whether a housing association is a body governed 
by public law or lies under the control of the state.
Article 70d of the Dutch Housing Act provides for the minister to issue an 
Order in Council instructing that certain acts be performed or omitted (Act 
of 2 December 1999; Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1999 no. 553). The minister 
may also determine that certain acts should be performed only having first 
obtained prior ministerial approval. The minister can even oblige a housing 
association to first have a plan drawn up by the minister (or a person or body 
designated by the minister) before performing acts such as investing in a resi-
dential building project. The supervision involved here is not only retrospec-
tive. If this is the case, then the third (dependency) criterion of a contracting 
entity is also satisfied (Case C-373/00 of 27 February 2003; RO 70).
The Dutch Government does not consider housing associations to be con-
tracting entities, however (http://www.europadecentraal.nl, 04-06-2007b). 
Opinions differ on this point, in view of the relevant European case law in-
volving a judgment by the European Court of Justice. This judgment classed 
French limited companies for social housing (known as Sociétés Anonymes 
d’Habitation à Loyer Modéré, or HLMs) as contracting entities. The European 
Commission’s opinion was that such companies should be viewed as con-
tracting entities within the meaning of the Directive, and consequently sub-
mitted the question to the European Court of Justice. The Court stated in its 
judgment that pursuant to various statutory provisions, the HLM companies 
were subject to governmental management supervision, which put the gov-
ernment in a position to influence the decisions of HLM companies regarding 
public works contracts (De Boer, 2006: 724). Box 2.1 lists a number of signifi-
cant points in the Court judgment that were relevant to establishing the HLM 
as a contracting entity.
As is evident from the articles set out in Box 2.1, it seems that the French 
Government’s supervision of HLMs has a broader scope than the supervision 
exercised on Dutch housing associations. While the French Government inter-
venes in policy making, the Dutch Government maintains a supervisory role. De 
Boer draws the following conclusion: ‘Dutch supervision is mainly repressive 
financial supervision on the management of assets by the housing associations. 
3.
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There is extremely limited, and furthermore completely transparent, use of a 
relatively heavy instrument such as an authority to issue a designation order. 
Only sporadic use is made of the power to approve (the Minister is authorised 
by Art. 43 of the Subsidised Rented Sector (Management) Decree (BBSH) to de-
termine that a corporation may perform certain acts only with prior permission 
from a person or body approved by the Minister).’ De Boer therefore concludes 
that a Dutch housing association cannot be considered to be a contracting en-
tity within the meaning of the Directive. However, different conclusions can 
be drawn. For instance, Koning (2002) concludes that like French HLMs, Dutch 
corporations should be considered to be contracting entities. Other authors are 
also unwilling to rule out a Court of Justice opinion of this kind (e.g. Bregman 
and De Win, 2005; Van Romburgh, 2005). These differences of opinion would ap-
pear to have been prompted by diverging assessments of the (degree of) minis-
terial supervision on housing associations. Should the Court ever deliberate on 
the situation of Dutch housing associations, it is a realistic probability that they 
could be considered to be contracting entities.
In line with conclusions drawn by De Boer (2006: 729), any future increase 
in public control over housing associations, such as compulsory investment 
measures, could lead to an increase in the government’s supervisory role such 
as to enable the government to influence corporations’ decisions. Should this 
influence extend so far that the government is able to control investment de-
cisions, and therefore tenders, Dutch housing associations may be considered 
to be contracting entities in future.
Maintenance
If housing associations are considered to be contracting entities in line with 
the EU Directive, then contracts only have to be put out to ‘European’ tender 
if they are above a certain threshold. The question is then the extent to which 
maintenance jobs reach this threshold.
There are different thresholds for public works, public supply and public 
services. For the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009, the thresh-
old amounts for the central government are 5.15 million euros for public 
works, and 133,000 euros for public services and public supplies. For local gov-
ernment, the thresholds are 5.15 million euros and 206,000 euros, respectively. 
These thresholds are adjusted every two years, and are estimated amounts 
that exclude VAT. If no total sum is indicated in the tender, and the contract 
is continuous or expires after 48 months, then the amount is the monthly fee 
multiplied by 48. If the contract expires within 48 months, the monthly fee 
should be multiplied by the number of months of contract duration.
It is forbidden to split contracts in order to avoid the thresholds.
The contract term plays a role in the correct valuation of a contract. How-
ever, contracting entities are not obliged to enter into a contract for a certain 
minimum or maximum term.
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The key question is whether maintenance constitutes works or a service. 
While the methods of tendering for these categories are largely the same, dif-
ferent thresholds are involved, meaning that a shift in the application of pro-
cedures and regulations may occur.
Drastic or major maintenance, for which there is no longer an element 
of regular management, falls under ‘works’. Maintenance contracts related 
to repairs and the maintenance of machines, vehicles and technical instal-
lations, as well as maintenance activities on buildings in the sense of build-
ing management and cleaning, can be considered to be ‘services’ (Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken, 1999). The Ministry of Economic Affairs confirms 
that routine patching-up of paintwork falls under building management, and 
may therefore be considered to be a service. In other words, regular planned 
maintenance, void repairs and reactive maintenance in the dwelling may all 
be considered to be ‘services’, unlike major maintenance and refurbishment, 
which may be considered to be ‘works’.
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Box 2.1 From: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 1 February 2001. Commission 
of the European Communities versus the French Republic. Failure by a 
Member State to fulfil obligations – Directive 93/37/EEC – Public works 
contracts – Concept of ‘contracting authority’
Article L. 451-1 of the Code provides that low-rent housing bodies are 
to be subject to supervision by the administration. In accordance with 
Article R. 451-1 that supervision is to be carried out by the Minister 
responsible for finance and the Minister responsible for construction 
and housing.
Article L. 451-2 of the Code states that the officials responsible for 
supervising those bodies may, in the exclusive interest of performing 
their supervisory duties, consult any accounts, copy letters and 
documents relating to income and expenditure at the premises of the 
architects or developers who have dealt with bodies subject to that 
supervision.
Article L. 422-7 of the Code states: 
‘In the event of serious irregularities, gross mismanagement or failure to 
act on the part of the administrative board, or of the managerial board 
and the supervisory board, of an HLM or mortgage corporation, the 
Minister responsible for construction and housing may, after hearing the 
observations of the corporation or after the latter has been duly invited 
to submit its observations, order that it be wound up and appoint a 
liquidator.’
In accordance with Article L. 422-8 of the Code, the Minister responsible 
for housing may in such cases merely suspend the managerial organs 
and appoint a provisional administrator, to whom all the powers of 
the managerial organs to continue the operations in progress are 
automatically transferred.
The first paragraph of Article L. 423-1 of the Code provides: 
8�
9�
10�
11�
12�
‘Any low-rent housing body which manages fewer than 1,500 housing 
units and has not built at least 500 housing units or granted 300 loans 
over a 10-year period may be dissolved and a liquidator appointed by 
decree of the Minister responsible for construction and housing or, in 
the case of a public low-rent housing entity or a public development and 
construction entity, by decree adopted jointly by that Minister and the 
Minister of the Interior.’
Article L. 423-2 of the code provides: 
‘Any low-rent housing body which manages more than 50,000 housing 
units may be given formal notice, by decree of the Minister responsible 
for construction and housing, to transfer all or part of the housing units 
in excess of that number to one or more bodies designated by name.’
By Decree No. 93-236 of 22 February 1993 (JORF 24 February 1993, p. 
2941) an interministerial task force for the inspection of social housing 
was set up. Article 3 of that decree provides: 
The task force shall be responsible for supervising natural or legal 
persons involved in social housing. It shall carry out documentary and 
on-the-spot inspections of operations relating to the construction, 
acquisition, or improvement of housing in respect of which financial 
assistance has been provided by the State or State-controlled funds have 
been used, or which form the subject-matter of an agreement with the 
State or are supported by tax-exempt resources. 
[...] 
It may be instructed by the Ministers to whom it is responsible to carry 
out checks and inquiries and also studies, audits or assessments in the 
field of social housing. 
It shall draw up proposals as to the action to be taken following its 
inspection reports and shall ensure that the persons concerned by its 
inspections implement the measures taken by the Ministers to whom it 
is responsible.
13�
14�
Procedures
A contract that is subject to the Directive must be put out to tender through 
one of the procedures mentioned in the Directive. We focus on the most com-
mon procedures:
Open procedure. Any interested economic operator may submit a tender 
under this procedure. Companies submit their selection documents and 
proposal simultaneously.
Restricted procedure. Any economic operator may request to participate in 
this procedure, but only candidates invited by the contracting entity may, 
after a selection procedure, actually submit a tender for a contract.
One can choose whether to go for an open or restricted procedure, and nei-
ther procedure may involve negotiation of prices or other conditions. As stat-
ed, other procedures mentioned in the Directive may only be used in specific 
situations.
If the contract must be put out to European tender, a notice of the envis-
aged contract must be published in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the 
a.
b.
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13�
14�
European Union. To this end, the contracting entity sends the contract notice 
to the Office for Official Publications in Luxembourg. The contract award must 
be published in the Supplement to the Official Journal, and the contracting entity 
must draw up a report for each preselection and contract award.
Framework agreements
The new Directive defines a framework agreement as: ‘an agreement be-
tween one or more contracting authorities and one or more economic opera-
tors, the purpose of which is to establish the terms governing contracts to be 
awarded during a given period, in particular with regard to price and, where 
appropriate, the quantity envisaged’ (European Union, 2004). In other words, 
a framework agreement is a general term covering agreements between pub-
lic authorities and contractors for the award of contracts for a given period 
in accordance with documented conditions and prices. The framework forms 
the basis for later contracts involving the participating parties (http://www.
europadecentraal.nl, 04-06-2007a). Framework agreements facilitate bundled 
purchasing, do not imply compulsory sourcing (which is useful if the price-
quality ratio fails to meet expectations) and reduce the administrative burden. 
This certainly applies to European procurement, by allowing orders to be con-
cluded without having to repeatedly follow the full procedure.
A framework agreement is drawn up based on an estimate of whether the 
European threshold will be exceeded, taking into account the total lifetime 
of the framework agreement, and the total estimated value of envisaged con-
tracts under that agreement. If the framework agreement itself is not pub-
lished, the applicability of the threshold must be ascertained for each individ-
ual contract. The least cumbersome option is therefore usually to publish the 
framework agreement itself. Regarding the lifetime of the agreement, a con-
tracting entity should know that: ‘The term of a framework agreement may 
not exceed four years, save in exceptional cases duly justified, in particular by 
the subject of the framework agreement’ (European Union, 2004).
Selection and award
The exclusion of economic operators may be justified by matters including 
involuntary liquidation, grave professional misconduct, and violations of en-
vironmental law and of noncompliance with social legislation. For example, it 
will be investigated whether an economic operator has been found guilty of 
the offences of participation in a criminal organisation, fraud, or money laun-
dering (European Union, 2004).
Contracting entities use selection criteria to verify the suitability of eco-
nomic operators pursuant to economic and financial capacity, and techni-
cal and/or professional capability. Technical capability may be proven on 
the basis of past results, information regarding capacity for executing qual-
ity control or other quality assurance measures, academic and professional 
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qualifications held by the service supplier, capacity in terms of manpower or 
technical plants, tools and equipment, an indication of the proportion of the 
contract that the service supplier may intend to subcontract, and certificates.
The award of a contract may be based on the following criteria (European 
Union, 2004: 134):
either, when the award is made to the tender most economically advanta-
geous from the point of view of the contracting authority, various criteria 
linked to the subject-matter of the public contract in question, in addition 
to the price. These can include quality, technical merit, aesthetic and func-
tional characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs, cost-
effectiveness, after-sales service and technical assistance, delivery date 
and delivery period or period of completion;
or the lowest price only.
For an award on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender, the 
contracting entity must specify the relative weighting it gives to each of the 
criteria chosen. Furthermore, where, in the opinion of the contracting author-
ity, weighting is not possible for demonstrable reasons, these criteria are ap-
plicable in descending order of importance.
There is a mandatory 15-day ‘standstill’ period after the award before 
negotiations can start, so as to allow for any legal challenge to the contract 
award. The contracting entity has no discretion when it comes to which ten-
derer will be awarded the contract. Its freedom is restricted to concluding a 
contract with the party that, on the basis of award criteria stated by the con-
tracting entity, submits either the most economically advantageous tender, or 
the lowest price.
In Chapter 3 and ultimately in Chapter 9, attention will be given to the as-
sessments regarding the use of selection and award criteria, as well as con-
tract-related incentives and specifications.
 2.4.3 Application
Housing associations and the Dutch government do not currently consider 
European procurement rules to be applicable to Dutch housing associations. 
Should public control over housing associations ever increase, the Directives 
may be declared applicable. The Directives represent both a threat and an op-
portunity for Dutch housing associations.
One of the most frequently cited disadvantages of European procurement 
rules is the substantial administrative burden that they entail. This burden 
can be reduced by means of using electronic aids, e.g. Tendernet. In addition, 
when European tendering regulations are applicable, housing associations 
cannot spontaneously award contracts to existing partners. In order to get the 
desired supplier, or better, the supplier with the desired qualities, the choice 
a.
b.
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of selection and award criteria is crucial. Principals applying European ten-
dering regulations may choose applicable award criteria, as long as they are 
explicit and clear about them. Framework contracts can be agreed for a pe-
riod of four years, and this period may be extended if stated beforehand. This 
might be interesting when a supplier’s experience (including the costs associ-
ated with re-tendering) proves to be more advantageous than the advantages 
offered by the competitive functioning of the market.
The regulations do not, therefore, have to be an obstruction when it comes 
to optimising commodity strategies. European procurement procedures de-
mand specific sequences and set out process requirements, and even help 
to streamline housing associations’ purchasing processes. In this sense, they 
may present opportunities where the contract is awarded on the basis of the 
most economically advantageous tender. More attention might be given to 
the definition of the desired delivery. Moreover, professionalisation of the re-
lationship between the principal and the supplier might occur, including the 
introduction of more objective selection and evaluation procedures.
As European tendering regulations would appear not to hinder the optimi-
sation of maintenance commodity strategies, then we can turn out primary 
attention to possibilities for optimising commodity strategies. In other words, 
how can the client-contractor relationship be optimised in order to maximise 
tenant satisfaction?
 2.5 Conclusions
This chapter covered three issues related to maintenance purchasing: the 
maintenance market, procurement regulation, and theoretical tools for opti-
mising the client-contractor relationship. The research questions that were 
presented at the start of the chapter will now be answered in turn.
Maintenance market
The first research question was: what effect do the maintenance market’s 
characteristics have on maintenance purchasing optimisation possibilities 
from the end-customer’s perspective?
The maintenance market is fragmented, which has the following implica-
tions for the relationship with the end-customer.
It is difficult to combine efforts on different aspects of building, making 
it more likely that tenants will be inconvenienced by maintenance. More 
agreements are needed, and the probability of duplicated activities and 
suboptimal technical coordination is higher. In other words, the market 
structure precludes possible synergy benefits.
It is difficult to combine different types of maintenance: planned main-
tenance, maintenance in response to requested repairs and maintenance 
■
■
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following a change of tenant. This has the same disadvantages as listed 
above.
The capacity to initiate developments that would benefit tenants is limited, 
due to the lack of resources that is, in part, attributable to tight margins.
As this answer makes clear, the maintenance market does not enjoy perfect 
competition, in the sense of transparency, homogeneous products and zero 
transaction costs. Insights from new institutional economics might shed 
some light on how to deal with these deficiencies and optimise outcomes.
New institutional economics
The second research question posed in this chapter was: which new institu-
tional economics notions and theories are useful for analysing and developing 
coordination mechanisms for the maintenance client-contractor relationship?
The neoclassical individual is assumed to be hindered neither by a lack of 
information nor by a finite capacity to process information. The absence of 
an information problem means there are no costs involved in entering into 
and performing transactions. In theory, the operation of the market should 
lead to a Pareto-efficient outcome. In other words, no one would prosper un-
less someone else suffered. This theory rests on a number of assumptions: 
the market would have to be perfect, with complete competition, complete 
information for all, no barriers to entry and exit, no transaction costs, and 
homogeneous products.
Transaction cost theory, which is considered to be part of new institutional 
economics, suggests the following issues that may arise in the client-contrac-
tor relationship and may affect on tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance.
Bounded rationality, which manifests itself in automatism and risk-averse 
behaviour regarding tenders: imitation, incomplete (complex) contractual 
documents, and incomplete procedures.
Opportunism, with a possible impact on the quality of service, the use of 
substantial resources for management and supervision, and opportunity 
costs. Solutions for opportunism may come from monitoring, incentives, 
selection and socialisation.
Asset specificity. Asset specificity crops up in the maintenance of homes in 
many ways, relating to the uniqueness of buildings, projects, maintenance 
solutions, and tenants.
Information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is a form of market im-
perfection that enables a supplier to act opportunistically without being 
detected, which can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard, with a 
negative impact on services.
Although transaction cost theory does not focus on explaining performance 
as such (which would be in line with the focus of this thesis), it does ask how 
■
■
■
■
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transaction characteristics affect a transaction’s coordination mechanism. 
The characteristics of a transaction affect the risks associated with a trans-
action. The risks then determine the way in which a transaction will be (or 
should be) governed in order to improve performance (Kamann et al., 2006).
Property rights theory states that an actor endowed with more property 
rights will take a broader view when making decisions, which will lead to 
higher efficiency for society as a whole. A contractor may gain a greater sense 
of responsibility by acquiring property rights regarding a maintenance solu-
tion, say, which could have a positive impact on the quality of the services. 
This responsibility could be transferred to contractors via the use of output 
specifications, for instance.
From agency theory, it can be learned that contracts that are oriented to-
wards behaviour, and therefore assume behaviour-based management, fo-
cus on processes, and emphasise tasks and activities that lead to reduction 
of risk on delivery (Eisenhardt, 1989; Logan, 2000). Maintenance jobs that in-
volve considerable risks, therefore, would be best managed by using behav-
iour-based contract. As uncertainty becomes less significant, agency theory 
supports outcome-based supply risk management efforts as appropriate.
Insights from new institutional economics appear to be useful in analysing 
and developing coordination mechanisms for the maintenance client-con-
tractor relationship. Chapter 9 discusses the opportunities presented by ap-
plying these tools for optimising maintenance purchasing from the tenant’s 
perspective.
Procurement customs and regulation
In order to optimise purchasing, housing associations must exploit the op-
portunities offered by the maintenance market. Procurement regulation can 
help housing associations in this regard, but may also bring a number of dis-
advantages. The third research question posed in this chapter was: what ef-
fect do existing procurement regulations and trends in regulations have on 
maintenance purchasing optimisation possibilities from the end-customer’s 
perspective?
So long as there is no case law on European procurement regulations per-
taining to Dutch housing associations, there will be no certainty regarding 
whether housing associations are obliged to apply these regulations. Opting 
not to apply these regulations therefore continues to pose a risk. On the other 
hand, applying the regulations brings the disadvantage of a considerable ad-
ministrative burden. Application brings benefits as well, however. It ensures 
that the most suitable party is selected fairly and justifiably by means of a 
transparent and competitive procedure. This allows the market to operate the 
best quality supplier to be selected at the best price. Tendering at the national 
level can likewise produce such benefits. The choice of appropriate selection 
criteria and award criteria is essential to the success of the process.
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At any rate, there appears to be some need for public monitoring and trans-
parency regarding investment in public services. Unlike activities performed 
in a competitive setting, there is limited incentive for efficient investment in 
this area. Nonetheless, public, and in particular European, procurement rules 
are not currently applied, and the actual level of transparency is thus limited. 
Many housing associations currently put out single and private maintenance 
tenders, which would appear to inhibit the operation of the market. Housing 
associations are missing opportunities to find better service suppliers as a re-
sult.
This chapter was published in an adapted form in a Dutch Habiforum report under the 
title Inkoop van onderhoud en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007).
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 3 The purchasing of Dutch 
housing associations’ 
maintenance services: 
state of the art and a 
decision framework
 3.1 Introduction
The Dutch social rented sector consists almost entirely of housing associa-
tions. These are private organisations, functioning within the public frame-
work of the Housing Act. This Housing Act defines the scope of housing as-
sociations’ activities. In short, the housing associations’ domain is defined as 
‘housing, housing services, and the social environment of housing’ (Ministe-
rie van VROM, 2000). Housing associations are responsible for their own ef-
ficiency and effectiveness, and for their position within this defined domain. 
The organisational goals of housing associations are more or less directed to 
fulfilling public tasks. By far the most important assets of housing associa-
tions for attaining their strategic goals are their dwellings, for which technical 
management maintenance is essential: the housing stock is ageing fast, and 
has to fulfil the current needs of several target groups (Straub and Vijverberg, 
2004). Maintenance therefore plays an important role in realising housing as-
sociations’ strategic targets.
The purchasing of maintenance services currently receives continuous at-
tention within the social rented sector, thanks to interesting developments 
such as e-reversed auctions, performance-based cooperation between hous-
ing associations and technical management contractors, and developments 
concerning European tendering procedures. However, although purchasing 
tools have been developed, a systematic connection between the policy aims 
of housing associations and their purchasing practice is still lacking.
Concurrently, a business planning process leading to the identification of 
required maintenance activities is already being applied by housing associa-
tions, or has at least been developed (see e.g. Gruis and Nieboer, 2004b). The 
performance aims of the housing stock and the subsequent planning and 
management of maintenance services can be derived from a strategic portfo-
lio policy, which is adapted to the particular circumstances of the housing as-
sociation and its environment. This is known as the maintenance strategy of 
a housing association (Straub, 2002). As a result of the policy formulation and 
the budgeting process, maintenance or improvement activities are planned 
and carried out. Thus, while a systematic link exists between the housing as-
sociations’ aims and the planning of maintenance services, a similar link is 
still lacking for the purchasing of these services. In this chapter, this link is 
investigated. We take into consideration both the influence of maintenance 
services on the performance of housing associations, and the particularities 
of maintenance services.
First, attention is paid to current Dutch maintenance practices. After this, 
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consideration is given to the purchasing of maintenance. Information is de-
rived from interviews with purchasers, technical managers, and Dutch hous-
ing associations’ strategic managers, and from expert meetings with purchas-
ers, and directors and managers of maintenance companies. Furthermore, a 
recent survey of the Dutch social rented sector (Straub, 2004; Vijverberg, 2004; 
Vijverberg 2005) provides us with valuable data. Based on this ‘state of the 
art’, and an overview of housing associations’ institutional environment and 
the strategic focus that fits this, recommendations are made with regard to 
purchasing goals. A framework is used to present connections between the 
strategic focus of housing associations and purchasing goals. The framework, 
which has been created to fit the particular context of Dutch housing associa-
tions, could easily be extended to similar purchasing situations involving so-
cial enterprises in their capacity as private organisations undertaking public 
tasks.
 3.2 Maintenance in Dutch practice
In many cases, the maintenance plans of Dutch housing associations are 
derived their strategic portfolio policies, or strategic housing policies. In the 
strategic portfolio policy, ‘the housing association constructs a picture of the 
composition of the desirable dwelling portfolio and sets up market strate-
gies for product lines, e.g. invest in growth or divest’ (Straub, 2002). 71% of the 
Dutch housing associations have such plans, and for 91% of these, the stra-
tegic portfolio policy is derived from a written mission and quantified goals 
(Vijverberg, 2005). Housing associations indicate that market perspective and 
lettability, together with the residential quality of dwellings, are the most de-
cisive factors for determining the strategic portfolio policy (Straub, 2004).
The organisational types of maintenance (planned maintenance, reactive 
maintenance, void repairs, and service maintenance) have already been intro-
duced in Sub-Section 1.1.4. The whole range of maintenance services consists 
of maintenance of compound building components, maintenance of installa-
tions and maintenance of surrounding grounds of buildings. Table 3.1 offers 
some examples of these types.
The success of maintenance objectives is usually gauged by customer sat-
isfaction measurements, whether these result from investigations by local 
employees or from intuition. Although the main target group of housing as-
sociations does not have the financial strength to justify an upmarket quality 
policy, there still seems to be space for improving the fit between the services 
of the housing association and the needs of its customers and other stake-
holders.
Not all maintenance is realised by external service suppliers. Housing as-
sociations’ in-house maintenance departments account for 9% of total main-
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tenance expenditure in the Netherlands. For planned maintenance, this 
amounts to only 4% (Aedes, 2003; see Sub-Section 1.1.2). The purchasing of 
maintenance concerns maintenance realised by external service suppliers.
 3.3 The purchasing of maintenance 
in Dutch practice
The purchasing function – that is, the way purchasing is organised – is still in 
its infancy in Dutch housing associations. One can distinguish between two 
types of maintenance services purchasers, the technical manager and the 
purchaser.
The first type is usually an engineer, who has progressed from a techni-
cal background to a position where he or she can make decisions regarding 
the purchasing of maintenance. The purchaser-type can be either a generic 
purchaser of all kinds of goods and services, from lease-cars to pencils, or 
someone who is purely responsible for purchasing maintenance services. In 
any case, the purchasing function is usually not yet a board-level role within 
housing associations. However, housing associations are heavily dependent 
on their suppliers for the realisation of their goals. Purchasing, whether un-
dertaken by purchasers, technical managers, or both, forms the key interface 
with suppliers. Despite this, purchasing is often perceived as an operational 
function that only has to realise what is stated in the maintenance strategy 
of a housing association. This can hamper bottom-up control or the informa-
tion supply, leading to inefficiencies and even ineffectiveness.
The purchasing process (see Figure 3.1) usually starts with the specifica-
tion of the works, after which the supplier selection follows.
Increasingly, maintenance contractors are invited to add knowledge to the 
process of specification for a fee. However, these advising contractors do not 
necessarily have to also realise works. Specialised consultants provide alter-
natives to maintenance contractors giving advice on specifications. This con-
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Table 3.1 Classification of different types of maintenance services
Maintenance on (compound)  
building components Maintenance of installations
Maintenance on surrounding 
grounds of buildings
Exterior paintwork
Roofs and gutters
Entrance hall, gallery, corridors  
and/or stairs
Balconies
Kitchens
Bathrooms
Toilets
Drains
Hinges and locks of windows  
and external doors
Cleaning of shared areas
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Lifts
Heating and water systems
Ventilation systems
Lighting in shared areas
•
•
•
•
Paving around the building
Communal greenery
•
•
trasts with the old practice of drawing up a specification purely on the own 
insights of purchasers, aided by material and installation manufacturers if so 
desired. The most far-reaching current method is to make a specification en-
tirely consisting of output requirements, leaving the maintenance contractor 
to decide on the working methods. Since maintenance contractors are spe-
cialised in precisely this area, housing associations are expected to increas-
ingly use this menthod in future.
The majority of maintenance projects are procured through both private 
tendering (89% of housing associations use this method) and direct, one-to-
one contracting (84% of Dutch housing associations use this method ) (Vijver-
berg, 2005). European legislation on public tendering is not yet obligatory for 
Dutch housing associations (see Section 2.3), meaning that this type of ten-
dering is rarely used. The actual tender is usually conducted with parties that 
have already been already selected in a pre-selection process. This pre-selec-
tion is essential to separate the ‘sheep from the goats’, and to recognise po-
tential business partners. Usually the pre-selection is not tied to one project, 
but to a certain commodity, such as exterior paintwork. The pre-selection re-
sults in a distinction between a ‘white list’ and a ‘black list’ of contractors. 
Black-list contractors are those that have, in the past, failed to meet hous-
ing associations’ requirements. When pre-selecting contractors, in addition 
to product and process aspects, evaluation of their financial stability (e.g. the 
contractor’s solvency and liquidity) is important. Furthermore, common se-
lection criteria are directed at the contractor’s integrity. In addition, the use 
of quality, management, safety, and environmental systems (e.g. ISO 9000 and 
14000) provides information about suppliers’ standards. References from col-
leagues and purchasers’ own experiences are also very common when deter-
mining the suitability of suppliers. ‘Progressive’ customers also consider is-
sues such as innovative ability, added value in the longer run, environmental 
aspects, the dependability of the supplier on the customer, and the position 
of the supplier in the supply chain. Still, until now, there are no known ex-
amples of housing associations distinguishing between supplier selection cri-
teria that are used for services directed at different types of end-customers, 
or even selection criteria based on end-customer perceptions regarding the 
different maintenance services.
According to a study by EIB (1998), for housing associations, the quality of 
work is almost always the most important reason for choosing a particular 
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maintenance service supplier. The proposed price takes in second place, fol-
lowed by service. Service is defined here as the service provided by the con-
tractor and the extent to which the circumstances of the owner and users are 
taken into account.
Tendering procedures for building new houses and for building mainte-
nance are usually assessed in a comparable way. Performance criteria are di-
rected towards complicance with specifications, at the lowest possible price. 
This means that much attention is given to the price and quality of a prod-
uct and logistic processes. However, in contrast to building activities for new 
houses, most maintenance activities directly add to tenant satisfaction. The 
activities are often carried out in the presence of tenants, or other customers. 
Usually, the contractor who performs the works against the lowest price, or 
against the economically most advantageous offer, is allowed to perform the 
maintenance services.
Regardless of the generalities in the different types of maintenance with re-
spect to the specification and selection phases, differences do exist in the con-
tracting and ordering phases of purchasing. The most common and influential 
differences in the contracting and ordering stage are presented in Figure 3.2.
Two types of contracts can be identified: project-based contracts and pro-
cess-based contracts. The first is applied to planned maintenance of building 
components. Traditionally, planned maintenance is put out to tender for the 
duration of one maintenance cycle or project. It is expected, however, that 
there will be more partnership contracts in future, in the form of performance-
based maintenance contracts (Straub and Van Mossel, 2005). These contracts 
cover more than one maintenance project. In addition to the longer-term fi-
nancial advantages that are attributed to this type of contract, another advan-
tage of this type of contracting, which is based on functional requirements, 
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is that the contractors may have the chance to acquire in-depth knowledge 
about housing associations’ customers. These customers are the recipients of 
the maintenance services, and contractors can use this knowledge to improve 
services to these customers. In other words, performance-based contracts go 
beyond individual projects. In addition to performance-based contracts for 
planned maintenance of building components, performance-based contracts 
also exist for maintenance of installations. Unlike contracts for building com-
ponents, these are process-based contracts. The impact of using performance-
based contracts for installations is thus restricted to a move to output specifi-
cations and to a possible lengthening of contract duration.
As presented in Figure 3.2, all of the different types of maintenance of most 
building components are procured separately. Different suppliers are thus 
usually used for these different types as a result. For planned and reactive 
maintenance at installations, the different types of maintenance are often 
covered in one contract, with one supplier. Despite this, different suppliers 
normally are used for different parts of the country.
 3.4 Supplier selection
Purchasing has long been thought of as the management of inputs, i.e. raw 
materials, services, and sub-assemblies, into an organisation (Burt and Sou-
kup, 1985; Dobler and Burt, 1990; Farmer, 1985). However, firms are increas-
ingly moving away from managing the inward flow of goods and services, and 
moving towards the management of the supply process. Supply management 
is therefore concerned with the flow of goods and services through an or-
ganisation, with the aim of making the firm more competitive (Cousins and 
Spekman, 2003). In other words, supply management enables companies to 
improve their position in terms of costs or in terms of differentiation towards 
customers, which enables them to gain higher profits than their competitors 
(Porter, 1985). As Dutch housing associations are not just for-profit compa-
nies, but are private organisations with public tasks, these competition aims 
cannot be easily replicated. On the other hand, public bodies are often driven 
by budget constraints and formal rules and regulations (see e.g. Thai, 2001). 
These public purchasing aims and practices, however, are not sufficient for 
these private organisations either. This leads to the conclusion that appropri-
ate purchasing aims for housing associations have to be adapted to the par-
ticular circumstances of these organisations and their sector, and the charac-
teristics of maintenance services.
Purchasing aims can be further elaborated in the commodity strategy. 
Handfield et al., (2005) define ‘commodity strategy’ as follows: ‘The term “com-
modity” is used in supply chain management to refer to a general class of 
purchased items, so a commodity strategy is the specific decisions concern-
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ing sources of supply, number of suppliers, number of stocking points and 
relationship with suppliers that a company makes concerning any single 
commodity, while staying within the boundaries defined by the purchasing 
strategy’. For supplier selection and specification, which are important com-
ponents of this commodity strategy, this means that criteria and measure-
ment should be adapted to the purchased item. An important distinction in 
this context is between project-based contracts and process-based contracts. 
For project-based contracts, the contact between the supplier and the cus-
tomer is concentrated at regular intervals. For process-based contacts, there 
is no such concentration. Suppliers who are to be selected to perform services 
must be able to deal with these circumstances, in terms of logistics, for exam-
ple, or contact with tenants.
Dickson’s (1966) initial work in the area of supplier selection concludes that 
cost, quality, and delivery performance are the three most important criteria 
that need to be considered for supplier selection. It can be argued that it is ex-
tremely difficult for any vendor to excel in all performance dimensions (Verma 
and Pullman, 1998), implying that some choices must be made when prioritis-
ing supplier selection/evaluation criteria. Criteria should be adapted to the pur-
pose of a purchase and its implication for the organisation’s aims (in this case, 
those of the housing association). For housing associations, these aims are de-
rived from public aims that are applicable to the entire social housing sector.
 3.5 The social rented sector in the 
Dutch housing market
All markets and industries have their own characteristics. For social hous-
ing, in order to respond to volatile house prices and an inadequate supply of 
housing following the Second World War, many western European countries 
developed governmental control systems, including rent regulation and prop-
erty subsidies. During the last decades, the government effectively retreated 
from the housing market in those countries. This usually meant reduced fi-
nancial support for the social rented sector. In the Netherlands, no generic 
object subsidies have been granted for the building of social rented housing 
since 1995, and income-related subsidies have become the main form of gov-
ernment support (Priemus and Boelhouwer, 1999). Dutch housing associations 
are private organisations that combine public tasks with market activities. 
These public tasks mainly concern the supply of affordable housing and a 
liveable environment to certain target groups (see Chapter 4 for a description 
of the position of these target tenants). Housing associations have to use their 
own capital to finance the maintenance and renovation of existing housing, 
and they have to find funding for new construction on the capital market (Van 
Kempen and Priemus, 2002).
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Despite ex-ante regulation and supervision via the Social Housing Man-
agement Order (BBSH) and the Housing Act, Dutch housing associations are 
responsible for their own strategies. Their aims are not necessarily those that 
might be project on them from a public perspective. A market orientation 
could lead to housing associations being more effective and efficient in realis-
ing their strategies. Gruis and Nieboer (2004a: 187) define market orientation 
as follows: ‘Market orientation can be set against the traditional, task-orient-
ed approach that many social landlords have followed – and still follow – in 
which they focus solely on the production and management of cheap and de-
cent dwellings, with only a limited differentiation in rents, tenure and target 
groups, and often without attuning these factors to each other.’ Still, Dutch 
housing associations are restricted in their objectives. Financial possibilities 
set the preconditions for housing associations’ public and/or social activities. 
Housing associations are social enterprises without shareholders and the lat-
ters’ with financial objectives. A certain degree of control over these organisa-
tions is a matter of public interest. This control should focus on the two roles 
played by housing associations (e.g. Conijn, 2004):
The role of real estate investor, by which revenues are earned with real es-
tate; and
The role of performing public and social functions, which are often not 
cost-effective.
The interpretation of these roles has many implications for of the focus of 
maintenance and how it is purchased. In short, housing associations can 
strive to perform a mix of social and economic functions within current regu-
latory boundaries.
 3.6 Maintenance services as the 
means to fulfil tasks
Maintenance services are important means of fulfilling the functions that 
arise from the dual roles of housing associations. (1) Maintenance influences 
the quality of real estate and, by extension, its market value. On the other 
hand, procuring these services means costs. (2) Concurrently, maintenance 
services can help to achieve public and social functions by improving hous-
ing quality and by providing a customer-friendly service to tenants and other 
customers. As the way of procuring these maintenance services affects both 
price and service quality, choices that are made regarding the purchasing of 
maintenance services can help the social enterprise to achieve its aims.
In general, the main purpose of maintaining buildings (Seeley, 1987) in-
cludes:
retaining the value of an investment;
1.
2.
1.
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maintaining the building in a condition in which it continues to fulfil its 
function; and
presenting a good appearance.
These purposes fit perfectly with the three public tasks regarding mainte-
nance services. Given this perspective, Al-Zubaidi (1997: 174) adds: ‘These 
[purposes] all apply [as well] to varying degrees to hospital buildings, but 
there is a particular ordering priority with hospital buildings.’ The same ap-
plies to maintenance services for housing associations’ dwellings. Moreover, 
each housing association has to identify its own focus. The housing asso-
ciation that perceives itself to be a social real estate investor will look upon 
maintenance as adding to the value of its real estate. On the other hand, the 
housing association that considers itself to have a social identity will perceive 
maintenance as something that contributes to the housing service provided 
to residents. A third possibility is the housing association that fulfils its so-
cial tasks relating to maintenance in terms of its contribution to a neighbour-
hood’s ‘liveability’. Naturally, combinations of all three are possible.
With regard to maintenance, in fulfilling these tasks, housing associations 
are dependent on their service suppliers, maintenance contractors. These 
suppliers’ contributions cannot be realised unless purchasing, the key inter-
face, participates fully in corporate planning and strategy formulation. Pur-
chasing should therefore play a central role in corporate strategic success, 
through the selection and development of suppliers that support a housing 
association’s long-term strategy.
 3.7 A framework for purchasing
In contrast to the building of new housing, purchasing of maintenance servic-
es demands attention to aspects such as customer-friendliness, communica-
tion with residents, flexibility towards residents, and the cleanliness of both 
workers and the workplace. Thus, the extent to which maintenance activities 
have an impact on residential satisfaction differs from the impact of build-
ing new houses. In addition, many differences exist with respect to residen-
tial satisfaction relating to diverse maintenance activities, such as paintwork, 
planned or reactive lift maintenance, and roofing maintenance. This issue will 
be explored further in Chapter 5.
As suggested above, dwellings owned by housing associations have a num-
ber of core functions: providing housing services to tenants, contributing to 
liveability in a neighbourhood, and providing financial revenues to housing 
associations through cost-effective exploitation of real estate and value-en-
hancing maintenance solutions. Each building component contributes to 
these functions to a different extent. Maintenance services relating to each 
2.
3.
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of these components and the customers ‘using’ these components thus also 
contribute to these functions:
revenues on real estate;
residential satisfaction;
liveability of the neighbourhood.
1.	 Revenues	on	real	estate
Revenues can be earned through making maintenance choices that increase 
the market value of real estate, and through cost-effective purchasing of 
maintenance (e.g. using the principles of Total Costs of Ownership, TCO). Ap-
propriate maintenance work has the potential to lengthen the service life of 
buildings by curbing the progressive increase in their maintenance costs, and 
by curbing the decrease in their present market value (Skifter Andersen, 1995; 
OECD, 2005). All construction maintenance, such as exterior paintwork, main-
tenance of balconies, maintenance of porches, galleries, common passage-
ways and stairways, but also (to a lesser extent) maintenance to kitchens and 
bathrooms, influences a building’s aesthetic, technical and functional perfor-
mance, and thus the revenues on real estate.
2.	 Residential	satisfaction
The residential satisfaction of housing associations’ customers can be en-
hanced through attention to a customer-friendly maintenance process and 
to the quality of the output of maintenance on building components, instal-
lations and surrounding grounds of buildings. Maintenance is a service that 
aims to preserve or improve the housing situation of tenants (Dogge, 2002). 
All maintenance services contribute to this aim, to a greater or lesser degree. 
Dissatisfaction with maintenance services will lead to complaints, particu-
larly when the functional performance, or functionality, of installations and 
building components is damaged.
3.	 Liveability	of	the	neighbourhood
The visual and functional quality of the surrounding grounds of buildings 
and external building components (e.g. paintwork) can have a positive (or 
negative) influence on the liveability of a neighbourhood. Whether this effect 
is direct or indirect is disputed in literature. The so-called environmentalist 
approach assumes a direct relationship between physical-spatial attributes 
and social problems (Newman, 1972; Coleman, 1985). Others, such as Nieboer 
(2005), argue that physical housing characteristics determine the rent paid by 
tenants, which can subsequently affect the socio-economic position of the 
population. The composition of the population may influence the liveability, 
and may be linked to social problems. Maintenance services to external build-
ing components, such as (slope) roofing, paving, and the building façade may 
directly affect liveability. All maintenance services that somehow affect the 
1.
2.
3.
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aesthetic and functional performance of a building may have indirect effects 
on liveability, including maintenance to kitchens and bathrooms.
Finally, although sustainability as such is not a public task of housing associa-
tions, it might be defined as one of their maintenance objectives. As sustain-
ability is not a public task according to BBSH, however, and as maintenance is 
still not usually conducted for sustainability reasons, sustainability will not 
be given further attention in this chapter.
Housing associations should know what contribution maintenance makes 
to their strategic goals and, by extension, to the fulfilment of their public 
tasks, and should use this information to purchase maintenance services ef-
fectively. Table 3.2 presents the different maintenance services and their im-
pact on a housing association’s goals.
The results of the maintenance services fulfil certain functions, which sub-
sequently contribute to the housing association’s goals. The elaboration of the 
maintenance works determines the extent to which these goals are reached.
The choices in the commodity strategy should be made on the basis of 
these goals, such as the choice of performance criteria for suppliers. In prac-
tice, this may mean that for maintenance services with a relatively high im-
pact on residential satisfaction, criteria that are directed towards a high level 
of service to customers will be prioritised. On the other hand, criteria for ser-
vices that are important for maintaining the market value of the building may 
cover more ‘traditional’ process and product-related issues.
Since the underlying goals for purchasing of maintenance are clear, a 
framework can be constructed linking the function of maintenance services 
to the related purchasing strategy, enabling a commodity strategy to be de-
veloped. This framework is presented in Figure 3.3. According to this model, 
maintenance services affect the liveability of a neighbourhood, residential 
satisfaction and revenues on real estate. Strategic choices made with respect 
to these three tasks (which may in turn depend, for instance, on the service, 
the dwelling’s characteristics and the resident’s characteristics) determine the 
development of the commodity strategy.
The requirements for the service supplier and the offer can be set in differ-
ent ways:
through execution requirements (specifications);
through suitability requirements (supplier selection criteria);
through award criteria; and
through contract-related incentives.
In Sub-Section 2.3.2 above, the differences between suitability requirements 
and award criteria in the context of European tendering laws were outlined. 
Selection criteria allow contracting entities to verify the suitability of econom-
ic operators pursuant to economic and financial capacity, and technical and/or 
■
■
■
■
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professional capability. Award criteria are related to the offer itself. To what ex-
tent will the offer be delivered according to the criteria set? The specification, 
or execution requirements, states the required level of service delivery in the 
amount of detail needed to secure service quality. Contract-related incentives 
imply a bonus system for higher performances than required in selected areas.
Housing associations should apply an appropriate set of criteria and re-
quirements in order to get the service they expect. The appropriate set of cri-
teria and requirements are dependent on the building component or installa-
tion in question, and on the strategic objectives.
With regard to the suitability requirements, there is usually no reason to 
abandon one of the financial economic and ethical criteria and the criteria 
related to the authorisation to conduct works, as mentioned in the applicable 
European Directive 2004/18/EG (European Union, 2004: 144-145). The amount 
of technical competence needed on the part of the maintenance service sup-
plier depends on the specific maintenance service in hand. Naturally, a specif-
ic maintenance problem may demand specific expertise. In addition, a main-
tenance service supplier’s technical competence might be proven through 
quality or approval systems (e.g. ‘AF-erkenningsregeling’, ‘Dakmerk’, Concrete 
Repair Standard, see Straub and Van Mossel, 2007). Quality marks are not 
available for all requirements, however.
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Table 3.2 Maintenance services and their functions
Maintenance service Functions of the results of the services
Goals to which the service 
contributes
Maintenance of roofs and gutters Technical performance
Aesthetical performance for slope roofing, 
and in case of a view of flat roofing
Energic and acoustic comfort
•
•
•
Residential satisfaction
Total costs of ownership 
(TCO), market value
Liveability of the 
neighbourhood
•
•
•
Exterior paintwork Aesthetical performance
Social safety
Technical performance
•
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, market value
Liveability of the 
neighbourhood
•
•
•
Maintenance of balconies Functionality
Technical performance
Aesthetical performance
•
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, market value
Liveability of the 
neighbourhood
•
•
•
Maintenance of hinges and locks of 
windows and external doors
Functionality
Social safety
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO
•
•
Maintenance of entrance hall, gallery, 
corridors and/or stairs
Social safety
Aesthetical performance
Functionality
•
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, market value
Liveability of the 
neighbourhood
•
•
•
Maintenance of lifts Functionality
Technical performance
Safety of use
•
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO
•
•
Cleaning of shared areas Social safety
Aesthetical performance
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO
•
•
Maintenance service Functions of the results of the services
Goals to which the service 
contributes
Maintenance of lighting in shared areas Social safety
Aesthetical performance
Functionality
•
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO
•
•
Maintenance of ventilation systems Healthiness
Functionality
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO
•
•
Maintenance of heating and water 
systems
Functionality
Safety of use
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO
•
•
Maintenance of kitchens Functionality
Aesthetical performance
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, (market value)
•
•
Maintenance of toilets Functionality
Aesthetical performance
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, (market value)
•
•
Maintenance of bathrooms Functionality
Aesthetical performance
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, (market value)
•
•
Maintenance of drains Healthiness• Residential satisfaction
TCO
•
•
Communal greenery Aesthetical performance
Social safety
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, (market value)
Liveability of the 
neighbourhood
•
•
•
Maintenance on paving around the 
building
Aesthetical performance
Functionality
Social safety
Safety of use
•
•
•
•
Residential satisfaction
TCO, (market value)
Liveability of the 
neighbourhood
•
•
•
For works that include end-customer contacts, it is advisable to ask for 
proof of expertise. In this case, the most logical proof may be prior, successful 
experience. In addition, a housing association may ask a potential supplier 
how it has dealt with customer complaints in the past. For complex works, 
the potential supplier may be asked to list previous successfully completed 
complex works.
The application of supplier selection criteria, in combination with award 
criteria, will lead to a reduction in the number of suppliers that need to be 
evaluated. Selection criteria are thus often relatively generic in nature. The 
filtering process will reduce the time and effort required in collecting and an-
alysing supplier data in the award procedure. See Section 3.3 for information 
about the application of supplier selection and award criteria in practice.
The use of award criteria for potential suppliers, and contract-related in-
centives for existing contracts, can be combined with use of an incentive 
structure. The key performance requirements relating to the award criteria 
may be the same as those used in the performance measurement of existing 
contracts, so long as this does not lead to an insufficient number of potential 
suppliers. In this way, positive experiences from the past may be rewarded 
and lead to an increased chance of doing more business with the housing as-
sociation. Concurrently, performance requirements (being contract-related in-
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•
Table 3.2 Continued
centives) may be flexible enough to occasionally raise the requirements, and 
let suppliers submit continuous improvement plans on a regular basis.
Contracts may be awarded to the supplier that:
satisfies all requirements;
gets the highest ratings for desired but non-essential service attributes.
An attribute’s importance to the strategy determines its application and 
weight. An essential attribute may be made a requirement, whereas an im-
portant but not essential attribute might become one of the weighted criteria. 
An attribute may be related to the result of the service but also to the process 
of service delivery. Due to the fact that this thesis focuses on how to promote 
tenant satisfaction using maintenance, the following chapters will focus on 
the importance of attributes of maintenance service delivery for meeting this 
objective. In other words, which elements have an on impact tenant satisfac-
tion with regard to maintenance? This information serves as input for later 
chapters (7, 8 and 9), which look at how to optimise commodity strategies for 
tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance.
 3.8 Discussion
Due to the fact that mechanisms in the housing market do not lead to a gen-
erally accepted equilibrium, public tasks cannot be achieved in the absence of 
1.
2.
[  ]
institutional interventions. At the same time, private parties, housing asso-
ciations, carry out these public tasks.
What can be concluded from this chapter is that the performance of main-
tenance services appears to be a means of fulfilling essential aspects of these 
tasks: providing housing services to tenants, contributing to liveability in a 
neighbourhood and pursuing sound financial policies. In this thesis, we pri-
marily focus on the first aspect, the provision of housing services to tenants.
The influence of maintenance services on the realisation of the above-
mentioned tasks is not the same for each service, however, and further re-
search should investigate how all types of services influence customer value, 
value in terms of the total costs of ownership and the market value of the 
properties, and liveability. Moreover, the extent to which housing associa-
tions’ current commodity strategies take the particularities of different main-
tenance services into account is unknown. Further research should explore 
these issues in order to support further professionalisation of purchasing 
within the social housing sector.
As we have seen that the three tasks for housing associations with respect 
to maintenance services are a more elaborate version of the three main objec-
tives of buildings in general, the conclusions and implications of this research 
may be applied to comparable situations relating to other social enterprises, 
such as hospitals, in order to realise optimisation of purchasing.
Commodity strategies should differentiate on the basis of characteristics 
of building components and the accompanying maintenance services. Com-
modity strategies should cover different means of enabling high performance 
service delivery. These can include execution requirements (specifications), 
suitability requirements (supplier selection criteria), award criteria, and con-
tract-related incentives. The more important the component and the service 
are for tenant satisfaction, for instance, the more award criteria could take 
the tenant’s opinions and experiences into account. Relevant criteria in this 
respect are, for example, the completion of maintenance activities in a sin-
gle visit, accessibility, and sticking to execution planning agreements (Straub 
et al., 2005). The same applies to the liveability of a neighbourhood and rev-
enues on real estate. Additional research is needed to explore the current use 
of performance criteria for different types of service suppliers, and to explore 
the impact of maintenance services on the realisation of public tasks. For ex-
ample, how important are different maintenance services for customer satis-
faction? In the remaining parts of this thesis, steps will be taken to fill these 
gaps.
In order to be able to treat suppliers as extensions of housing associations 
when delivering services to residents, the function of purchasing mainte-
nance services needs to be more closely connected to the strategic level of 
organisations. The function of purchasing is currently underdeveloped. At 
present, purchasers simply realise what is stated in housing associations’ 
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maintenance strategies – assuming that there is in fact a link between the 
maintenance strategy and the purchasing strategy. The buying centre for 
a certain commodity should preferably be organised in alignment with the 
contribution to the public task of that commodity. For example, from the per-
spective of increasing customer satisfaction, it is advisable to have market-
ing professionals in the buying centre for those services that have a high im-
pact on customer satisfaction. As more and more suppliers play a role in the 
development of maintenance solutions (Straub and Van Mossel, 2005) rather 
than merely realising specifications, the role of purchasers within housing as-
sociations is expected to become more strategic in future. In this way, the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of housing associations’ policies will be secured at 
a higher level.
Award criteria and contract-related incentives, other than those relating to 
price, are seldom used in practice, which may indicate deficiencies in the use 
of potential tools for producing effective commodity strategies. The poten-
tial of incentives to assist with the improvement of service suppliers’ perfor-
mance appears to be undervalued. In Chapter 9, more attention will be given 
to ways of rectifying this. Purchasers from Dutch housing associations cur-
rently predominantly use selection criteria and specifications. Chapters 7 and 
8 will focus on the contents and organisation of maintenance service specifi-
cations. First, Chapter 4 will examine the specific position of the tenant as a 
customer in the Dutch social rented housing sector.
This chapter is based on an article that was published in the journal Property Man­
agement, under the title: Purchasing of Dutch housing associations’ technical management 
services (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007). 
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 4 Comparing housing 
associations with the 
public and private sector: 
retail and municipality
 4.1 Introduction
Purchasing in the public sector has many similarities with purchasing in the 
private sector (Telgen et al., 2007). At the same time, many authors acknowl-
edge the differences between these two worlds (e.g. Erridge, 1996; Thai, 2001; 
Thai et al., 2004). Social enterprises such as housing associations are subject 
to contextual factors, which in some cases are comparable with those in the 
private sector, but others, with those in the public sector. This chapter dis-
cusses two different sectors: retail, representing the private sector, and mu-
nicipalities, representing the public sector. They will be compared with the so-
cial rented housing sector, and lessons will be drawn for the latter. The sector 
comparison is structured around the principle of purchasing for others than 
the purchasing organisation, often the end-customer. This combines the con-
sumer’s perspective and organisational purchasing processes and investigates 
the question, ‘What could be learned from retail and municipality?’
This chapter is primarily directed at sector differences related to the posi-
tion of the customer, and begins with a general overview of institutional dif-
ferences and differences related to purchasing practice and knowledge. This 
overview is presented in Table 4.1.
Harland (1996) defines supply chain management as the management of 
business activities and relationships that are (1) internal to the organisa-
tion, (2) with immediate suppliers, (3) with ‘first-tier’ and ‘second-tier’ sup-
pliers and customers and so on through the supply chain, and (4) with the 
entire supply chain. We focus in this chapter on the supply chain as defined 
under (3): with ‘first-tier’ and ‘second-tier’ suppliers and customers and so on 
through the supply chain. In this case, the end-customer is the focal actor. 
Figure 4.1 shows the traditional supply chain in accordance with this defini-
tion.
The figures are presented with demand from the end-customers at the 
centre, partly in the interests of clarity and also to preserve the essence of the 
supply chain.
 4.2 Retail
 4.2.1 Supply chain
Retail can be defined as the delivery of services and/or goods to consumers 
for their personal use. The sector consists of multiple branches, such as food, 
fashion, home furnishings, banking and travel. In the traditional chain pre-
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sented in Figure 4.1, retail occupies the position immediately before that of 
the end client. If we focus in on retail, an outline of the relevant part of the 
supply chain emerges, as shown in Figure 4.2. Wholesalers (e.g. Makro and 
Sligro) and manufacturers (e.g. Dell) may also supply directly to the end client.
The added value of retail lies in its knowledge of customers and how to 
reach them. Indeed, without these aspects, manufacturers could just as eas-
ily directly supply end clients with products or services. The retail sector is 
not normally involved in any kind of transformation in a technical sense. De-
livery is commonly accompanied with additional services that are oriented 
to achieving an optimum fit with the end client’s demands. Purchasing is a 
key function in retail, since the core product, or core service, is usually what 
that which is produced by the manufacturer. A range of products will often 
be built up, with a view to guaranteeing optimum availability and freedom 
of choice for the end client. This implies some risk for the retailer. Often, re-
tailers have to deal with ‘basket shoppers’: consumers who want to purchase 
from multiple product categories (as one would in a supermarket).
[  ]
Table 4.1 Sector comparison: institutional and purchasing practice differences
Retail Municipalities Housing associations
Institutional characteristics
Objective Private Public A mix of public and private
Organisation Enterprise Public body Social enterprise
Ownership Private Public Private
Institutional interventions in 
market by government
– Not applicable, municipalities 
take part of the government
+
Purchasing and delivery
Scope (Inter)national Usually national and local Usually national and 
local/regional
Public monitoring and 
transparency
– + 0
Application of European 
procurement directives
– + Unclear
Delivery by chain Delivery by manufacturer, 
wholesaler and retailer to 
end client
Delivery by service supplier 
and municipality to end client
Delivery by service 
supplier and housing 
association to end client
Branch blurring + –– +
Influence of effective demand by 
end client on purchasing decisions
+ 0 0
Much scientific analysis and 
knowledge available related to 
purchasing
+ – ––
 ––  = Not applicable – = Minimally applicable 0 = Rather applicable + = Most applicable
 4.2.2 Customer demands
The customer forms a preference for what he or she wants from the firm. In 
a retail context, this typically means selecting from a predetermined menu of 
products or services. Substance is given to the preference by paying the sup-
plier, by which demand becomes effective demand. The more customers de-
mand a certain service or good, the more sense it will make for the supplier 
to produce it and for the retailer to purchase it.
Alford (2002) identifies several more characteristics of transactions between 
consumers and private firms. The first is the reciprocal nature of the process 
by which the customer pays money according to the price of the service and/
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or good, in return for the goods or services provided by the firm. Furthermore, 
both parties receive value. The good or service may be consumed individually, 
and the firm can appropriate the money. The money is related explicitly to 
the value of what is bought. Moreover, the customer has two choices to make:
the choice of retailer; and
the choice of product.
Another characteristic is that the customer has a positive preference for the 
good or service, in that he or she wants to obtain or consume it. Finally, as 
long as a firm earns a profit on each transaction, it will seek to maximise 
sales by increasing the number of customers, and/or by gaining ‘repeat busi-
ness’ from the same customers.
 4.2.3 How to deal with customer demands?
The objectives of most firms in the sector are concerned with some combina-
tion of performance (now and in the future), and expansion (of the market, or 
within the market). Efficient and effective purchasing is necessary to preserve 
margins and to appeal to appropriate client groups. Marketing policy leads 
purchasing. The retailer must take current trends into consideration in order 
to stay ahead of the competition. ‘The industry will experience a shift towards 
services and solutions, leading companies to rethink product development 
with an emphasis on these aspects. The outcome of the consumption experi-
ence, rather than the features and functions, will become much more impor-
tant to the shopper’ (Global Commerce Initiative, Capgemini, Intel, 2006).
Assortment planning is important for retailers. Many retailers are adopt-
ing an ‘efficient assortment’ strategy, which primarily seeks to find a profit-
maximising level of variety by eliminating low-selling products (Kurt Salmon 
Associates, 1993). However, if a retailer reduces variety in all categories based 
on single-category analyses, then the store becomes less attractive and some 
customers are likely to defect to other retailers, reducing store traffic. This 
concern is particularly relevant with respect to basket shoppers. If a basket 
shopper does not find an item that she wants in one category, she may pur-
chase her entire basket from another retailer (Bell and Lattin, 1998). Category 
management has been described as a major innovation in retailing (Hogarth-
Scott, 1999) and has been promoted as a mechanism for achieving closer 
working relations between suppliers and retailers (Hogarth-Scott and Dapiran, 
1997). The implication is that buyers are responsible for entire product (or 
service) categories, allowing them to consider all possibilities within these 
in order to optimise results across entire categories. This often leads to a re-
duction in the number of suppliers, and a preference for suppliers that cover 
at least parts of an entire category. The need to achieve these closer work-
ing relations is due to changes in the retail environment, in which power has 
1.
2.
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shifted from manufacturers to retailers (McGoldrick, 2002; Sparks, 1998; Varley, 
2001). Both parties are realising their need to develop mutuality in their re-
lationships (Hogarth-Scott, 1999). Category management relies on collabora-
tive and co-operative supply partnerships (Freedman et al., 1997), achieved by 
means of cross-functional interactions between suppliers and retailers (Var-
ley, 2001). The traditional transactional approach to buying prevented compa-
nies from gaining cost efficiencies in the supply chain. Having recognised this, 
many have moved towards collaborative supplier partnerships (Varley, 1999).
Finally, the optimisation of services leads to branch blurring, and even sec-
tor blurring. Some production has also shifted to the retail trade, allowing the 
production process to be adapted to the specific needs of the customer. One 
example is that of paint-mixing machines in Do-It-Yourself stores. This, in 
turn, has an impact on the structure presented in Figure 4.2: retailers are tak-
ing over parts of the production process from manufacturers, creating a form 
of vertical integration.
 4.3 Dutch municipalities
 4.3.1 Authorities and organisation
The Netherlands is a decentralised, unitary state. It is ‘decentralised’ in the 
sense that the national government devolves various duties to the municipal-
ities and provincial government. It is a ‘unitary state’ in that it is centred on 
the national government, and the powers of provincial government and mu-
nicipalities are subordinate to those of the national government. Local and re-
gional authorities, including municipalities, are obliged to implement central 
regulations set by the national government, a process known as ‘joint admin-
istration’. Nonetheless, each administrative layer also has its own powers.
In the Netherlands, the meaning, organisation and functions of a mu-
nicipality can be explained as follows. A municipality is a public body: it is 
a governmental organisation with a legal personality. Various administrative 
organs control this public body, including a council, a municipal executive, a 
mayor and committees. Each of these has its own powers and duties. A mu-
nicipal council’s principal duties are to establish the outline of policy and su-
pervise its implementation. The vote of every member of the municipal coun-
cil carries the same weight, and resolutions are passed by majority voting. 
The municipal council is the forum that has ultimate authority on matters 
such as road building, car parks, residential zones, pedestrian tunnels and cy-
cle paths. Other matters, such as the broader provision of out-of-school care 
and the management of cultural centres or sports fields, all fall within the 
scope of municipal council resolutions.
The municipal executive is responsible for the day-to-day management of 
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the municipality. The municipal authority reports to the municipal council 
on the policies pursued, and can be held accountable by the latter. While the 
municipal council may not overturn a municipal executive resolution that it 
disagrees with, it may urge the municipal executive to adopt a different res-
olution. In extreme cases, one or more aldermen may be dismissed (http://
www.overheid.nl, 14/06/2007). The municipal executive arranges and records 
in resolutions the internal rules for purchasing and procuring supplies, works 
and services.
Municipal officials are responsible for preparing and implementing these 
resolutions. The official organisation is divided into departments or directo-
rates, with lower-level departments responsible for elements of provincial 
policy, such as the environment, water management, spatial planning, eco-
nomics, leisure activities, natural assets, traffic and transport. Municipal offi-
cials receive their mandate from the municipal executive and the elected mu-
nicipal council, rather than directly from the public.
 4.3.2 Supply chain
Purchasing is less of a strategic priority for municipalities than for private 
firms (43% versus 64%; De Boer and Telgen, 1998). Unlike private firms, mu-
nicipalities are obliged to observe the European Directives on procurement, 
and this has an impact on the planning and organisation of the purchasing 
process. Transparency is an important aspect of the process. The great major-
ity of municipalities (95%) have centralised purchasing in some way or anoth-
er. Of these, however, only 15% have done so by creating a formal purchasing 
department (De Boer and Telgen, 1998). Property-related purchasing, which 
forms a substantial part of the total purchasing volume, is usually handled in 
a separate forum (‘Property’).
The services rendered to the public are usually purchased by the munici-
pality, but often delivered by an external service supplier (see Figure 4.3). The 
municipality as an organisation is therefore not always the party that enjoys 
the services, but has to purchase them all the same. The municipality is re-
sponsible for intervening if the service supplier performs poorly. The public 
(that is, voters) may use an election to exact revenge for any failure to inter-
vene.
 4.3.3 The citizen and municipal services
Citizenship implies a certain degree of collective choice. This collective choice 
is not simply an aggregation of the preferences of individual citizens (Carroll, 
1995; Pegnato, 1997). This aggregation would be extremely difficult to achieve, 
because each citizen has many wishes and aspirations (Alford, 2002). Collec-
tive choices are therefore necessarily the outcome of political interaction and 
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deliberation, in which citizens or their representatives (in this case, the mu-
nicipal council) engage with each other in advocacy, debate, and negotiation 
(Lynch and Markusen, 1994; Patterson, 1998). In the event of disagreement 
on choices, the majority will usually decide. Collective choice is therefore an 
imperfect expression of citizens’ individual expectations, because the prefer-
ences of those in the minority are usually overruled. Given that citizens have 
varying wishes, it is unlikely that any individual citizen will be satisfied with 
every one of a municipality’s policies.
Customers in the private sector signal their preference for a product or 
service by paying for it. Taxpayers, or at any rate citizens, pay for municipali-
ties’ services directly or indirectly (through taxes paid to other public authori-
ties: a municipality receives more than 80% of its income from the national 
government). The municipality receives money from the citizen by means of 
municipal taxes, including property tax, dog licence fees, standing charges 
(such as for sewerage, refuse collection and parking), incidental charges (such 
as for admission to swimming pools and metered parking), and administra-
tive charges (such as for issuing planning permits and renewing passports).
In many cases, the amount charged will have no direct relationship with 
the value returned to citizens by a municipality. Taxpayers are legally obliged 
to pay. The government (usually the national government) decides how much 
should be charged, and this thus forms part of the democratic process. Mu-
nicipalities, however, often determine what the money should ultimately be 
spent on, assuming they have the money to spend. Although an individual 
taxpayer may not wish to spend money on the particular services delivered 
on behalf of the municipality, the majority of citizens’ representatives sup-
port the expenditure, or at least go along with it (Alford, 2002). Citizens might 
also support a given policy, even though they are personally worse off as a 
result. On the other hand, citizens do not expect any direct ‘return’ on their 
taxes. Taxes provide for investments that might pay future dividends, and for 
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investments that might contribute indirectly to a stable environment. For in-
stance, the municipality is responsible for providing the fire service, but one 
never knows whether this ‘insurance’ service will ever be ‘enjoyed’.
Since the 1980s, the direct benefit principle has become an increasingly 
important policy instrument. This principle encourages a satisfactory distri-
bution of goods and services in accordance with the benefit to the people. It is 
based on the notion that citizens and firms contribute to the costs of services 
provided by the government according to the direct benefit that they (the citi-
zens) receive from the services. The direct benefit principle can be applied by 
municipalities in such areas as the hiring of sports facilities to citizens, sew-
erage charges, the waste collection levy, or applications for planning permits. 
The direct benefit principle has the following advantages (Verdult, 1996: 71):
Optimum allocation. The application of a price mechanism can signal citi-
zens’ preferences to the local government that the latter would only other-
wise learn about through extremely indirect means (e.g. surveys).
It helps to make the citizen more cost conscious.
A more direct link between paying and enjoyment gives citizens a direct 
relationship with the local government, and they may well choose to tackle 
local government directly on the level of services provided.
Municipalities are not concerned with maximising demand. Instead, un-
der the direct benefit principle, the actual situation is one of distributing ra-
tions; municipalities have limited budgetary resources. A citizen may also be 
obliged to use a service without having any positive preference for it, as with 
permits, for example.
It would appear to be cost-effective to treat stakeholders (citizens) in a 
customer-friendly manner. If stakeholders resist, then enforcing compliance 
is expensive (Diver, 1980; Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Grabosky, 1995). Further-
more, in some cases the municipal authority demands action on the part of 
citizens, making them co-producers of services. For example, the government 
depends on active citizens to report their suspicions of criminal behaviour in 
their neighbourhoods. It can be helpful, in this and other situations, if citi-
zens are treated in a customer-friendly manner. Despite this, closer inspec-
tion reveals that the incentives for municipalities to work in a customer-ori-
ented manner are less direct than for many firms.
 4.3.4 Consumption
Service interactions in the private sector occur at the discretion of the cus-
tomer. For example, an individual may decide independently whether or not 
to use the services of a particular hairdresser. In this case, the receiver is the 
consumer. This does not always apply in the public sector. Some service inter-
actions are foisted upon citizens without any choice, for instance when a fine 
1.
2.
3.
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has to be paid. In these circumstances, service receivers are ‘captives’, and 
are forced to undergo a service interaction (Brown, 2007). Some service inter-
actions fall between the extremes of force and free will, such as when service 
receivers enter into an exclusive and binding relationship with a service sup-
plier and can exert little influence on the price, but have some limited say 
in the way in which the service is delivered (Hyde, 1991). Rail passengers fall 
into this category. The same sort of relationship occurs in healthcare institu-
tions, particularly for specialised operations with restricted availability. Brown 
refers to the service receiver in this case as a ‘client’.
The distinction made above affects the way in which service quality is 
evaluated. Service receivers tend to assess quality depending on their posi-
tion relative to the service supplier. Free choice predisposes respondents to 
making more positive evaluations, while the use of force causes a negative 
bias (e.g. Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995, see Figure 4.4).
Usually, a person is automatically a resident of a municipality by virtue of 
where he lives, which makes him a user of certain services. The citizen will 
therefore be a ‘captive’ customer for some services. The service interaction 
that results from providing a site in which neighbourhood youths can gather, 
but which is situated close to the home of someone who is opposed to the 
initiative, for example, will be both forced and undesirable. For other munici-
pal services, the citizen may be considered to be a ‘client’, and the services 
involved will usually be oriented to the individual. In this sense, citizens are 
increasingly being given opportunities to express individual preferences re-
garding services, and there is a gradual movement towards treating citizens 
as ‘consumers’. For some services, citizens can already be described accurate-
ly as consumers, as for public swimming baths owned by municipalities and 
some cultural establishments.
 4.3.5 The influence of the citizen
Besides the method of consumption, the position of the customer can be dif-
ferentiated to the extent that he or she may be able to influence service deliv-
ery. A citizen basically has two possible responses when he or she perceives 
that the quality or benefits of a municipality’s services is decreasing: they can 
‘exit’ (withdraw from the relationship, move); or they can ‘voice’ (attempt to 
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repair or improve the relationship by communicating the complaint, griev-
ance or proposal for change) (Hirschman, 1970). With regards to the use of 
voice, a citizen has a number of options.
The customer may be a coproducer, in what is referred to as participation. 
The most important form of participation involving municipalities is the char-
acter of democracy itself. Active and passive franchise allows the citizen to 
influence municipal policy. Public consultation exercises, as may be set out in 
participation-related bye-laws (within the framework of the General Admin-
istrative Law Act), are another way for individual citizens to influence policy. 
Citizens can also exercise influence on policy through lobbying or being in-
volved in mediating structures. Finally, there are currently many experiments 
in the Netherlands on ‘interactive policy forming’. When policy is formed 
interactively, political choices are made in cooperation with stakeholders, 
meaning that policy is not developed unilaterally. However, the results are not 
always convincing (Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 2001). As an extension to inter-
active policy forming, citizens can use civilian initiative to put items on mu-
nicipal council agendas.
 4.4 Housing associations
 4.4.1 The supply chain
Figure 4.5 shows the housing association supply chain from the point of view 
of the tenant. The housing association’s end client, the tenant, only exercis-
es demand on the housing association. The service may be delivered by the 
housing association, or by a service supplier, such as a maintenance company. 
Delivery does not result in possession by the end client, who receives only 
the enjoyment of use. In other words, rent is paid, and a home is provided 
as a service in return. Manufacturers sometimes exert substantial market 
power; they are often far more concentrated than service suppliers (the lat-
ter are known for their fragmentation). Painting work offers one example of 
this. Major paint manufacturers, such as Akzo Nobel and SigmaKalon, have 
to deal with small painters and external wall maintenance companies. As a 
result, paint manufacturers regularly bypass painters and offer their products 
directly to housing associations and even tenants.
 4.4.2 The tenant
The rented sector is divided into a regulated part and a liberalised part. The 
former is subject to rent protection (maximum rent increases). 95% of all 
rented housing in the Netherlands is subject to regulated rents (Elsinga et al., 
2006). The rent for each dwelling can only be reviewed once a year, on 1 Ju-
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ly. The landlord submits a timely proposal to the tenant, thereby keeping up 
with the general directive stipulated by parliament. Any increase in rent is 
subject to a maximum, as decided by a so-called ‘ministeriële regeling’ (Min-
isterial Order). According to the current policy of the Dutch Ministry of Hous-
ing [Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer] 
(2007), the maximum rent increase allowed is equal to the rate of inflation.
The rights and duties of tenant and landlord are set out in landlord and 
tenant law. In the Netherlands, the latter falls under the civil code (BW) (Sec-
tion 4 of Book 7) for both the social and commercial rented sectors.
The tenancy agreement (Book 7, Section 201 of the BW) is defined as fol-
lows: ‘Tenancy is the contract in which one party, the landlord, makes under-
takings to the other party, the tenant, to provide a property or part of a prop-
erty for occupation, and the tenant undertakes to make payment in return.’ 
The law provides protection for the tenant, without which he or she would 
be in a vulnerable position. On average, the target groups for the policy spend 
a large proportion of their income on rent. Furthermore, in most parts of the 
country the choice of homes is extremely limited. The tenant is therefore 
heavily dependent on the landlord.
The tenant has to pay rent and must conduct him- or herself in a respon-
sible manner. In return, the tenant enjoys security of tenure, which means 
that the tenant may assume that he or she can stay in the home as long as 
they fulfil their obligations, barring exceptional cases. Furthermore, the land-
lord is obliged to rectify defects at the tenant’s request, unless these are im-
possible, unreasonably expensive, are the tenant’s own responsibility, or are 
the tenant’s fault. The landlord’s obligations include periodic maintenance 
and the prevention of defects. While tenants may make demands of their 
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housing associations, they are also allowed to conduct maintenance activi-
ties themselves. The results of these activities are called ‘Zelf Aangebrachte 
Voorzieningen’ (ZAV) [Self-Installed Facilities]. In agreement with the housing 
association, tenants are allowed to conduct activities inside dwellings as long 
as the lettability and value of the dwelling are not harmed. The housing asso-
ciation’s permission is not needed for adaptations and additions that can be 
undone without great cost at the end of the tenancy period. The tenant does 
require permission for major alterations, however, and this will be granted 
depending on the consequences for lettability, safety, health and value.
 4.4.3 The market and consumption
Sub-Section 1.1.3 examined the different ‘housing markets’ that are relevant 
for this thesis. Following Priemus (1984), we concluded that the social rent-
ed sector is a housing services market, which consists of a mobile part and 
an immobile part. The level of competition in the mobile housing services 
market can vary. In case of pressure, supply exceeds demand, and proprie-
tors have to compete for tenants. In case of suction, demand exceeds sup-
ply, and candidate tenants have to compete for dwellings (Kornai, 1971). Giv-
en the restrictedness of the market to a specific area, and the immobility of 
residents, Priemus indicates that the mobile housing services market can be 
best referred to as oligopoly. The delivery of the most important component 
of the housing service, the dwelling, is subject to the housing allocation sys-
tem. Housing associations and municipalities agree on rules for how vacant 
rented homes should be allocated, and these differ from one municipality or 
region to another. Some municipalities and associations have dozens of de-
tailed rules, whereas others suffice with a few guidelines, and sometimes va-
cated dwellings are even allocated in a lottery. After registering, house seek-
ers are entitled to apply for available housing, as publicised by the housing 
association(s). Later, after viewing, they can decide whether to accept the 
dwelling. Furthermore, ‘suitability criteria’ are often defined, with require-
ments relating to the age, income and family structure of house seekers. The 
system has some known disadvantages. A house-seeker in one village may 
succeed almost immediately, while enormous waiting lists continue to grow 
in the neighbouring city. Moving from one town to another is usually disas-
trous for one’s position on a waiting list. We can thus conclude that in the 
case of suction in the market (which is often the situation in Dutch urban 
areas), the customer’s choice – particularly that of starters – is extremely lim-
ited, which is to say that the model is strongly supply-driven.
Like citizens in municipalities, candidate tenants also shift back and forth 
between being between ‘captives’, ‘clients’ and ‘consumers’, as mentioned 
above in Section 4.3. Tenants in a tight housing market (suction) are almost 
forced to opt for any housing association with a vacant dwelling. A tenant 
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in a relaxed housing market (pressure) has more freedom of choice and is a 
‘consumer’.
The immobile housing services market concerns the relationship between 
the tenant and the proprietor (in this thesis, the housing association). This 
situation implies high exit barriers for tenants, undermining their competi-
tive position. A tenant can be considered to be a ‘captive’. To a large extent, 
tenants are dependent on housing associations with regard to rent increases 
and the maintenance policy. As soon as a resident becomes a tenant, he or 
she is generally forced to endure planned maintenance. Sometimes there will 
be a choice of finish and result, and in these cases the tenant is more of a ‘cli-
ent’. The tenant has more choice when it comes to reactive maintenance. He 
or she has more influence on the timing of the service, and has some say in 
whether the service is provided. The same is true of service maintenance, and 
in some cases, (parts of) void repairs. Because tenants are frequently ‘cap-
tives’, the services that social landlords tend to impose upon tenants will act 
as ‘dissatisfiers’: negative experiences weigh more heavily than positive ones. 
Increasing tenant participation via the provision of options for maintenance 
may relieve this captive position.
Currently, tenants are being presented with more choice regarding main-
tenance, besides compulsory matters. Residents’ committees are becoming 
involved with planning and with matters such as, for example, choosing the 
colours of external walls. Individual tenants can also be approached, and de-
cisions are sometimes taken by a majority vote. Individual tenants are often 
given options for the maintenance of sanitary facilities and kitchens. For in-
stance, a tenant may be able to choose taps or the tiles, possibly for an addi-
tional price.
Institutions have been created, however, to support what is basically the 
tenuous position of tenants. A special aspect of the position of end clients 
in the social rented sector is their ability to be involved in the management 
of and policy on landlords, by means of the Tenant and Landlord Consulta-
tion Act and the BBSH. The Tenant and Landlord Consultation Act sets out the 
rights of tenants’ organisations, which represent tenants in consultation with 
landlords. The Tenant and Landlord Consultation Act (Commissie Zeggenschap 
en Versterking positie huurders(-organisaties), 2005) covers:
the areas in which consultation or advice is required;
the tenants’ organisation’s right to a qualified opinion on policy changes in 
these areas;
a financial contribution from the landlord to the tenants’ organisation.
The areas in which, on the tenants’ organisation’s request, the landlord has 
to provide information and allow consultation are (Commissie Zeggenschap 
en Versterking positie huurders(-organisaties), 2005):
maintenance and management policy for dwellings;
■
■
■
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letting and allocation policy;
the general conditions of the tenancy agreement;
plans for rents in the coming years;
the package of services and the service charges;
the demolition of dwellings; and
the sale and/or encumbrance (with mortgage) of dwellings.
The BBSH specifically addresses the activities of housing associations. Regard-
ing the Tenant and Landlord Consultation Act, the BBSH prescribes a com-
plaints committee and the provision by the landlord of facilities for residents’ 
committees. Additional subjects for consultation and advice are also identi-
fied. These are liveability, disposal/encumbrance/demolition, and the housing 
of specific target groups.
In addition the law, institutional support for tenants is offered by vari-
ous organisations. The Dutch Union of Tenants (De Nederlandse Woonbond) 
is an independent national association that stands up for tenants’ interests. 
It successfully supports local residents’ committees, lobbies the government 
in support of tenants’ interests, and advises individual tenants. Maintenance 
is an important issue for De Woonbond. By far most of the advice that they 
have given to tenants and residents’ committees is related to maintenance 
(Vereniging Nederlandse Woonbond, 2006). An example of an achievement 
claimed by De Woonbond that is embedded in law is the ‘gebrekenregeling’ 
[arrangement of defects], which has been set up in order to stimulate housing 
associations to perform maintenance (see Sub-Section 1.1.5 for a more com-
prehensive description of this arrangement).
In Sub-Section 4.4.2, we noted that housing associations’ target groups 
spend on average a large proportion of their income on rent. In addition to 
the rent, energy bills are becoming increasingly important for tenants. It is, 
however, the housing association that invests in the quality of the thermal 
isolation, while the tenant takes advantages of the investments. In other 
words, the relationship between the costs and benefits of investments is a dif-
ficult one for housing associations, utility companies and tenants to manage. 
Presenting the benefits of thermal isolation to tenants in combination with 
rent increases would provide an extra incentive for housing associations to 
invest in thermal isolation and thus improve housing quality. The implication, 
however, is that a housing association’s influence on its tenants’ cost of living 
can extend beyond rent alone.
■
■
■
■
■
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 4.5 Comparison of sectors
 4.5.1 Introduction
This section compares relevant characteristics of the retail sector, Dutch mu-
nicipalities and Dutch housing associations. The differences identified in this 
chapter are shown in Table 4.2. Occasionally, we have added characteristics 
which were not described in previous sections of this chapter, but which are 
relevant to the discussion in this section. The rest of the section discusses the 
differences in detail.
 4.5.2 Freedom of choice
Effective demand is brought to bear most directly in the retail sector, where 
it has the most direct consequences for the chain. There is a high degree of 
differentiation and of freedom of choice for the end client. Demand in mu-
nicipalities is expressed in different ways. Some of the demand is expressed 
collectively in elections, but only when delivery is an issue at election time. 
The government ultimately decides on the actual purchasing and delivery. 
Another part of the demand operates through the direct benefit principle: a 
citizen who demands a certain service pays for and receives that service. The 
greater the direct benefit from a given government facility, the more the indi-
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Table 4.2 Sector comparison: differences related to the position of the customer
Customers Retail Municipalities Housing associations
Freedom of choice of supplier + –– ––  (maintenance)
Freedom of choice of product + – 0 (maintenance)
Amount of different categories of 
products/services is high
Depending on the retailer, 
but may be +
+ or 0 –
Big size of the assortment of products/
services per category
Depending on the retailer, 
but may be +
– –
Influence of customers on choice of 
service attributes
+ – 0 (maintenance)
Services/products are delivered by 
external parties
+ (products)  
– (services)
0 0
Performance is related to customer 
satisfaction
+ – 0
Relationship between customer 
satisfaction and loyalty
+ –– –
Payment is related to the value of the 
product or service
+ –– 0
Large share of income spent Customers’ choice 0 +
Influence of customers on policy – + 0
 ––  = Not applicable – = Minimally applicable 0 = Rather applicable + = Most applicable
vidual will pay. Finally, part of the exercise of demand by citizens is taken up 
by social organisations that represent citizens’ interests.
For the housing services market, one can make a distinction between the 
mobile market and the immobile market. With regards to the mobile hous-
ing services market, tenants in a tight market (suction) are almost forced to 
opt for any housing association with a vacant dwelling. A tenant in a relaxed 
housing market (pressure) has freedom of choice and is a ‘consumer’. Where-
as the customer of a retail firm is a consumer and service interactions oc-
cur in accordance with customer choice, the same is not always true for mu-
nicipalities and housing associations. House seekers who fall within housing 
associations’ priority groups have little choice, especially in a tight housing 
market.
The immobile housing services market concerns the relationship between 
tenants and housing associations. This situation implies high exit barriers for 
tenants, as moving is expensive. This implies that the tenant’s position can 
be considered a ‘captive’ one. Planned maintenance, unlike reactive mainte-
nance, is tied to the dwelling, not to the customer. After a tenant has taken 
occupation of the home, he or she can become familiar with the planned 
maintenance schedule. If appropriate, the customer can immediately enjoy 
void repairs. As soon as residents become tenants of a social landlord, they 
generally have little choice regarding planned maintenance. Reactive mainte-
nance and service maintenance may occur at the tenant’s request, but com-
pulsory sourcing applies and there is limited choice regarding planning, the 
manner of execution, and the result.
This situation begs for tenant participation via the provision of choice re-
lating to maintenance inside the dwelling. The housing association or the 
maintenance service supplier may present tenants with certain options in 
combination with the implications for the price. In other words, tenants could 
be offered certain product or delivery process upgrades in exchange for a fee.
 4.5.3 Assortments
Depending on the retailer, customers are offered a certain scope of different 
categories of products or services. A supermarket is one example of a retailer 
that offers a range of product categories (such as bakery products or snacks), 
relating both to food and non-food products. In addition, the retailer can de-
termine the degree of choice relating to products or services within each cat-
egory. Service retailers often allow customers to influence service attributes. 
One example is the hairdresser who adapts his service delivery to customers’ 
wishes, resulting in a satisfactory hairstyle and a nice chat while the service 
is delivered.
Residents enjoy a relatively wide range of different ‘categories’ of services 
from their municipalities. The latter offer services such as swimming facilities 
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and building permits, which are apparently unrelated to each other. However, 
the assortment per category is very limited. Usually, there is only one swim-
ming pool in a certain district. In addition, the influence of customers on the 
choice of service attributes (characteristics) is limited. The smaller and poorer 
the municipality is, the fewer facilities it may offer to its tenants. In addition, 
the supply from neighbouring municipalities may influence the offer.
The services offered by Dutch housing associations are usually restricted 
to the housing category, which includes energy and water. There is some as-
sortment of services within that category, such as maintenance of heating 
and water systems and exterior paintwork, but tenants can seldom choose 
between services. For reactive maintenance inside the dwelling, they may 
choose not to take the service. Moreover, tenants may have (little) choice re-
lating to service attributes.
For planned maintenance (outside the dwelling), tenants can be asked 
about their preferences relating to both product and process characteristics. 
These preferences then form important input for purchasing decisions. For 
tenant satisfaction, receiving subsequent feedback on their input is essential.
 4.5.4 Service and product delivery
With services retail, it is usually the retailer that delivers the service to his 
or her customers. In most cases, the delivery of services is the retailer’s core 
business. For product retailers, meanwhile, products are often delivered by 
external suppliers. Both housing associations (for maintenance) and munici-
palities often make use of external service suppliers.
 4.5.5 Value for money
The relationship between performance and satisfaction in a retail context is 
usually tight. In addition, satisfied customers tend to be loyal and frequently 
lead to repeat business.
For a municipality, performance means more than customer satisfaction 
alone (see e.g. Kelly, 2005). Public accountability, for instance, might be at least 
as important a goal. Customer satisfaction, in addition, is virtually separate 
from loyalty in this case. The decision to move to another city is usually not 
inspired by dissatisfaction with a municipality’s service delivery.
For housing associations, performance of maintenance service delivery 
can be related to cost/value considerations, and objectives such as liveability 
of neighbourhood, tenant satisfaction and even sustainability (see Chapter 2). 
Therefore, there is certainly some relationship between performance and cus-
tomer satisfaction, but this is not as tight as that for retail. Customer satisfac-
tion is related to loyalty to a certain extent. The decision to move to another 
housing association is usually not inspired by dissatisfaction with mainte-
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nance service delivery, but may be related to the characteristics of the dwell-
ing and neighbourhood. Often, changing circumstances in the life course of 
tenants, such as getting a new job, lead to dissatisfaction with the tenant’s 
current circumstances and thus with the housing service (see e.g. Van der 
Vlist et al., 2002).
As choices relating to a municipality are generally collective, the same 
is also largely true for social landlords. Sometimes tenants are involved in 
choices. Purchasing decisions cannot be derived directly from effective de-
mand, so the association must make decisions on the basis of its own judg-
ment. However, the service received by a tenant in return for paying rent is 
less differentiated than those provided by a municipality. Whereas the service 
supplied by a municipality in return for taxes varies widely, the service pro-
vided by a housing association in return for rent is always connected either 
with housing or, in a broader sense, with the liveability of the surroundings 
(social property).
 4.5.6 Share of income spent
The share of income that tenants spend on housing is high. Given the fact 
that they also have a ‘captive’ position, tenants may be considered to be vul-
nerable. This is less the case for municipalities (although the share of the resi-
dents’ income spent on government services is extremely high). The share of 
income spent on some forms of retail may be high (e.g. in the case of super-
markets), whereas for others, such as hairdressers, the proportion of income 
spent is usually restricted.
The tenant’s position in the social rented sector is not the same as that 
of the client in the retail sector, or the citizen. Compared with the client in 
the retail sector, the tenant is in a vulnerable position. The groups targeted by 
social policy mostly spend a high proportion of their income on rent. Further-
more, the choice of homes may be extremely limited. The tenant is therefore 
heavily dependent on the landlord. Tenants received some protection in law 
and assistance from institutions such as De Nederlandse Woonbond, which 
appears to have a stronger position on housing than that of the more general, 
non-specialised Dutch Consumers Association, the ‘Consumentenbond’.
 4.5.7 Influence on management and policy
The distance between decision-makers and end-customers appears to be 
greater for municipalities and housing associations than it is for the retail 
sector. This is related to a lack of competition for the client, although govern-
ance structures partly compensate for this (the direct benefit principle and 
democracy provide something of an incentive). In addition, both housing as-
sociations and municipalities have to make collective choices for customers; 
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the choices that they make cannot always be attributed to individuals. These 
differences imply that municipalities and housing associations have a less 
pressing need than the retail sector for a purchasing function that sees some 
responsibility for the purchasing of front office services to be coupled directly 
to the end-client’s preferences.
Unlike clients in the retail sector, tenants have an opportunity to become 
involved in the management and policy of landlords. The involvement of ten-
ants in this process is set down in the Tenant and Landlord Consultation Act 
and the BBSH.
 4.5.8 What could be learned from retail 
and municipalities?
From retail, aspects of the principle of category management could function 
as an inspiration for housing associations. By improving the performance of 
an entire category rather than of separate products, improved performance 
might be delivered overall. Comparably, maintenance performance as a whole 
could be improved by integrating decision-making for reactive maintenance, 
planned maintenance and void repairs. Currently, separate departments of 
housing associations are often responsible for these three maintenance types, 
despite the links between the three, which may well hamper the achieve-
ment of optimal outcomes. For instance, structural maintenance could be 
aligned with installation maintenance in order to improve energy quality and 
to decrease energy bills. Integration could, in addition, be achieved for main-
tenance and (small) improvements. For instance, maintenance workers that 
visit tenants for reactive maintenance could also install new police-approved 
locks, if so desired by tenants.
Unlike municipalities, the situation of retailers is one of competing for cus-
tomer favour. Public accountability and transparency function as incentives 
for rational decision-making by municipalities and effective spending. With 
regard to the immobile housing services market, competition is very restrict-
ed. In order to stimulate effectiveness in spending, there seems some need 
for public monitoring and transparency, at any rate regarding investment in 
public services. Unlike the activities performed in a competitive setting, there 
is limited incentive for efficient investment. Nonetheless, public, and in par-
ticular European, procurement rules are not being applied, and actual trans-
parency is thus limited. Given this, it would be advisable to apply transparent 
procedures enabling fair competition among candidate suppliers.
For collective choices, when the direct benefit principle cannot be applied, 
residents have access to democratic tools in order to influence their munici-
pality’s decisions. For housing associations, planned maintenance can be per-
ceived as a form of collective choice. Tenants can thus use tenants’ organi-
sations to empower themselves. However, it appears that currently, the fact 
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that decisions are taken at a business (instead of local) level, affecting many 
aspects including the price and quality of services, is seldom contested. Giv-
ing stakeholders (e.g. tenants) a strong position vis-à-vis the internal deci-
sion-making structure of housing associations (e.g. supervisory bodies) could 
improve debate, allowing accountability to follow transparency. This could 
include paying attention to the representativeness of tenants’ organisations. 
Increased accountability for tenants’ interests would probably lead to an in-
creased focus on the customer. It would be logical, for instance, for the pur-
chasing department to become accountable for its performance from the ten-
ant’s perspective. Inadequate service delivery would have consequences for 
the housing association’s decision-makers.
At the level of the housing block, for collective maintenance choices, i.e. 
planned maintenance, tenants’ opinions could be collected and used for 
maintenance priority setting. For reactive maintenance, the individual tenant 
might be offered certain product or delivery process upgrades in exchange for 
a fee. In any case, it is important to keep tenants well-informed about expect-
ed maintenance works.
An adapted version of this chapter was also included in the Habiforum report Inkoop 
van onderhoud en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007).
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 5 Impact of maintenance 
services on tenant 
satisfaction in social 
housing
 5.1 Introduction
 5.1.1 Housing services
This research focuses on maintenance services purchased by housing associ-
ations and delivered to tenants. The implication is that these customers can-
not make such purchasing decisions themselves1.
The maintenance service is procured by the housing association and deliv-
ered to the housing association’s customers, i.e. the tenants, as a constituent 
part of the entire housing service (Van Mossel and Van der Valk, 2006). The de-
livery of high-quality maintenance stimulates tenant (residential) satisfaction, 
which, in turn, means fulfilling important aspects of housing associations’ so-
cial objectives and concurrently improving the housing stock’s market posi-
tion (Gruis et al., 2005). In order to optimise tenant satisfaction, the quality of 
essential maintenance services should be secured. Knowing which services 
are essential to tenants allows housing associations set priorities relating to 
maintenance policy and purchasing. This chapter will investigate the ques-
tion of which commodity should receive housing associations’ primary atten-
tion in order to stimulate tenant satisfaction with regard to maintenance.
The periodically carried out ‘WBO’2 research (2002) has investigated the 
main factors that influence residential satisfaction. This study measured resi-
dents’ perceptions of the importance of 26 characteristics of dwellings and 
living environments, such as the size and atmosphere of the dwelling, contact 
with neighbours, and the maintenance condition of the dwelling. In what fol-
lows, we only present the results relating to the tenants of housing associa-
tions. The levels of importance were measured on a four-point scale, ranging 
from (1) ‘very important’ to (4) ‘very unimportant’. The perceived importance 
of a dwelling’s maintenance condition received a rating of 1.69, one of the 
most important aspects for tenants. Compared with other aspects related to 
the dwelling itself (and not the living environment), it is even considered to 
  The only services directly purchased (or conducted) by tenants are those conducted through the tenants’ self-
activation policy in maintenance, called Do-It-Yourself-Work (‘ZAV’).
  The ‘WBO’ (Housing demand survey, 2002) is a large-scale Dutch questionnaire on housing, conducted in or-
der to get insights into developments in the housing market. To meet this aim, the composition of families, hous-
ing situations, housing preferences, and the moving behaviour of the Dutch residents are investigated (http://
www.scp.nl, 03-05-06). WBO 2002 is a representative sample of about 120,000 Dutch residents administered by 
Statistics Netherlands (Kauko, 2005). Recently, the WBO survey has been succeeded by the WOON survey. This 
survey replaces both the WBO survey and the Qualitative Housing Survey (KWR).
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be the most important.
In order to set spending priorities for maintenance, it is essential to know 
what one’s customers’ preferences are. From the start, attempts to increase 
end-customer satisfaction should be aimed at those services that are impor-
tant to end-customers. For individual housing associations, efforts should be 
further prioritised if the resulting service delivery is found to be inadequate, 
and additional efforts may be needed to monitor service quality.
 5.1.2 Satisfaction with maintenance
The current research focuses on tenants’ perceptions with regard to the im-
portance of and satisfaction with maintenance services. These topics were in-
vestigated by means of a large-scale survey held among more than 6,000 ten-
ants of Dutch housing associations.
As far as we are aware, end-customers’ preferences for maintenance servic-
es have seldom previously been explored. This chapter aims to fill this knowl-
edge gap. Nevertheless, substantial prior research into customers’ preferences 
with regard to housing in general has been conducted. Residential satisfaction 
has long been a major research topic in disciplines such as sociology, psychol-
ogy, planning, and geography (e.g. Bailly and Peart, 1992; Bruin and Cook, 1997; 
Canter and Rees, 1982; Cutter, 1982; Diaz-Serrano, 2006; Galster and Hesser, 
1981; Grzeskowiak et al., 2006; Lévy-Leboyer and Ratiu, 1993; Lu, 1999; Marans 
and Rodgers, 1975; Weidemann and Anderson, 1985). The main focus of resi-
dential satisfaction research, however, is related to residents’ residential mo-
bility following dissatisfaction with their living situations (Fang, 2006). Resi-
dential satisfaction is often seen as an intervening variable to help understand 
residential mobility (e.g. Marans, 1976; Rossi, 1980; Speare, 1974).
In this chapter, we examine the perceived importance of and satisfaction 
with maintenance services. This leads us to the following research question: 
Which maintenance services are of primary importance for tenant satisfaction with 
maintenance?
 5.2 Literature review and expectations
In this section, we will outline some expectations concerning the impor-
tance of maintenance services. For this reason, we focus on the ‘generic serv-
ice’ (Levitt, 1980) i.e. the ‘problem-solving benefits’ of the service (Kotler and 
Armstrong, 2004), assuming that these the most important part of the service. 
Chapter 6 will draw attention to the relative importance of different service 
aspects.
Maintenance can be perceived as a form of problem-solving for those 
needs that are covered by building components and installations in dwellings. 
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With regard to needs related to housing, Lévy-Leboyer and Ratiu (1993) make 
a distinction between what one might call minimum conditions of physical 
comfort (shelter, heating, light) and conditions of ‘socially defined comfort’. 
Phillips (1967) and Peach (1982) have explored different categories of physi-
ological wellbeing and comfort. Heijs and Stringer (1987) categorise the corre-
sponding sub-properties of the dwelling as thermal, visual, auditory, olfactory 
(smell), tactile and kinaesthetic comfort. Heijs and Stringer subsequently add 
two categories, one that incorporates general necessary conditions for physi-
cal health and safety, and another relating to all kinds of conditions for sat-
isfying occupants’ (other) biological needs, such as eating, drinking, sleeping, 
and personal hygiene.
De Jonge (1960, 1961) suggests that, besides physiological needs, the dwell-
ing must also satisfy psychological needs (for example, privacy), cultural 
needs (such as being able to carry out particular activities in particular spac-
es), and fashion-dictated needs (for example, the style of decor). There is a 
decreasing amount of durability of these needs (Priemus, 1984), which may 
point at some prioritising.
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
When it comes to the prioritisation of general needs, the best-known au-
thor is Maslow (e.g. 1943; 1970). Many theorists and practitioners adhere to 
Maslow’s hierarchy, but there are also those who challenge his approach 
(Bellott and Tutor, 1990; Frame, 1996; Maddi, 1977; Sackett, 1998). Some have 
questioned the practicality and reality of the hierarchy, the process by which 
people proceed through it, and its relevance and applicability to modern soci-
ety. However, while not particularly new, his hierarchy of needs is still wide-
ly applied in many different disciplines and has been tested by others than 
Maslow. For instance, Franke (1983a: 16) stated that it ‘yielded the hypothesis 
that a high degree of dissatisfaction of lower-level needs results in behavior 
conducive to economic growth,’ and found strong and significant relation-
ships between the basic needs of managers and the economic growth rates of 
11 developed nations.
In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943), there are at least five sets of 
goals that may be termed basic needs (Figure 5.1): physiological, safety, love 
and belonging, esteem, and self-actualisation. Maslow believed that human 
beings aspire to becoming self-actualizing (Stephens, 2000). The needs that 
are usually taken as the starting point for motivation theory are the so-called 
physiological drives. A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem 
would most probably crave food more strongly than for anything else. If the 
physiological needs are relatively well satisfied, a new set of needs will then 
emerge, which may be categorised roughly as the ‘safety needs’. If both the 
physiological and safety needs are fairly well satisfied, the needs for love, af-
fection and belonging subsequently arise. An individual’s need for belong-
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ing or love covers a wide variety of needs, from a sense of affiliation (group 
membership, clubs, churches, work affiliations, etc.) to friendship and love of 
spouses, children, and parents (Seeley, 1988). All people have a need or desire 
for a stable, firmly grounded, high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect 
or self-esteem, and for the respect of others. The esteem needs represent an 
individual’s desire for a feeling of self-confidence and adequacy. This may re-
flect internal feelings of strength, achievement, independence, or external de-
sires for reputation, prestige, recognition, attention, etc. (Seeley, 1988). Finally, 
self-actualisation indicates the desire to realise one’s full potential (Seeley, 
1988) (see Figure 5.1).
Application to maintenance
Maintenance influences the characteristics of dwellings and, as a result, the 
way in which dwellings fulfil certain needs. The most ‘basic’ needs are physi-
ological. Kitchens, bathrooms, toilets and drains play some role with regard 
to these. They enable residents to eat and to excrete. However, maintenance 
of these building components is not always directly related to physiological 
needs. In particular, maintenance of kitchens, toilets and bathrooms is often 
primarily directed towards visual aspects and luxury: tiles, painting, cupboards 
etc. In this case, maintenance has more to do with fashion-dictated needs, and 
therefore, with esteem. This aspect is positioned much higher in the hierar-
chy of needs than that of physiological needs. Services related to physiological 
needs that are functional (as opposed to visual) include maintenance of heat-
ing and water systems, and maintenance of drains. Therefore one would ex-
pect these two maintenance services to be essential for tenants. Roofing is an-
other function that is related to people’s physiological needs. It seldom occurs 
that a roof loses its entire function, however. Small leaks are more common, 
but their impact is limited. Maintenance of lifts may also impact the function-
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ing of a dwelling with regard to physiological needs, but this may only affect a 
restricted group of tenants. For tenants who are physically dependent on lifts, 
having functioning lifts is essential for being able to care for themselves and 
obtain essentials, such as food. For tenants who are not dependent on lifts, the 
functioning of lifts, and therefore lift maintenance ‘only’ has to do with com-
fort, although this is partly dependent on which floor the dwelling is situated.
After physiological needs, safety needs are essential for human beings. 
Well-functioning hinges and locks of windows and external doors provide 
the best protection against external violence. One would thus expect main-
tenance of hinges and locks of windows and external doors to be very impor-
tant for tenant satisfaction with maintenance. More indirectly, a well-main-
tained environment directly surrounding the dwelling may add to security, 
of to the perception of security. There are many maintenance services that 
can influence the liveability of the neighbourhood. In multi-family dwellings, 
maintenance of shared areas is important for liveability. This includes main-
tenance of entrance halls, galleries, corridors, stairs, lighting in shared areas, 
and cleaning of shared areas. In addition, exterior paintwork, maintenance 
of communal greenery and maintenance of paving around a building may af-
fect tenants’ feelings of security, albeit to a limited degree. In a more general 
sense, almost all types of maintenance imply some impact on safety. When, 
for instance, maintenance of balconies is neglected for years, safety levels 
may be reduced. In particular, inadequate maintenance of heating and water 
systems may carry significant risks for inhabitants.
The third level in the pyramid, ‘love and belonging’, is not directly influ-
enced by maintenance. Esteem, on the other hand, can be influenced by the 
visual, aesthetic impact of maintenance. One would expect this to be par-
ticularly applicable to individual dwellings, rather than shared areas. Exterior 
paintwork is a service that might also influence esteem, as might the mainte-
nance of kitchens, toilets and bathrooms, communal greenery and the main-
tenance of paving around a building. The effect, however, will be limited and 
not easily measureable.
An overview of the functions of the services is offered in Table 3.2, Chap-
ter 3. By means of the large-scale survey presented in this chapter, the actual 
perceived importance of maintenance services has been measured. In the 
next section, we will explain the different measures of attribute importance 
used to gauge the perceived importance of maintenance services.
 5.3 Measures of attribute importance and 
impact on tenant satisfaction
This research measured the perceived importance of maintenance services in 
two ways:
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by asking respondents to indicate the importance of maintenance services 
directly;
by estimating the importance of maintenance services in a regression 
analysis, with satisfaction with maintenance in general as the dependent 
variable, and satisfaction scores for the distinct maintenance services as 
predictors.
The direct importance measurement (the first concept above) covers two dif-
ferent measures: a rating and a top-three ranking. Why conduct two types of 
measurement for the same concept, and why use two concepts? According 
to Heeler et al. (1979), convergent validation is an attempt to obtain similar 
results using different measures of the same concept. When applied to meas-
ures arising from different conceptual bases, proof of convergence is an es-
pecially strong validation for the measures. Absence of convergence can also 
enhance our understanding of both the concepts and the measures.
Some researchers identify the disadvantages of direct importance meas-
urements (Oliver, 1997). According to Matzler and Sauerwein (2002), it is ques-
tionable whether respondents assess ‘importance’ as ‘desirable’ or as ‘essen-
tial’, and this may have consequences for the rating that is given and for the 
conclusions that may be drawn. Some factors need a certain minimum qual-
ity level, and if absent, the entire service may be rated very low (basic factors). 
Other factors only become important for customers when their quality level 
is high (performance factors). If factors are interpreted as being ‘desirable’ 
for respondents, then basic factors become insignificant, while performance 
factors become decisive. In order to meet this objection, in addition to direct 
measures of attribute importance, we have asked respondents to list their top 
three most important attributes. We assume that the top three ratings will 
visualise ‘essential’ maintenance services from the customer’s perspective.
One problem with explicitly derived importance weights is that they may 
result from socially acceptable or ‘politically correct’ answers (Oliver, 1997: 59), 
or from strategic considerations (Matzler and Sauerwein, 2002). Maintenance 
of communal facilities, for instance, may be given a high importance rating, 
but in many cases it would not play a major role if tenants were be allowed to 
choose what their money were to be spend on. For instance, maintenance of 
balconies might be rated as extremely important and as contributing to low 
tenant satisfaction if tenants expected extra maintenance efforts to be con-
ducted as a result of the survey.
In order to check the sensitivity of the measurement of the stated impor-
tance of attributes, three different measurements were conducted. In Section 
5.5, the differences in results for the three measurements will be indicated 
and discussed.
■
■
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 5.4 Methods
 5.4.1 The questionnaire and response
A questionnaire was used to measure tenants’ perceptions of the importance 
of maintenance services, and tenants’ satisfaction with various maintenance 
services. This questionnaire was sent to tenants in the Netherlands who live 
in social rented housing. Other clients of housing associations, such as home 
owners who enjoy the technical services of housing associations, were not 
included in the sample. The sample consisted of respondents who are cus-
tomers (i.e. tenants) of four main Dutch housing associations located in cen-
tral and western areas of the Netherlands, namely: Vivare, Portaal, Vestia, and 
Staedion. The questionnaires were distributed in February 2006. This distribu-
tion was preceded in December 2005 by a pilot study. Table 5.1 sets out the 
key characteristics of the four housing associations.
Approximately 28,000 questionnaires were sent to potential respondents, 
and more than 6,000 respondents participated by returning the questionnaire. 
This amounts to a response rate of 22%. Reminders were not sent, since the 
response rate was higher than we had expected (20% response). Respondents 
could either fill in the questionnaire on paper or online. 5.6% responded on-
line and 94.4% responded in writing, and the results of both groups are highly 
comparable. As far as the characteristics of respondents are concerned, we 
can conclude that the online respondents were, on average, almost ten years 
younger than respondents who filled in the paper version of the question-
naire, and fewer of them were retired. Moreover, in the case of online re-
spondents, 64% were male (compared with 47% male overall), and they tend-
ed to be more highly educated.
The attributes – the maintenance services – were determined by examining 
the literature (see e.g. Straub, 2001; Thomas et al., 2005), and by asking experts 
as well as tenants for their opinions. Only attributes that might have some 
impact on residential satisfaction were included. For example, construction 
work without any aesthetic, functional or other impact that might directly in-
fluence tenant satisfaction was not included (see Table 5.2 for a description of 
the specific maintenance services).
The levels of importance of and satisfaction with each of these attributes 
were then evaluated using the large-scale survey described above. Respond-
ents’ perceptions of the importance of the various maintenance services were 
measured on a seven-point scale, ranging from (1) ‘extremely unimportant’, 
through (4) ‘neither important nor unimportant’, to (7) ‘extremely important’. 
The levels of satisfaction were also measured on a seven-point scale, ranging 
from (1) ‘extremely dissatisfied’, through (4) ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’, 
to (7) ‘extremely satisfied’.
We also explored how respondents evaluated the current maintenance of 
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their dwelling by asking: ‘How do you experience the current maintenance 
of your dwelling?’ Seven categories of answers were provided, ranging from 
(1) ‘extremely negative’, through (4) ‘neither negative nor positive’, to (7) ‘ex-
tremely positive’.
A pre-test was conducted in two phases. First, the survey instrument was 
pre-tested by ten purchasing and technical management professionals to 
ensure content validity. These practicing managers read, checked and made 
recommendations for changes to the survey in a group meeting and a small 
number of separate meetings. According to the recommendations, some 
questions were rephrased to improve validity and clarity. Second, the ques-
tionnaire was sent to 613 potential respondents, all customers of the Stae-
dion housing association who lived in the ‘Lamel’ housing block in The Hague. 
A total of 116 questionnaires were returned. When these were evaluated, spe-
cial attention was paid to the difficulties experienced by respondents when 
filling in the questionnaire (see Appendix 2 for the questionnaire).
 5.4.2 Regression analyses
Regression analyses must be conducted under certain conditions. First of all, 
the predictors must be linearly independent, i.e. one must not be able to ex-
press any predictor as a linear combination of the others. This condition tells 
us that the correlations between the independent variables should not be too 
high. While it continues to be a point of debate for statisticians, a commonly 
accepted (although somewhat strict) rating is 0.65. In this research, we as-
sume that a score higher than 0.65 may suggest multicollinearity problems. 
The individual effects of variables that are connected too closely to one an-
other cannot be distinguished any more.
For single-family dwellings, only maintenance of toilets and maintenance 
of kitchens correlate with a rating higher than 0.65, namely 0.671. For multi-
family dwellings, two pairs of attributes correlate with a rating higher than 
0.65. Again, maintenance of toilets and maintenance of kitchens, rate 0.671. 
In addition, cleaning of shared areas and maintenance of porches, galleries, 
corridors and communal staircases correlate with 0.833. Therefore, mainte-
nance of toilets has been left out of the regression analyses for both single 
and multi-family dwellings. Cleaning of shared areas has been dropped from 
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Table 5.1 Key figures of the housing associations included in the research (consolidated figures)
Staedion Portaal Vivare Vestia
Housing units 32,472 53,969 23,539 71,618
Balance sheet value € 1,379,802,000 € 1,893,785,000 € 730,404,000 € 3,231,000,000 
Employment 388 534 298 915
Local departments 5 5 5 13
Core region of activity The Hague Amersfoort/Utrecht, 
Arnhem/Nijmegen, 
Leiden
Arnhem area Southern 
Randstad
Sources: Annual reports Staedion (2007), Portaal (2007), Vivare (2007), Vestia (2007); data December 31st, 2006
the regression analysis concerning multi-family dwellings.
Another requirement for conducting regression analyses concerns the nor-
mal distribution of variables. This is not the case for the collected data. In ac-
cordance with the Central Limit Theorem, however, the sample used for this 
research is large enough to assume that the sample mean scores resemble 
the mean scores for the population as a whole.
Given the exploratory character of this research, the enter-method for con-
ducting regression analyses was used.
 5.4.3 Missing data
The need for maintenance services depends, in the first place, on the type of 
dwelling. The housing stock can be most obviously broken down into single- 
and multi-family dwellings. Some maintenance services, such as lift main-
tenance, can only be delivered to tenants of multi-family dwellings. For this 
reason, the analyses were conducted separately for single- and multi-family 
dwellings. However, not all multi-family buildings have features such as lifts 
and balconies, meaning that missing values appear for such services – some-
thing that is termed Not Missing At Random (NMAR). NMAR refers to miss-
ing observations related to the outcome of interest. The regression analyses 
have only been conducted for cases that include all answers on the related 
(satisfaction) questions. Therefore in the regression analyses, in particular for 
multi-family dwellings, N is limited compared with the overall response.
 5.5 Results
 5.5.1 The respondents
Appendix 1 shows the respondents’ socio-demographic and household char-
acteristics, as well as the general characteristics of their dwellings. When 
compared with the average figures for the entire population of social rent-
ed housing in the Netherlands (WBO 2002), a number of differences can be 
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Table 5.2 Maintenance services
Maintenance of building components Maintenance of installations Maintenance of surrounding grounds
Exterior paintwork
Entrance hall, gallery, corridors and/or stairs
Hinges and locks of windows and external doors
Kitchens
Drains
Toilets
Cleaning of shared areas
Balconies
Bathrooms
Roofs and gutters
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Heating and water systems
Lifts
Ventilation systems
Lighting in shared areas
•
•
•
•
Paving around the building
Communal greenery
•
•
identified. These had a very limited influence on the results, however, as was 
made clear by the sensitivity analyses. The following differences were iden-
tified. Singles are somewhat underrepresented in the current study (38.4% 
vs. 49.1%). In contrast, couples without children living at home are slightly 
overrepresented (30.4% vs. 23.1%). Furthermore, middle-aged people are over-
represented (45 to 64 years old: 42.2% vs. 29.8%), whereas young people are 
underrepresented (18 to 34 years old: 11% vs. 24.6%). In our sample, tenants 
of single-family dwellings are overrepresented (59.5% vs. 47.1%). This is par-
ticularly the case for tenants living in early post-war houses constructed be-
tween 1945 and 1959 (12.1% vs. 8.7%), and to a lesser extent pre-war houses 
constructed prior to 1940 (8.2% vs. 5.1%). Early post-war multi-family dwell-
ings are underrepresented (1.8% vs. 7.5%), as are multi-family dwellings from 
the 1990s (4.2% vs. 7.4%).
 5.5.2 Mean importance ratings and satisfaction scores
Tables 5.3 and 5.4, respectively, show the means and standard deviations of 
the importance ratings and the satisfaction scores for single-family dwellings 
and multi-family dwellings. In general, the results with regard to the stated 
importance ratings are very similar for single-family and for multi-family 
dwellings. Heating and water systems appear to be the most important main-
tenance service for tenants of both types of dwelling. Other very important 
maintenance services are maintenance of drains, maintenance of lifts (only 
for multi-family dwellings) and maintenance of hinges and locks of windows 
and external doors.
With regard to the satisfaction scores, tenants of multi-family dwellings 
generally seem to be more satisfied with the maintenance services than 
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Table 5.3 Means and standard deviations of the perceived importance ratings and satisfaction scores of 
respondents, single-family dwellings
Maintenance service (n = 3783) 
Importance ratings Satisfaction scores
Mean Std n Mean Std n
Heating and water systems 6.39 0.9 2991 4.81 1.8 2689
Drains 6.27 1.0 2711 4.65 1.7 1972
Hinges and locks of windows and external doors 6.22 1.0 2946 4.74 1.8 2406
Toilets 6.17 1.0 2635 4.49 1.9 2033
Ventilation systems 6.11 1.1 2591 4.23 1.9 1969
Kitchens 6.08 1.1 2622 4.49 1.9 2030
Bathrooms 6.06 1.1 2639 4.07 2.0 2088
Roofs and gutters 6.02 1.1 2961 4.59 1.8 2512
Exterior paintwork 6.01 1.1 2905 4.30 2.0 2687
Paving around the building 5.82 1.2 2778 3.98 1.9 2270
Note: higher scores relate to higher importance and more satisfaction with the particular maintenance service (range 1 to 7).
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
tenants of single-family dwellings. Respondents are most satisfied with the 
maintenance of lighting in shared areas, maintenance of heating and water 
systems, maintenance of hinges and locks of windows and external doors, 
and maintenance of drains. Respondents are less satisfied with the mainte-
nance of porches, galleries, corridors and/or stairways, maintenance of balco-
nies, and maintenance of paving around the building.
 5.5.3 Top three rankings of most important 
maintenance services
We asked the same group of respondents to cite their top three most impor-
tant maintenance services, thus forcing respondents to make choices. We 
counted the number of respondents who rated a maintenance service most 
important, second most important, and third most important. Separate cal-
culations were made for single-family and multi-family dwellings. For com-
mon green space around a building, lifts or a balcony (multi-family dwellings), 
frequencies were divided by the number of respondents who indicated that 
dwelling did indeed include the specific building component or installation. 
This was done in order to correct for differences in response due to the avail-
ability of a certain building component or installation (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).
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Table 5.4 Means and standard deviations of the perceived importance ratings and satisfaction scores of 
respondents, multi-family dwellings
Maintenance service (n = 2202) 
Importance ratings Satisfaction scores
Mean Std n Mean Std n
Heating and water systems 6.37 0.9 1706 4.83 1.8 1522
Lifts 6.26 0.8 1750 4.72 1.3 1718
Drains 6.22 1.0 1528 4.81 1.7 1070
Ventilation systems 6.21 1.0 1595 4.26 2.0 1299
Hinges and locks of windows and external doors 6.20 1.0 1632 4.78 1.8 1303
Toilets 6.18 1.0 1536 4.71 1.8 1152
Cleaning of shared areas 6.18 0.9 1781 4.20 1.7 1731
Porch, gallery, corridors and/or stairways 6.17 0.9 1782 4.12 1.7 1736
Lighting in shared areas 6.13 0.9 1834 4.98 1.5 1718
Kitchens 6.11 1.0 1510 4.61 1.9 1116
Bathrooms 6.09 1.1 1501 4.35 2.0 1142
Balconies 5.91 0.9 1781 4.16 1.4 1639
Roofs and gutters 5.90 1.3 1334 4.82 1.7  901
Exterior paintwork 5.89 1.2 1650 4.57 1.9 1475
Paving around the building 5.84 1.2 1598 4.27 1.9 1304
Communal greenery 5.76 1.1 1836 4.28 1.6 1758
Note: higher scores relate to higher importance and more satisfaction with the particular maintenance service (range 1 to 7).
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
Maintenance of heating and water systems and maintenance of hinges 
and locks of windows and external doors receive the highest scores. Moreover, 
maintenance of lifts (in case of multi-family dwellings) gets high scores. Com-
pared with the mean scores (Tables 5.5 and 5.6), maintenance of drains seems 
to be a less prominent issue, and the same applies to maintenance of toilets. 
Exterior paintwork and, to a lesser degree, maintenance of bathrooms, on the 
other hand, get many top three scores, whereas the average importance rat-
ings are not very high for these attributes. One key difference between both 
types of measurement is the relatively high influence of extremely positive 
feelings about the importance of certain attributes in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. The 
interpretation of these results is presented in Section 5.6.
 5.5.4 Regression analyses
Two regression analyses were performed. Regression analyses with ‘satisfac-
tion with the current maintenance of the dwelling’ as a dependent variable 
were performed for both single-family dwellings and multi-family dwellings. 
The satisfaction ratings of the discerned maintenance services were the inde-
pendent variables. The results are presented in the Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
Regression coefficients are high for exterior paintwork and maintenance 
of bathrooms in the case of both single-family and multi-family dwellings. 
Maintenance of hinges and locks of windows and external doors and main-
tenance of heating and water systems are only significant for single-family 
dwellings. The same applies to maintenance of roofs and gutters, and main-
tenance of kitchens. Maintenance of entrance hall, gallery, corridors and/or 
stairs is an attribute that significantly regresses with the evaluation of tenant 
satisfaction with maintenance for multi-family dwellings.
Until now, we have not examined the influence of socio-demographic vari-
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ables on the results. Part of the unexplained variance of the regression of sat-
isfaction with the discerned maintenance services with tenant satisfaction 
with maintenance in general may be due to these variables. For single-family 
dwellings, the contribution of socio-demographic, geographic and construc-
tion-related variables to the degree of explained variance is 15%.3 The entire 
explained variance is 55%. For multi-family dwellings, the contribution of so-
cio-demographic, geographic and construction-related variables to the degree 
of explained variance is 43%. The entire explained variance is 77%.
  The following variables were included in the analyses: Gender, Plan to move within two years, Family income, 
Source of income (as dummies), Age, Type of family (as dummies), Community (as dummies), Education (as 
dummies), number of hours of labour/week outside home (respondent), number of hours of labour/week outside 
home (partner of respondent – excluded from multi-family dwellings analysis because of multicollinearity), Ur-
banisation, Part of country and Year of construction.
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 5.6 Discussion and conclusions
 5.6.1 Research question
How, then, can one answer the research question: Which maintenance servic-
es are of primary importance for tenant satisfaction with maintenance? One 
should recall that we initially made a distinction between single-family and 
multi-family dwellings.
 5.6.2 Single-family dwellings
From the analyses, we can conclude that maintenance of heating and water 
systems and maintenance of hinges and locks of windows and external doors 
are both very important for tenants of single-family dwellings. These are serv-
ices that directly contribute to people’s essential basic needs: that is, their 
physiological needs and safety. In particular, problems relating to inadequate 
service may lead directly to unsafe and very uncomfortable situations.
Maintenance of bathrooms and kitchens and maintenance of roofs and 
gutters are also considered important through all measurements. When striv-
ing for maximisation of tenant satisfaction with maintenance for tenants liv-
ing in single-family dwellings, the quality of delivery of these services should 
be assured. These services also contribute to satisfying people’s physiological 
needs. In addition, and particularly for maintenance of bathrooms and kitch-
ens, good maintenance may help to meet fashion-dictated needs (esteem).
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Table 5.5 Regression analysis regarding maintenance services for tenants of single-family dwellings
Unstandardised  
Coefficients
Standardised 
Coefficients t Significance
Maintenance services (N = 1067) B Standard Error Beta
(Constant) 0.267 0.136 2.020 0.044
Exterior paintwork 0.210 0.025 0.230 8.331 0
Hinges and locks of windows and external doors 0.193 0.027 0.200 7.033 0
Bathrooms 0.180 0.025 0.204 7.253 0
Heating and water systems 0.152 0.027 0.155 5.633 0
Roofs and gutters 0.098 0.028 0.097 3.465 0.001
Kitchens 0.062 0.028 0.065 2.257 0.024
Ventilation systems 0.038 0.027 0.041 1.382 0.167
Toilets 0.006 0.031 0.006 0.195 0.845
Paving around the building *
Drains *
* The coefficients were restricted to have a value ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one. The explanatory 
factors indicated with ‘*’ were dropped for further analyses because of a ‘wrong’ sign of the coefficient.
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
Exterior paintwork is often ranked as the most important maintenance 
service. Moreover, the correlation with general satisfaction on maintenance 
is high. However, the average importance rating that is awarded by respond-
ents to this attribute is relatively low. Often, respondents that assign a rela-
tively low satisfaction score to a certain attribute give a relative high impor-
tance rating to that attribute. Further analysis of the results suggests that 
this is particularly the case for exterior paintwork. The group of people that 
ranked this maintenance service first includes many people who were dis-
satisfied with exterior paintwork. In other words, maybe strategic considera-
tions played a part, following Matzler and Sauerwein (2002). Another reason 
for the reported differences in the results of measurements can be attributed 
to the fact that one can expect satisfaction with maintenance in general to 
be judged with the most predominant maintenance service in mind, which 
might be exterior paintwork – a service that might be predominant both in 
terms of process and result. The result, or the lack of result, can be noticed 
easily due to the obvious visual impact, and might thereby contribute to the 
‘esteem needs’ of tenants. The impact is not only clear to recipients, but also 
to neighbours and others. People are often confronted with exterior paint-
work in daily life, for instance due to scaffolding. Thus when compared with 
other maintenance services that have more of a direct impact on wellbeing, 
[ 0 ]
Table 5.6 Regression analysis regarding maintenance services for tenants of multi-family dwellings
Unstandardised  
Coefficients
Standardised 
Coefficients t Significance
Maintenance services (N = 134) B Standard Error Beta
(Constant) 1.054 0.504 2.091 0.039
Exterior paintwork 0.412 0.086 0.434 4.778 0
Porch, gallery, corridors, and/or stairways 0.203 0.092 0.213 2.195 0.030
Bathrooms 0.202 0.081 0.222 2.489 0.014
Heating and water systems 0.131 0.080 0.139 1.639 0.104
Paving around the building 0.130 0.095 0.133 1.363 0.176
Hinges and locks of windows and external doors 0.081 0.093 0.085 0.870 0.386
Lifts 0.077 0.093 0.083 0.822 0.413
Ventilation systems 0.045 0.095 0.048 0.473 0.637
Lighting in shared areas 0.003 0.120 0.003 0.029 0.977
Roofs and gutters *
Communal greenery *
Drains *
Balconies *
Kitchens *
* The coefficients were restricted to have a value ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one. The explanatory 
factors indicated with ‘*’ were dropped for further analyses because of a ‘wrong’ sign of the coefficient.
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
painting of external building components gets relatively low importance rat-
ings (assuming the quality is not too disappointing). The impact on general 
satisfaction with maintenance is high, however.
The results for maintenance of drains contrast with those of exterior 
paintwork. The stated importance rating is relatively high, but drain mainte-
nance is not frequently mentioned as being one of the three most important 
maintenance services. Moreover, maintenance of drains does not significant-
ly regress with general satisfaction with maintenance. The results of main-
tenance of drains are not easily visible. Moreover, negative experiences with 
inadequate maintenance of drains are probably less common than those of 
other maintenance services. Therefore, when evaluating the combination of 
all maintenance services, maintenance of drains is not the first service that 
comes to mind. When asked to rate the service, however, most respondents 
will acknowledge the problems that arise when maintenance of drains is in-
sufficient. In that case, a lack of maintenance may affect the fulfilment of (ba-
sic) physiological needs.
 5.6.3 Multi-family dwellings
The results for multi-family dwellings are somewhat different from those 
of single-family dwellings. Maintenance of heating and water systems and 
maintenance of hinges and locks of windows and external doors are still im-
portant for tenants of multi-family dwellings, however, there is no significant 
correlation anymore with satisfaction with maintenance.
In order to increase satisfaction with maintenance for tenants of multi-
family dwellings, instead, attention must be paid to exterior paintwork, main-
tenance of entrance hall, gallery, corridors and/or stairs, and maintenance of 
bathrooms.
It is striking to remark, however, that these maintenance services are not 
among the services that get the highest importance rankings, and also not 
among the services that get the most top three scores. Similar to the situation 
of single-family dwellings, exterior paintwork gets relatively low importance 
ratings. We assume the same reasons for these differences to be applicable as 
for the situation of single-family dwellings.
Maintenance of entrance hall, gallery, corridors and/or stairs is rated better 
than on average. Moreover, this maintenance service earns the fourth place 
of all maintenance services in the frequency of top three scores. Therefore 
we can conclude that for tenants of multi-family dwellings, maintenance of 
these communal facilities should be one of the main priorities. It seems to be 
an important precondition for a positive feeling about the social security in 
the building. In addition to this, for some tenants good maintenance in par-
ticular to stairways is essential for their personal mobility. Therewith it con-
tributes to needs of safety, which are basic needs. Similar to maintenance of 
[ 0 ]
entrance hall, gallery, corridors and/or stairs, maintenance of bathrooms re-
gresses significantly with the general tenant satisfaction with maintenance. 
With regards to the other two measurements however, the maintenance serv-
ice does not exceed the middle bracket. In particular when people are asked 
to rate maintenance services, there are other maintenance services than 
maintenance of bathrooms that get higher ratings (e.g. maintenance of heat-
ing and water systems and maintenance of lifts). A negative evaluation of the 
maintenance condition of the bathroom is something that is easily remarked. 
Comparable to for instance exterior paintwork, inadequate service supply is 
manifest. Similar to the situation of single-family dwellings, maintenance 
of drains gets high importance ratings, while it does not score really high in 
the amount of top three scores. In addition, there is no significant correlation 
with satisfaction with maintenance as a whole. The same results can be no-
ticed for maintenance of lift services.
 5.6.4 Some final remarks
In Section 5.5 we have concluded that besides satisfaction with maintenance 
services, socio-demographic variables explain part of the variance in the eval-
uation of maintenance. Housing associations should acknowledge that dif-
ferences appear in perceived importance of maintenance services between 
individual tenants and between categories of tenants. Tenants with different 
characteristics are mostly scattered all over the properties of housing asso-
ciations. In order to increase tenant satisfaction with maintenance, service 
delivery ideally fits tenants’ demands. As reactive maintenance is often de-
livered to individual tenants, adapting the service to individuals is possible 
through giving them options of choice regarding maintenance service deliv-
ery. Planned maintenance is delivered to groups of tenants. Giving individuals 
options of choice, therefore, might not be possible. Instead some democratic 
influence of tenants may stimulate tenant satisfaction with maintenance.
Elsinga (1995) has investigated the meaning of rights of ownership of 
homes for, in particular, low-income groups in the Netherlands. Part of that 
study was related to the different perceptions of residents about buying or 
renting homes. She found out that tenants give lower report marks to the 
maintenance condition of their dwelling than owner-occupiers do. Elsin-
ga suggested that this difference is related to the fact that owner-occupiers 
generally rate their own work and therefore score higher than tenants who 
evaluate the work of the landlord. This implies the argument that tenant sat-
isfaction with maintenance can be improved by giving tenants some respon-
sibilities and participation in maintenance policy. This would be in conformity 
with the property rights theory (see Sub-Section 2.4.4). As indicated in Chap-
ter 4, tenants can be invited to give their priorities in maintenance. In Chap-
ter 6, attention is given to the tenant-perceived importance of participation in 
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maintenance through giving them options of choice.
In case of housing estates for, or dominated by, specific target groups, such 
as students or elderly, some fit might be achievable between the demand of 
the specific target group and the (tailored) maintenance (purchasing) policy.
In addition, some overall concluding remarks can be made with regard 
to the analyses made in this chapter. While (inadequate) maintenance serv-
ices that can easily be noticed by tenants, such as exterior paintwork, main-
tenance of entrance hall, gallery, corridors and/or stairs and maintenance of 
bathrooms, get importance ratings which are lower than on average, their im-
pact on tenant satisfaction with maintenance in general is significant. On the 
other hand, there are maintenance services that have little visual impact on 
tenants but large impact on requirements for a satisfactory living situation, 
such as comfort and personal mobility. Examples of this type of services are 
maintenance of drains and maintenance of lifts. These services do not regress 
significantly with tenant satisfaction with maintenance in general, but the 
given importance ratings are high.
Finally, maintenance of heating and water systems and maintenance of 
hinges and locks of windows and external doors may, based on this research, 
and at least for tenants of single-family dwellings, be designated as essential. 
Inadequate maintenance of these components is expected to severely harm 
the well being of tenants.
This chapter is based on a paper written in co-operation with Sylvia Jansen (OTB 
Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies, Delft University of 
Technology), which has been submitted to an international journal.
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 6 Securing high-performance 
maintenance service 
delivery
 6.1 Introduction
 6.1.1 Research question
This chapter will investigate which aspects of maintenance service delivery 
are important for securing tenant satisfaction with maintenance.
When the phase of contracting a maintenance supplier is complete, it is 
important to conduct performance measurement, or monitoring, in order to 
secure high-quality maintenance service delivery for tenants. This chapter 
focuses on performance measurement of maintenance service delivery. How-
ever, conclusions regarding the relevant determinants of maintenance service 
quality may also be relevant to earlier stages of the purchasing process, and 
this issue will be addressed in Chapter 7.
The importance of the determinants of maintenance service quality for 
tenant satisfaction is measured by adopting the questionnaire introduced in 
Chapter 5. Relevant determinants of maintenance service quality can be used 
as input for both purchasing (specifications and award criteria) and perfor-
mance measurement. Part of the performance measurement of maintenance 
service delivery can be covered by referring to the performance measure-
ment tool for quality of service delivery that is currently most widely applied 
in the Dutch social rented sector: the ‘KWH-huurlabel’. In order to get this 
quality mark, tenants’ satisfaction with housing associations’ service delivery 
is measured across the whole spectrum. In this chapter, the coverage of im-
portant determinants of maintenance service quality is measured for main-
tenance alone. The aim of this exploratory research is to investigate what is 
important for tenants in maintenance service delivery, and to study whether 
this is adequately secured by the performance measurement of maintenance 
service delivery by Dutch housing associations. The research question for this 
chapter is thus: Which determinants of maintenance service quality are of primary 
importance for tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance, and how can performance 
measurement of maintenance service delivery in the social rented sector encourage 
tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance?
 6.1.2 Performance measurement
All performance measurement systems consist of a number of individual 
performance measures. There are various ways in which these performance 
measures can be categorised, ranging from Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) bal-
anced scorecard to Fitzgerald et al.’s (1991) framework of results and deter-
minants. The rationale underlying this chapter is that performance measures 
need to be positioned in a strategic context, as they influence what actors do. 
Measurement may be a ‘process of quantification’, but its goal is to stimulate 
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action, and as Mintzberg (1978) has pointed out, it is only through consistency 
of action that strategies are realised (Neely, 2005).
In the manufacturing literature, it is frequently argued that performance 
measures should be derived from strategy; that is, they should be used to re-
inforce the importance of certain strategic variables (Skinner, 1969). Although 
this does not always appear to happen in reality (Neely et al., 1994), the link 
between performance measurement and strategy has been extensively ex-
plored in the business strategy literature. Strategies evolve as decisions are 
made and courses of action are pursued. Indeed, it has been argued that a 
strategy can only be said to exist when one can identify a consistent pattern 
of decisions and action within a firm (Mintzberg, 1978). Hence an important 
question is, how can one induce consistency of decision-making and action 
within an organisation? From an end-customer perspective, this would imply 
operationalising the objective of including tenants’s perspectives in purchas-
ing policies.
In Section 6.2, maintenance services are specified, and the objectives of 
maintenance are clarified. In Section 6.3, attention is given to current practic-
es of performance measurement of maintenance services. The maintenance 
service delivery process is clarified and presented using a conceptual systems 
approach. In addition, the quality mark ‘KWH-huurlabel’ is introduced. ‘KWH’, 
or ‘Kwaliteitscentrum Woningcorporaties Huursector’, is an association that 
presents itself as a quality driver for the Dutch social rented housing sector. 
KWH is renowned for its measurement instruments, which aim to make the 
performance of housing associations more transparent. The organisation has 
performance measurement products for rental processes (the ‘huurlabel’), at-
tributes relating to good governance, tenant participation, management pro-
cesses and societal performance. Section 6.4 contains an evaluation of the 
KWH-huurlabel from the sole perspective of maintenance service delivery. 
Section 6.5 includes the results of a survey of end-customer perceptions about 
maintenance service delivery. These results are then compared with the con-
clusions drawn from the evaluation of KWH. Finally, recommendations are 
suggested for improving the service delivery system.
 6.2 Maintenance services
 6.2.1 Objectives of maintenance
Irrespective of whether maintenance is purchased externally or procured via 
an in-house maintenance department, performance requirements have to be 
set in order to ensure high-quality service delivery. There is thus a need for 
appropriate and measurable performance indicators. This chapter will exam-
ine the process of maintenance, the possibilities for (external) monitoring of 
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this process by using performance measurement, and the appropriateness 
and measurability of performance indictors for maintenance services.
As hybrid organisations, Dutch housing associations both engage in market 
operations and perform public tasks. Each of these activities involves finan-
cial risks. The public tasks are defined in the BBSH (Social Housing Manage-
ment Order) of 1993, which is derived from the Housing Act (1901).
In Chapter 3, we concluded that maintenance, or broader, technical man-
agement, primarily contributes to the following goals:
Yields on real estate – Yields can be earned through real estate market-val-
ue increasing maintenance choices, and through cost-effective procure-
ment of maintenance (TCO);
Residential satisfaction – Residential satisfaction of housing associations’ 
customers can be enhanced through a customer-friendly maintenance 
process and through the quality of maintenance on building components, 
installations and surrounding grounds of buildings;
Liveability of the neighbourhood – The visual and the functional quality of 
surrounding grounds of buildings and external building components (e.g. 
paintwork) has a positive or a negative influence on the liveability of the 
neighbourhood. A special, however scarce category of maintenance servic-
es regard to the up keeping of monumental buildings, or other buildings 
with historical value.
These functions of maintenance perfectly comply with some of the tasks in 
the Social Housing Management Order, namely:
to guarantee the financial continuity of the housing association (see: yields 
on real estate);
to maintain the quality of the housing stock (residential satisfaction);
to increase and maintain the quality of life in the area surrounding the 
dwellings (liveability of the neighbourhood).
On the other hand, the contribution of maintenance to residential satisfac-
tion is only covered by the results of maintenance: the quality of the housing 
stock (plus the housing environment). While the process of maintenance is 
also very important for tenant satisfaction, there is no explicit public duty to 
provide high-quality services to customers. Concurrently, there is little pres-
sure from the market for high-quality service processes. In theory, this im-
plies that housing associations generally go unpunished for providing inad-
equate services to tenants.
One general public task defined in the Social Housing Management Or-
der does reduce the chance of this occurring, namely that relating to ‘ten-
ant involvement in management and policy’. The implications for mainte-
nance service delivery processes are unclear, however. In addition, Aedes, the 
branch organisation for the social rented housing sector, has drafted a code 
■
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of conduct for its members (the ‘AedesCode’). This agreement includes some 
general guidelines relating to tenants, e.g. tenant participation. The most ap-
plicable article is that which states, ‘the wishes and needs of our clients are 
considered key for our business’. This arrangement is, however, too broad to 
be effective for maintenance service delivery. Despite these omissions, from 
the point of view of good social entrepreneurship, high quality maintenance 
processes should be a key issue. How could these be developed for individual 
housing associations? The latter can take the strategic opportunity to choose 
their focus: either yields on real estate, residential satisfaction and liveability 
of the neighbourhood. They may as well follow a diversification strategy and 
opt for more than one objective, however.
 6.2.2 Current use of performance indicators
As mentioned above, maintenance services can lead to financial yields, ten-
ant satisfaction and improved liveability of a neighbourhood. The contribu-
tion of maintenance to the latter has not yet been measured by housing as-
sociations. The contribution of maintenance to financial yields has only been 
measured in terms of costs analyses. Value consequences for objects, as well 
as total costs of ownership, have scarcely been measured. Periodically, the 
level of a building’s maintenance may be measured from a technical point of 
view. Do the building’s components and systems still function according to 
the minimum requirements stated in the maintenance contract? Such min-
imum requirements are usually based on standards set in the Building De-
cree, other regulations, or standards agreed by principals themselves. These 
requirements may take a safety perspective, but can also address issues relat-
ing to utility, sustainability and health. Some housing associations measure 
tenant satisfaction, which is often related to recent maintenance works.
This chapter focuses on tenant satisfaction due to maintenance service de-
livery. The relevant outcome of the maintenance processes is tenant satisfac-
tion; if the latter is achieved, an important part of the housing association’s 
raison d’être as a social enterprise is fulfilled. The desired output should thus 
be related to tenant satisfaction. Residential satisfaction research reports 
form the most direct way of measuring tenant satisfaction in terms of out-
put. Another way of examining tenants’ satisfaction with the maintenance is 
to measure the number and severity of complaints. Attributes, for example, 
might include (dis)satisfaction with timeliness, tidiness, and the meeting of 
commitments by the maintenance supplier. Another way of securing high-
quality services is to measure the actual output of key activities from the 
perspective of tenants. For the results of maintenance, this is usually done 
by supervising performed activities, particularly those relating to planned 
maintenance and void repairs. For reactive maintenance, it is possible to track 
crucial moments in the handling of complaints, such as the information sup-
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ply to the tenant concerning the maintenance process. This all concerns the 
measurement of output. Even parts of the maintenance process when there 
is interaction with the tenant can be considered to be output. The prepara-
tion of such output is considered to be throughput. In other words, given that 
the outcome is tenant satisfaction, throughput in this case is the entire main-
tenance process excluding the interaction with, and the results delivered to, 
tenants. For the delivery of maintenance services, handling the throughput is 
not an easy task. As mentioned before, many parties are involved, and main-
tenance solutions are often complex.
 6.3 Maintenance services and 
performance measurement
 6.3.1 Maintenance contractors and the 
service delivery process
The three main parties that are involved in the service delivery process are:
tenants: the end-customers;
the housing association;
maintenance contractors (or the housing association’s in-house mainte-
nance department).
For the production of maintenance services, the most important inputs are 
the resources and capabilities of internal or external service suppliers. From 
the perspective of the housing associations, however, the actual inputs are 
the means of hiring these service suppliers and monitoring their performance. 
Barney (1991) offers three categories of resources: physical resources, such as 
plant equipment, location and assets; human resources, such as manpower, 
management teams, training and experience; and organisational resources, 
such as culture and reputation. Capabilities are defined as ‘architectural abili-
ties or bonding mechanisms whereby resources are combined in new and in-
novative ways’ (Duncan et al., 1998: 10). It is the purchasing department’s task 
to ensure the right combination of resources and capabilities for the appro-
priate delivery of maintenance services. This is primarily achieved during the 
supplier selection phase of purchasing. In the specification phase, the quality 
requirements for the maintenance service to be delivered are set. Finally, the 
quality of the delivered service is measured in the evaluation phase of the 
contract, or in separate evaluations of specific orders. From the end-custom-
er’s perspective, this service quality can be separated into two components: 
the physical results of the service (on the building components and installa-
tions), and the interactions with the end-customer during the service delivery 
(Van Mossel and Van der Valk, 2006). In this chapter, we focus primarily on the 
1.
2.
3.
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measurement of service delivery quality by housing associations, taking the 
end-customer’s perspective.
Figure 6.1 shows the process of maintenance service delivery from the per-
spective of the housing association. The black box in this case is the actual 
execution of maintenance works by the service supplier. The relevant out-
put is tenant satisfaction with the delivery process of maintenance, and ten-
ant satisfaction with the result of maintenance, i.e. tenant satisfaction with 
maintenance. Tenant satisfaction in general can be perceived as the outcome.
When housing associations want the relevant determinants of main-
tenance service quality to be covered in order to ensure tenant satisfaction 
(which particularly the case for reactive maintenance inside dwellings), it 
is necessary to have the relevant output measurement. At the level of input, 
specifications should include the necessary determinants of maintenance 
service quality in order to be able to monitor these aspects (see Chapter 7).
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 6.3.2 Managing maintenance service delivery
Maintenance services can be directed towards individual customers, housing 
blocks, or part of – or even the entire – housing stock of a housing associa-
tion. Planned maintenance is usually directed towards more than one dwell-
ing, whereas reactive maintenance and void repairs are mostly customised. 
In most circumstances, there are two recipients: the housing association and 
the tenant.
The maintenance agenda is filled from both the ‘bottom-up’ and from the 
‘top-down’. For reactive maintenance and void repairs, maintenance activities 
are highly dependent on the suggestions, complaints and desires of tenants. 
Concurrently, the level of quality is usually determined by the housing associ-
ation’s policy. Ideally, planned maintenance is derived from the housing asso-
ciation’s strategic portfolio/asset plan, which may include tenant preferences 
(Straub, 2002).
Purchasing, whether undertaken by purchasers, technical managers or 
both, is the key interface with maintenance suppliers. Despite this, purchas-
ing is currently frequently perceived as an operational function that only has 
to realise what is stated in the maintenance planning of housing associations. 
This can hamper bottom-up control or the information supply, leading to in-
efficiencies or even ineffectiveness (Van Mossel and Straub, 2006). In addition, 
almost all maintenance services demand different skills, and therefore dif-
ferent disciplines are usually involved (see Chapter 2). This leads to an accu-
mulation of dyadic relationships that have to be managed by housing asso-
ciations in order to secure a high-quality supply, leading to all sorts of supply 
risks. Among other things, performance-based partnerships have been devel-
oped to decrease the number of relationships between the housing associa-
tion and its maintenance service suppliers, particularly those of a short-term 
nature.
Notwithstanding the jumble of parties involved in the supply of mainte-
nance services, in terms of securing both the product and the process quality, 
it is desirable to have some generalised minimum requirements for all sup-
plies and all suppliers of comparable commodities. Concurrently, as already 
mentioned, these requirements need to be well-chosen in order to ensure ef-
fectiveness and efficiency.
 6.4 Determinants of maintenance service quality
 6.4.1 Methods
What determines maintenance service quality? In other words, what should 
we measure when trying to reach high levels of end-customer satisfaction? 
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The importance and satisfaction of the main determinants of maintenance 
service quality have been investigated using the survey questionnaire intro-
duced in Chapter 5 (see further Chapter 5 for a description of the procedure 
used).
A survey questionnaire was developed which aimed to measure the impor-
tance of different determinants of maintenance service quality as perceived 
by the tenant. The determinants of maintenance service quality used for the 
purpose of this research were derived from the determinants of service qual-
ity defined by Parasuraman et al. (1985). Their SERVQUAL model focuses on 
important determinants of service quality, and thus on the question of what 
creates service quality. Five specific dimensions of service quality have been 
identified that apply across a variety of service contexts (Zeithaml et al., 2006):
reliability: ability to perform the promised service dependably and accu-
rately;
responsiveness: willingness to help customers and provide prompt service;
assurance: employees’ knowledge and courtesy and their ability to inspire 
trust and confidence;
empathy: caring, individualised attention given to customers;
tangibles: appearance of physical facilities, equipment, personnel, and 
written materials.
On the basis of exploratory and quantitative research, these five dimensions 
were found to be relevant for many businesses (Zeithaml et al., 2006). We 
therefore assume that these dimensions can also be applied in the present 
context, i.e. that of Dutch housing associations. The general determinants of 
service quality were adapted to the maintenance situation with reference to 
the maintenance literature (Straub, 2001; Thomas, Johnson and Veale, 2005). 
The determinant of the service quality ‘tangibility’, for example, is covered in 
this survey by ‘the quality of the result of maintenance’.
In order to ensure that the determinants that we selected sufficiently cov-
ered what tenants consider important, we discussed them with purchasers, 
marketing managers, technical specialists and representatives from residents’ 
groups. In this way, we achieved a sufficient level of data-saturation. Added 
to the fact that no representative quality characteristics were missing, this 
means that the validity of the research has been ensured. The research’s va-
lidity is supported by the results of the questionnaire survey. Although the 
respondents had the option of adding a determinant of maintenance service 
quality that they deemed to be important, they hardly used this option, and 
the few addition that were made were generally highly fragmented. Two cat-
egories of maintenance quality can be identified that were cited by respon-
dents and that make sense, namely ‘provision of information before the start 
of the maintenance activities’, and ‘evaluation and service recovery’.
In the end, 14 determinants of maintenance service quality remained. Sec-
■
■
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tion 5.2 describes the applied questionnaire procedures, and Sub-Section 5.3.1 
offers a description of the respondents.
 6.4.2 Measurements
In order to simplify the process of filling in the questionnaire for tenants, we 
equalled planned maintenance to planned maintenance to the exterior build-
ing, and reactive maintenance services to reactive maintenance performed 
inside dwellings.1 This way, tenants had one and the same service in mind 
when answering the various questions, and the duration of the questionnaire 
was restricted.
After that, the determinants of maintenance service quality were laid 
down, as described above, and the levels of importance of and satisfaction 
with each of these attributes were evaluated using the questionnaire. The 
levels of importance were measured on a seven-point scale, ranging from (1) 
‘extremely unimportant’, through (4) ‘neither important nor unimportant’ to 
(7) ‘extremely important’. The levels of satisfaction were also measured on a 
seven-point scale, ranging from ‘extremely dissatisfied’, through (4) ‘neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied’ to (7) ‘extremely satisfied’.
The perceived importance of attributes was measured in two ways, one 
direct (verbal) and one indirect (implicit). The direct way entailed calculat-
ing the mean importance ratings for all determinants of maintenance service 
quality. Comparable to Chapter 5, the indirect way of measuring the perceived 
importance of attributes implies measuring the impact of satisfaction with 
determinants of maintenance service quality on tenant satisfaction with 
maintenance. The reasons for using these different types of measurements 
are set out in Section 5.3.
 6.4.3 Results
For both reactive and planned maintenance, ‘the quality of the result of main-
tenance’ is considered to be most important, followed by ‘the competence of 
maintenance workers’, and ‘completing maintenance activities in a single 
visit’. Although the results for planned and reactive maintenance are highly 
comparable, when there is a high level of interaction (which is the case with 
reactive maintenance), it seems to be particularly important to deliver quick 
service. Quick service is stimulated by prompt problem identification, by mak-
ing it easy to arrange appointments, and by restricting the period of time that 
  With this distinction, respondents are offered a clearer perspective on the differences between each type of 
maintenance. In practice, by far the majority of planned maintenance works are conducted to the exterior of 
buildings. At the same time, by far the majority of reactive maintenance is conducted inside dwellings.
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workmen have to be in tenants’ private settings (see Chapter 7). The stated 
mean scores on the attributes are presented in Table 6.1.
Similar to the situation described in Chapter 5, differences might occur 
between verbal priority patterns, and priority patterns of statistically derived 
(subconscious) priorities actually used when evaluating the housing situation, 
in this study the statistically derived importance factors are presented next to 
the stated importance ratings. The perceived importance of attributes is mea-
sured indirectly through regression analyses. Satisfaction with either planned 
maintenance to the exterior of the building, or reactive maintenance inside 
the respondent’s dwelling, are the dependent variables. The independent vari-
ables are the satisfaction scores for the determinants of maintenance service 
quality, either for planned maintenance to the exterior of building, or for re-
active maintenance inside the respondent’s dwelling. The regressions result 
in a list of independent variables that seem to have a relationship with ten-
ant satisfaction with the two types of maintenance identified. The model for 
satisfaction with planned maintenance to the exterior of the building has an 
explained variance rating of 28%. The regression model for satisfaction with 
reactive maintenance inside the dwelling has an explained variance score 
of 37% (see Appendix 3). Part of the unexplained variance of the satisfaction 
with the discerned determinants of service quality with tenant satisfaction 
with maintenance in general may be attributed to socio-demographic, geo-
graphic and construction-related variables. For both planned maintenance 
to the exterior of the building and reactive maintenance inside the dwelling, 
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Table 6.1 Importance ratings determinants of maintenance service quality
Reactive maintenance  
inside the dwelling
Planned maintenance  
on the exterior of building
Mean N Standard Mean N Standard
The quality of the result of maintenance 6,49 5010 0,868 6,49 5226 0,848
The competence of maintenance workers 6,43 5032 0,901 6,43 5262 0,905
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit 6,41 5005 0,926 6,42 5249 0,924
Avoiding damage to personal property 6,37 5051 0,963 6,36 5244 1,011
Sticking to execution planning agreements 6,34 5036 0,938 6,26 5203 0,976
The politeness of maintenance workers 6,29 5103 0,949 6,25 5277 0,978
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints 6,22 5037 0,987 6,12 5300 1,043
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site 6,19 5044 0,971 6,11 5246 1,098
Flexibility in making appointments 6,12 5028 1,087 6,05 5217 1,041
Tenant participation in maintenance through options 5,96 4900 1,213 5,89 5102 1,271
Being addressed in your own language 5,80 4951 1,313 5,80 5260 1,549
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration 5,77 4998 1,558 5,65 5210 1,408
Limiting the time taken by the work 5,69 4969 1,388 5,65 5111 1,396
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls 5,48 5045 1,559 5,40 5281 1,596
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
the contribution made by socio-demographic, geographic and construction-
related variables to the degree of explained variance is 11%.2 For satisfaction 
with planned maintenance to the exterior of the building, there is a signifi-
cant relationship with satisfaction for the aspects, ‘tenant participation in 
maintenance through options’ and ‘the quality of the result of maintenance’. 
‘The quality of the result of maintenance’ is another aspect that was explicitly 
rated ‘most important’ by respondents. For reactive maintenance inside the 
dwelling, most of the aspects that were rated as important by respondents al-
so have a significant relationship with satisfaction with reactive maintenance 
inside the dwelling. An exception is ‘avoiding damage to personal property’. 
Based on additional regressions, we can conclude that this aspect does have 
a significant relationship with residential satisfaction in general. This means 
that this aspect is mentally generally attributed as being potentially harmful 
to respondents’ residential situations, rather than being attributed to mainte-
nance services in particular.
We asked the same group of respondents to rank their top-three most im-
portant maintenance services. We counted the number of respondents who 
rated a maintenance service most important, second most important and 
third most important. Separate calculations were made for reactive mainte-
nance inside dwellings and planned maintenance to the outside of dwellings 
(see Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
In general, we can conclude from Figures 6.2 and 6.3 that the issues that 
received high importance ratings (see Table 6.1) also get many top-three 
scores. For both planned maintenance to the outside of dwellings and reac-
tive maintenance inside dwellings, the quality of the results of maintenance 
has the most top-three scores. It is remarkable that ‘being available to answer 
questions and receive complaints’ – in particular for reactive maintenance in-
side dwellings – and ‘sticking to execution planning agreements are among 
the highest receivers of top-three scores.
 6.5 Case: the ‘KWH-huurlabel’
 6.5.1 The ‘KWH-Huurlabel’
The quality mark, the ‘KWH-huurlabel’, is an important tool that is used by 
housing associations delivering services to 50% of all end-customers in the 
  The following variables were included in the analyses: Gender, Plan to move within two years, Family income, 
Source of income (as dummies), Age, Type of family (as dummies), Community (as dummies), Education (as 
dummies), number of hours of labour/week outside home (respondent), number of hours of labour/week outside 
home (partner of respondent – excluded from multi-family dwellings analysis because of multicollinearity), Ur-
banisation, Part of country and Year of construction.
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Dutch social rented sector. The KWH-huurlabel measures the perceived quali-
ty of service delivery in the letting process. While other quality marks, such as 
the VGO-keur and the MQM (both of which were specifically set up for main-
tenance), do not focus on the end-customer, the tenant, this is not the case 
for the KWH-huurlabel. KWH measures service quality for 174 housing asso-
ciations. Annually, around 200,000 paper-version tenant questionnaires, tele-
phone questionnaires and mystery guest meetings form the basis for mea-
suring performance. Although the focus of the KWH-label is on the processes 
executed by housing associations, service suppliers can be required to deliver 
services in conformity with KWH-standards.
The KWH-huurlabel quality mark consists of ten components, which range 
from searching for housing to paying rent. Of these ten components, five are 
related to maintenance processes: ‘doing repairs’, ‘maintaining dwellings’, 
‘complaint handling’, and to a lesser extent ‘calling the housing association’, 
and ‘visiting the housing association’. The quality of service delivery is mea-
sured once every two years over a period of eight weeks. For the component, 
‘doing repairs’, end-customer satisfaction with the delivery of services can al-
so be measured continuously. These quality of service delivery measurements 
are done through online questionnaires. For all components, terms of deliv-
ery (performance indicators), as well as standards, are set out. These terms of 
delivery are considered to match end-customers’ expectations. The delivery 
process is broken down into the actual standards, or performance indicators, 
that are to be met by the housing association. According to KWH, the quality 
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requirements are based on general-accepted standards and values, such as 
respect for one another, timeliness, clearness, approachability, patience and 
friendliness (KWH, 2007a). In addition to KWH, marketing consultancy com-
panies such as USP carry out comparable performance measurements of the 
quality of services provided by housing associations. Given that KWH is cur-
rently the market leader, and that the KWH-huurlabel is a recognised quality 
label, the following analysis will focus on this tool.
The next section will analyse the extent to which the KWH-label addresses 
the relevant determinants of maintenance service quality, and thus the ex-
tent to which additional requirements should be made of housing associa-
tions in order to ensure maintenance service quality.
 6.5.2 Document study
A document study was carried out to examine the KWH-huurlabel’s terms of 
delivery, standards and measurement points (KWH, 2007a; 2007b). Using the 
determinants of maintenance service quality as points of reference, we inves-
tigated whether these aspects were covered by the KWH-huurlabel. Two anal-
ysers indicated separately whether these aspects were indeed covered, and if 
so, how. The discrepancies were discussed and consensus was finally reached 
on all determinants of maintenance service quality. The results with respect 
to the different determinants of maintenance service quality are presented in 
Table 6.2.
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Appendix 4 provides a more extensive evaluation of the extent of the de-
terminants of maintenance service quality covered by KWH.
 6.5.3 Conclusions from KWH
The most important determinants of service quality should be included in 
the performance measurement of maintenance, possibly in combination with 
the two aspects that are mentioned by respondents (‘provision of information 
before the start of the maintenance activities’, and ‘evaluation and service 
recovery’). The KWH-huurlabel covers a significant part of this performance 
measurement.
‘The quality of the result of maintenance’ is generally considered to be the 
most important determinant of service quality. The KWH-huurlabel indirectly 
measures this aspect. This is logical, since the KWH-huurlabel was primar-
ily set up to measure the quality of service delivery to tenants in terms of 
processes. From this perspective, it is necessary to make condition measure-
ments and output performance measurements of the results of maintenance. 
For other standards, KWH uses throughput, output and outcome measures. 
Apart from the method of measurement, the choices for measures seem to 
cover many of the aspects identified in the survey.
It is notable that two very significant stated importance aspects, ‘the com-
petence of maintenance workers’, and ‘completing maintenance activities 
in a single visit’, are only partly or not covered at all by the KWH-huurlabel 
respectively (note that for reactive maintenance inside the dwelling, these 
are also included in the regression model of indirectly measured aspects). 
For housing associations, this means that in order to ensure customer sat-
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Table 6.2 Determinants of maintenance service quality covered by the 
KWH-huurlabel (Qualification given by analysists)
The quality of the result of maintenance +
The competence of maintenance workers 0
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit –
Avoiding damage to personal property 0
Sticking to execution planning agreements +
The politeness of maintenance workers +
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints +
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site –
Flexibility in making appointments 0
Tenant participation in maintenance through options 0
Being addressed in your own language –
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration –
Limiting the time taken by the work 0
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls –
+ = Covered 0 = Partly covered – = Not covered
isfaction, additional performance measurements are needed. For ‘complet-
ing maintenance activities in a single visit’, which implies that maintenance 
workers should not have to return unnecessarily to tenants’ dwellings for ex-
tra materials or because of mistakes, both output and throughput measure-
ments may be satisfactory. This aspect can be covered by throughput mea-
sures related to the activities that are needed to finalise a job. Another option 
is (output) measurement of tenant evaluations of the number of interactions 
needed to complete the job adequately. For the competence of maintenance 
workers, output and throughput measurements with respect to the activities 
conducted by maintenance workers might be combined with input measure-
ments of maintenance contractors’ human resources.
In addition to this, from this research we may conclude that the KWH-
huurlabel pays limited attention to worker- and workplace-related distur-
bance. Although these aspects are not among the most influential for tenant 
satisfaction with maintenance, for specific groups (e.g. the elderly, see Van 
Mossel et al., 2006), additional attention via performance measurement may 
nevertheless be necessary in order to ensure customer satisfaction.
The KWH-huurlabel does not cover the prevention of noise and vibrations, 
and inconveniences due to litter and dust, both issues that require additional 
output measures in addition to KWH’s broad current satisfaction measure-
ments. In addition, the KWH-huurlabel does not cover the restriction of the 
duration of works, even though, in case of reactive maintenance, this has a 
significant relationship with tenant satisfaction with maintenance. Again, an 
output measurement would seem to be most suitable for forcing maintenance 
workers to communicate and deal adequately with this issue.
Aside from the issues covered, the quality of performance measurement 
depends on how the measurements are made. This research does not address 
this latter issue, as this study is concerned with the contents of measure-
ments rather than measurement techniques.
 6.6 Conclusions
 6.6.1 Important determinants of 
maintenance service quality
From the perspective of the tenant, the most important aspect is ‘the quality 
of the result of maintenance’, followed by ‘the competence of maintenance 
workers’ and ‘completing maintenance activities in a single visit’. The latter 
implies that maintenance workers should perform their maintenance activi-
ties without unnecessary re-working or making extra site visits.
The average stated importance ratings of determinants of maintenance 
service quality are comparable for planned maintenance to the outside of 
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dwellings and reactive maintenance inside dwellings. However, the only de-
terminants of maintenance service quality regressing with the evaluation of 
planned maintenance on the exterior of buildings are ‘the quality of result of 
maintenance’ and ‘tenant participation in maintenance through options’. For 
reactive maintenance of the interior of buildings, the most importance stated 
importance determinants of maintenance service quality also regress signifi-
cantly with the evaluation in general. In addition, satisfaction with aspects 
related to the planning of the actual realisation of works, such as ‘sticking 
to execution planning agreements’, and ‘flexibility in making appointments’, 
have a significant impact on tenant satisfaction with reactive maintenance 
inside the dwelling.
 6.6.2 Performance measurement
This chapter has offered an account of, and the reasons for, the widespread 
use of performance measurement of maintenance service delivery in the so-
cial rented sector. The aim of this investigation was to assess the extent to 
which performance measurement with regard to maintenance service deliv-
ery is consistent with housing associations’ intentions.
As maintenance service delivery is often the responsibility of an external 
service supplier, for housing associations, performance measurement can 
take three basic forms:
1. Throughput measurement – The measurement necessary process steps from 
a customer satisfaction perspective. Actual interaction with the end-custom-
er during the process is considered to be output, however. Standards relating 
to accessibility are examples of throughput measures. They enable adequate 
output in terms of successful interactions, and should thus be necessarily in-
cluded in a performance measurement system. One disadvantage of under-
taking this type of measurement is the lack evaluation by the end-customer.
2. Output measurement – The measurement of the client’s evaluation of inter-
actions with the service supplier, as well as the measurement of the physi-
cal consequences of maintenance (changes to the building component or in-
stallation). For example, standards that relate to tenant satisfaction with the 
ways in which they are approached by maintenance workers can be consid-
ered to be output measures. One disadvantage of this type of measurement is 
that end-customers may be overloaded with surveys.
3. Outcome measurement – The measurement of tenant satisfaction in general. 
Measuring outcomes can be useful for measuring the performance of suppli-
ers and the buying centre. Housing associations’ boards can use these mea-
sures to steer and improve the buying centre, and can use the information to 
inform strategic and organisational policy. For the buying centre itself, this 
type of measurement has the disadvantage of being too broad, and moreover 
may contribute to overloading end-customers with surveys. In other words, 
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these kinds of indicators, which are often used by housing associations in or-
der to test the quality of service supply, are not specific enough to act as valu-
able key performance indicators for improving the quality of service delivery, 
and function merely as alerts.
 6.6.3 KWH-huurlabel and public performance criteria
The KWH-huurlabel measures the quality of service delivery in the let-
ting process. Many aspects that are related to maintenance service delivery 
seem to be adequately covered by the KWH-huurlabel. For maintenance ser-
vice delivery, in addition to the aspects that are adequately covered by the 
KWH-huurlabel, housing associations should pay particular attention to the 
measurement of completing maintenance activities in a single visit in or-
der to ensure customer satisfaction. As mentioned earlier, this means that 
maintenance workers should not have to return to tenants’ dwellings unnec-
essarily, either for extra materials or because of mistakes. Since worker and 
workplace-related disturbances are also not covered by the KWH-huurlabel, 
additional performance measurements related to these may be necessary in 
order to achieve customer satisfaction within specific target groups that put a 
high value on these qualities.
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that cur-
rent public and private incentives to improve the quality of service delivery 
are not adequate in all respects. This is in contrast to the results of main-
tenance, which are covered both in law (e.g. the building decree, which sets 
minimum quality requirements), and in public performance criteria, such as 
BBSH.
For a potential customer, the fact that a particular housing association has 
the KWH quality mark does not influence the eventual choice of dwelling (and 
thus the service supplier). Moreover, in a ‘suction’ market situation, which is 
often the case for Dutch urban housing (see Chapter 4), clients in the social 
rented sector do rarely have any choice. This situation begs for clear public 
objectives with regard to high-quality service delivery to tenants, including 
high-quality maintenance service delivery. The current public performance 
criteria (BBSH) do not take this important issue into account, however. The al-
ternative, meanwhile, the branch code of conduct (AedesCode), also does not 
cover maintenance service delivery satisfactorily. Despite this, from the point 
of view of good social entrepreneurship, high-quality maintenance processes 
should be a key issue for housing associations – just as they are for other pub-
lic (and private) services. Future developments in public or private reviewing 
processes may provide new opportunities in this respect.
It may be advisable to oblige housing associations to present the results 
of the KWH-huurlabel performance measures in the information provided to 
candidate tenants. The grades given to housing associations can give candi-
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date tenants insights into the quality of service delivery. While the physical 
aspects of a housing service are visible to candidate tenants, and can there-
fore be easily assessed, the quality of service delivery is not. The presentation 
of a service quality label for each dwelling offered might help customers in 
their search for a suitable place to live, including the quality of service deliv-
ery that they might expect. Such a development would be particularly useful 
in a situation of pressure in the market.
An adapted version of this chapter will be published in the book Performance measure­
ment in the Dutch social rented sector of housing, (edited by Van Mossel, Koopman and 
Straub), to be published by IOS Press.
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 7 Securing customer 
satisfaction through 
component service 
specifications
 7.1 Introduction
While Chapters 5 and 6 offered insights into tenant preferences regarding 
maintenance service delivery, this chapter will examine the consequences for 
purchasing.
The purchasing of business services has become a substantial element of 
firms’ total acquisition of external resources (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002; 
Ellram, Tate and Billington, 2004; Ellram, Tate and Billington, 2007). Whereas 
the purchase of business services traditionally revolved around non-product 
related services, nowadays companies are increasingly buying services that 
form part of their offer to customers. Examples of this include the outsourc-
ing of airport baggage handling by airlines, or the subcontracting of field 
maintenance by petrol pump producers. We adopt the terminology developed 
by Axelsson and Wynstra (2002, p. 105) and Wynstra, Axelsson and Van der 
Valk (2006), who refer to these services as ‘component services’.
The services management and marketing literature has largely failed to 
address the issue of services that play a role in the buying company’s cus-
tomer processes and, in effect, become part of the company’s offer to custom-
ers (Brown, 2002; Jackson and Cooper, 1988; Parasuraman, 1998). Nevertheless, 
Parasuraman (1998, p. 310) argues that customer-seller links differ for services 
that are used internally and services that will be sold to customers in the next 
level in the supply chain (whether or not they have been modified). In such 
supply chains, the quality of service provision strongly influences end-cus-
tomer satisfaction, which implies a need for well-mapped customer require-
ments (Wynstra et al. 2006; Åhlstrom and Nordin, 2006). Chandon et al. (1997) 
and Lewis and Entwistle (1990) argue that such service encounters must be 
carefully managed since they have a high impact on customer satisfaction.
Limited attention has been paid to how companies that buy services for 
their customers deal with the latters’ requirements, i.e. whether and how 
these requirements affect service specifications. In the case of services passed 
on to end-customers, determinants of service quality include not only aspects 
related to the buying organisation, but also – perhaps even more importantly – 
to end-customers and interactions with end-customers.
This chapter therefore focuses on the specification of component services. 
Our main objectives are to establish: What determinants of service quality are 
important for customer satisfaction when buying component maintenance services, 
and to what extent are these taken into account in the specification of these services. 
The chapter is organised as follows. First, we draw on a usage-based classifi-
cation of business services (Wynstra et al., 2006) to further pinpoint the kinds 
of services under discussion. Then, we draw on literature in the area of ser-
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vice supply chains, service quality and specifications to conceptualise how 
component services can be specified in a way that contributes to customer 
satisfaction. Having explained the research design, the results of document 
studies are examined in order to establish the extent to which the relevant 
determinants of maintenance service quality are included in maintenance 
service specifications. This discussion is aided by first drawing on the ques-
tionnaire results presented in Chapter 6. The chapter ends with a discussion 
of our conclusions, the managerial implications, the research’s limitations, 
and areas for further research.
 7.2 Component services and 
service supply chains
Companies are increasingly buying services for inclusion in their offerings 
to end-customers. Research on the purchasing of business services has tra-
ditionally focused on relatively standardised ‘support services’, such as facil-
ity services or IT. Increasingly, research is being carried out on professional 
services such as marketing and consultancy services, which generally rely to 
a large extent on the expert knowledge of the service supplier (Axelsson and 
Wynstra, 2002). However, the services studied are mainly those targeted at the 
buying company, and little attention has been paid to services that are tar-
geted at the customer.
Jackson and Cooper (1988) were among the first to acknowledge this cat-
egory of services. They propose a classification of products and services that 
takes into account those products and services that are being passed on to 
the buying company’s customers. They refer to this category of services as 
‘production services’, i.e. services that become part of the production proc-
ess for a particular (set of) product(s) (which thus generally constitute direct 
costs). Building on this classification, and that proposed by the Industrial Mar-
keting and Purchasing (IMP) Group (see e.g. Håkansson, 1982) for industrial 
goods, Wynstra et al. (2006) propose a classification of business services based 
on how the buying company uses the service with respect to its own offerings. 
According to these authors, this usage dimension is one of the main drivers 
for effective, ongoing interaction between buyer, seller and end-customer. 
‘Ongoing’ here refers to the period of continuous service exchange after the 
contract has been signed.
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Wynstra et al. (2006) identify four service types. Two of these are used by 
the buying firm1, whereas the other two are targeted at customers of the buy-
ing firm. The latter two types of services concern:
Semi-manufactured services, which are used as an input into the buying 
company’s offer to end-customers. One such example would be the over-
night cleaning of trains.
Component services, which are directly passed on to the end-customer. 
One example would be the cleaning of train stations during the day.
In a recent series of iterative field studies, which build on the initial theoreti-
cal framework developed by Wynstra et al. (2006), it was found that the four 
service types set different requirements for the way in which these servic-
es are purchased (Van der Valk, 2007). For example, when buying component 
services, it is important to take end-customer requirements into account. 
Knowledge about these requirements is most likely to come from marketing 
and sales. Thus, when buying component services, it would seem advisable 
to involve marketing in the purchase team that draws up the specifications. 
Key buyer capabilities include identifying and communicating customer re-
quirements, whereas important supplier capabilities include understanding 
these requirements, adapting service delivery to the individual needs of each 
customer (flexibility), and reliable delivery. Similarly, Congram and Epelman 
(1995) indicate that if service managers and employees are to be effective in 
anticipating or meeting their customers’ needs, then they must understand 
the processes underlying their services. For component services, this includes 
understanding the provider’s service processes, and how these interact with 
with those of the buying company.
The notion of component services facilitates our discussion of service sup-
ply chains. Ellram, Tate and Billington (2004) note that little research has been 
conducted into service supply chains. Despite this, the increased importance 
of services (see e.g. Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003; Vargo and Lusch, 2004) and the 
associated service supply relationships (see e.g. Åhlstrom and Nordin, 2006; 
Blumberg, 2003; O’Farrell and Wood, 1999; Trent and Monczka, 1998) justify 
further research in this area. Appropriate management of component servic-
es is extremely important, since low performance on the supplier’s side will 
immediately affect end-customer satisfaction and, ultimately, buying com-
pany performance. In their study of service supply relationships, Åhlström 
and Nordin (2006) furthermore signify that using suppliers that get between 
  The two service types are instrumental services and consumption services. Instrumental services are used to 
change the way the buying company conducts its primary processes (think, for example, of the use of manage-
ment consultancies to professionalise purchasing), whereas consumption services generally become part of the 
buying company’s support processes (think of traditional facility services such as office cleaning and catering).
■
■
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a manufacturing company and its customers may result in a loss of control 
over customer relationships. As a result, buying companies can feel a need 
to control the encounter if this is indeed where the supplier delivers value to 
the end-customer. Chandon, Leo and Philipppe (1997) and Lewis and Entwis-
tle (1990) also underline the importance of careful management of service en-
counters2, since they can strongly influence customer satisfaction.
 7.3 The importance of specifications for 
ensuring customer satisfaction
For component services, it is essential to take the end-customer’s perspective 
into account in order to achieve (end-) customer satisfaction. Specifications 
play an important role in ensuring this. In the consumer (dis-)satisfaction lit-
erature, consumer satisfaction is generally viewed as being a function of con-
sumer expectations and perceived performance, or perceived service qual-
ity (e.g. Bolton and Drew, 1994; Erevelles and Leavitt, 1992; Oliver, 1977; 1980; 
1981; Oliver and DeSarbo, 1988; Rust and Oliver, 1994). Consumer satisfaction 
is thus a subjective evaluation of the degree to which the consumer’s expec-
tations concerning a particular service encounter have been met. As such, 
service quality can be regarded as an antecedent for the superordinate satis-
faction construct (Brady, Cronin and Brand, 2002). In the expectancy-discon-
firmation framework, consumers form expectations concerning the quality of 
the service to be received. Once the service has been produced and consumed, 
the consumer establishes a perception of the quality of the service that may 
or may not meet pre-consumption expectations.
Measuring service quality expectations and perceptions is thus an essen-
tial part of managing customer satisfaction. Regarding the measurement of 
service quality, considerable progress has been made in the area of business 
to consumer markets (e.g. Babakus and Boller, 1992; Brown, Churchill and Pe-
ter, 1993; Cronin Jr. and Taylor, 1992; Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1985; 
1988; 1991; 1994; Teas, 1993). Brady and Cronin (2001) identify two main ap-
proaches. First, the so-called ‘Nordic’ model (Grönroos, 1982; 1984) consists of 
technical and functional quality dimensions, which together constitute the 
experienced quality. By contrast, the ‘American’ perspective (Parasuraman et 
al., 1988) uses terms that describe service encounter characteristics, or de-
terminants of service quality (i.e., reliability, responsiveness, empathy, assur-
ances, and tangibles). This framework identifies gaps in the process of service 
delivery ‘that can be major hurdles in attempting to deliver a service which 
  Shostack (1985: 243) defines ‘service encounter’ as ‘a period of time during which a consumer directly interacts 
with a service’.
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customers would perceive as being of high quality’ (Figure 7.1) (Parasuraman 
et al., 1985, p. 44).
In our view, the ‘American’ perspective is a more elaborate approach to 
measuring service quality, and we thus draw on the conceptual model of ser-
vice quality developed by Parasuraman et al. (1985) to investigate service qual-
ity. Parasuraman et al. define five gaps and interrelationships between them. 
The fifth gap, i.e. the one between service quality as perceived by the end-cus-
tomer and the end-customer’s expectations, is considered to be the result of 
four other gaps:
between consumer expectations and management’s perceptions of con-
sumer expectations;
between management’s perception of consumer expectations and manage-
ment’s translation of those perceptions into service quality specifications;
between service quality specifications and actual service delivery;
1.
2.
3.
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between actual service delivery and external communications to the con-
sumer about the service.
When service delivery is not performed by the buying company, but by an ex-
ternal supplier (as is the case with component services), the buying company 
gives full responsibility concerning service delivery to the supplying organisa-
tion. This means that the supplier will be ‘managing’ Gap 5. The supplier is 
also responsible for Gap 3, i.e. for ensuring that service delivery matches the 
specifications of the buying company. Finally, Gap 4 may also become an is-
sue for the supplier, and may be closed by focused communication aimed at 
managing the end-customer’s expectations.
Gaps 1 and 2 thus remain under the control of the buying company, and 
for these, the buying company needs to properly assess customer expecta-
tions and requirements, and translate these into service specifications. Af-
ter all, these specifications (theoretically) determine how the service supply 
chain should operate. Aalders (2007) studied the issue of control in service 
encounters for component services, and suggests various ways in which buy-
ing companies can increase their level of control. For example, a service level 
agreement, which specifies what the buying company is buying from their 
suppliers, is a good way to increase control over the initial (pre-order) stages 
of the purchasing process. Building on this, using specifications would essen-
tially appear to be the only way in which a buying company can initially try to 
ensure quality regarding component services. These specifications, based on 
a relatively detailed set of requirements, will subsequently have implications 
for which supplier selection criteria are used and which kinds of interactions 
will take place between end-customers and suppliers.
This is in line with research conducted by Åhlstrom and Nordin (2006), who 
found that it is critical to developing service definitions. According to Swan, 
Bowers and Grover (2002), specifications are an essential part of the service 
process, as they determine which service will be created and how this will 
meet customer needs. Van Raaij and Pruyn (1998) point out that a service is 
comprised of its specifications, including the type of service, when and how it 
will be provided and the service’s characteristics. In other words, the service 
product, the service delivery, and the service environment should be covered 
by the specifications given to the provider, and these specifications should 
form the backbone for the services purchasing process.
 7.4 Maintenance services purchased by 
Dutch housing associations
This research focuses on planned and reactive maintenance (for a description, 
see Appendix 5), as these two types of services form almost 90% of all main-
4.
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tenance expenses. More specifically, we consider:
planned maintenance to the outside of dwellings; and
reactive maintenance inside dwellings.
Both services are component services: unaltered, they become part of the 
buying company’s offer to the end-customer. End-customer requirements 
should thus be taken into account in the service specification. However, there 
are some key differences between the two types of services, which relate to 
the characteristics of the service encounter. One such difference is the sense 
of urgency associated with them: in the case of reactive maintenance, the 
tenant usually has a problem inside his or her dwelling3 that may need to be 
resolved quickly; water damage or a broken heating system are two such ex-
amples. The sense of urgency is therefore usually high. Planned maintenance, 
however, is usually preventive, meaning that the sense of urgency is gener-
ally relatively low. Another aspect that may lead to a need for greater control 
with respect to reactive maintenance inside dwellings, as opposed to planned 
maintenance to the outside of dwellings, relates to the fact that tenants tend 
to feel more personally responsible for and attached to in-house maintenance 
than to (more public) outside maintenance.
The second key difference relates to the fact that reactive maintenance 
tends to be characterised by short and intensive interactions with tenants (in-
side dwellings), whereas planned maintenance implies less intensive interac-
tions relating to the works, which may take a relatively long time. These dif-
ferences can have an impact on which determinants of maintenance service 
quality are most important for each maintenance service. Any differences 
that occur between reactive and planned maintenance should be reflected in 
the service specification. Based on the above, we would expect different ser-
vice specifications for reactive and planned maintenance services.
 7.5 Research design
Our research consisted of a survey conducted among tenants of Dutch hous-
ing associations, and an analysis of these housing associations’ specification 
documents. The development and testing of the survey were described above 
in Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 6.4. The respondents were described in Sub-Section 
5.5.1, and Sub-Section 5.5.2 explained how missing data was handled.
We built upon the survey results by undertaking a document analysis. This 
  Despite the fact that exceptions exist (for example: the sudden breakdown of a shared heating system in an 
apartment building), for purposes of simplicity we assume that reactive maintenance takes place within an indi-
vidual tenant’s dwelling, which increases the sense of urgency.
■
■
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aimed at verifying whether or not the appropriate determinants of mainte-
nance service quality had been secured in the housing associations’ specifi-
cations. This is highly relevant to the issue at hand, since Åhlström and Nor-
din (2006) indicate that drawing up good agreements seems to be a potential 
problem area in the establishment of service supply relationships. The intan-
gibility of many services makes evaluation and specification difficult in the 
case of such agreements (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002, p. 24; Tinsley and Lew-
is, 1978). For component services that become part of the customer’s expe-
rience (Johnston and Clark, 2001), developing appropriate specifications also 
becomes more important from a strategic perspective.
The analysis includes a review of specifications relating to one form of 
planned maintenance, exterior painting, and one form of reactive mainte-
nance, maintenance to heating and water systems.4 We studied all documents 
that could be classified as being part of the maintenance service specifica-
tions for a selection of six (independent departments of) housing associations. 
These included the same housing associations whose tenants participated in 
the survey research.
These documents were analysed in detail for the presence, whether direct 
or indirect, of matters relevant to service quality determinants (as identified 
earlier in the tenants’ maintenance survey, see further Chapter 6). The follow-
ing service quality determinants were identified:
the quality of the result of maintenance;
the competence of maintenance workers;
completing maintenance activities in a single visit;
avoiding damage to personal property;
sticking to execution planning agreements;
the politeness of maintenance workers;
being available to answer questions and receive complaints;
limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site;
flexibility in making appointments;
tenant participation in maintenance (availability of options);
being addressed in your own language;
limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration;
limiting the time taken by the work;
having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls;
speed of response;
  Clearly, exterior painting is only one example of planned maintenance, just as maintenance to individual heat-
ing and water systems is only one example of reactive maintenance. We could have selected many others. We 
selected these services as examples of planned and reactive maintenance because these are exemplary examples 
of the two types of maintenance services, they are usually the most important in terms of expenditure, and are 
also very important for tenant satisfaction.
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
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evaluation and restoration of service (service recovery);
provision of information prior to the start of maintenance activities.
The documents analysed included contracts, specifications, memos, and gen-
eral terms and conditions. ‘Theme codes’ were used to retrieve and organise 
the chunks of data (Miles and Huberman, 1994), and clustering and displaying 
the condensed chunks set the stage for drawing conclusions. We recorded the 
document’s type, owner, date, and name; the maintenance service concerned; 
the statement referring to a specific determinant of maintenance service 
quality; the determinant of maintenance service quality covered by the state-
ment; the location of the statement in the document; and the weight of the 
statement. Points of consistency between the various documents were clari-
fied in interviews with buyers and contract managers from the various hous-
ing associations.
A three-point weighting system was applied to the presence of the deter-
minants: strong, average, and weak. The weighting of a particular statement 
was determined by comparison with other clauses and other service determi-
nants. We looked at how measurable and realisable the various clauses were, 
and how well they covered specific service quality determinants.
The weightings represent an attempt, despite the envisaged qualitative na-
ture of this survey, to gauge how much attention was given to a given deter-
minant for a given type of maintenance. A weakly-represented determinant 
in a clause was multiplied by 1; a determinant given average attention in a 
clause was multiplied by 2; and strongly-represented determinants (i.e. those 
that were specific, measurable, realisable, and provided good cover) were mul-
tiplied by 3.
In order to increase the reliability of the research, six documents were se-
lected at random from the entire range of documents included in the study. 
Three were re-evaluated by an expert reviewer, the other three by a layman. 
Some minor adaptations were made with regard to the determinants of main-
tenance service quality and the weighting of these aspects. Overall, our inter-
pretations can be considered to be reliable. The results of the survey and the 
document analysis are discussed in the next two sections.
 7.6 Results of the survey
 7.6.1 Introduction
The results of the tenant survey were described in Chapter 6. In this chapter, 
the so-called ‘stated’ importance ratings, presented in Chapter 6, will be used. 
For both reactive and planned maintenance, tenants consider ‘the quality of 
the result of maintenance’ to be most important, followed by ‘the compe-
■
■
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tence of maintenance workers’, and ‘completing maintenance activities in a 
single visit’. When asking respondents to give their top three determinants of 
maintenance service quality, in addition to the determinants of maintenance 
service quality just mentioned, ‘sticking to execution planning agreements’ 
also has a very high ranking. From these findings, we can conclude that for 
the maintenance of housing association’s dwellings, both the outcome and 
the process of the service are essential for tenant satisfaction and therefore 
for the success of service delivery. This is in line with research conducted by 
Grönroos (2004), Edvardsson and Olsson (1996) and Asubonteng et al. (1996, p. 
63), who all argue that a customer’s perception of quality is not solely based 
on the output of the service, but that the process of service delivery is also 
important.
When introducing the case study, we noted some expectations regarding 
the differences between planned and reactive maintenance. Two main differ-
ences were identified:
1. Differences relating to the character of interactions during the works: short 
and intensive interactions for reactive maintenance, and less intensive inter-
actions for planned maintenance works, which can take a relatively long time.
2. Differences with regard to the need for perceived control over service de-
livery: high for reactive maintenance inside dwellings, and low for planned 
maintenance to the outside of dwellings.
 7.6.2 Differences with regard to the character 
of interactions during the works
We tested the importance of determinants of maintenance service quality re-
lated to the character of interactions during works for both reactive mainte-
nance inside dwellings, and planned maintenance to the outside of dwellings. 
Interactions during such works take place between workmen and tenants. In 
the context of customer contact services (also a component service when it 
is purchased), Froehle (2006) argues that for services that are characterised 
by a fair degree of interaction between a company and its customers, service 
representatives’ skills are highly important. He points out that unprofessional, 
discourteous or inattentive agents can easily reinforce or even create negative 
customer impressions, and decrease customer satisfaction as a result. From a 
tenant’s perspective, workmen’s characteristics will therefore strongly affect 
the quality of interactions.
The test was conducted in two ways. First, workmen’s characteristics in a 
narrow sense (i.e. only factors directly related to workmen’s characteristics) 
were tested; and second, workmen’s characteristics in a broader sense (i.e. in-
cluding the consequences of the workmen’s characteristics) were tested. In 
order to be allocated to the narrow group of workmen’s characteristics, those 
determinants of maintenance service quality introduced in Chapter 6 relat-
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ing to the direct characteristics of maintenance workers were selected. The 
broader group of workmen’s characteristics included determinants of main-
tenance service quality that are affected by workmen’s characteristics, i.e. 
‘avoiding damage to personal property’ (see Table 7.1). The following hypoth-
eses were tested:
H1a: Workmen’s characteristics in a narrow sense are more important for tenants for 
reactive maintenance inside dwellings than for planned maintenance to the outside of 
dwellings.
H1b: Workmen’s characteristics in a broader sense are more important for tenants for 
reactive maintenance inside dwellings than for planned maintenance to the outside of 
dwellings.
For the ‘narrow’ group, the average importance of determinants of mainte-
nance service quality for reactive maintenance was 6.04, while the average 
figure for planned maintenance was 6.02. A pairwise t-test was performed in 
order to test whether the average importance differs for each type of service. 
The outcome of the test was t=-1.841 with df=4723 and p>0.05. The service 
types thus do not differ significantly, and hypothesis H1a was rejected. The 
test was conducted again for the ‘broad’ group. For this group, the average im-
portance of determinants of maintenance service quality for reactive main-
tenance was 6.01, while the average figure for planned maintenance was 6.00. 
The outcome of the t-test was t=-1.185 with df=4501 and p>0.05. This meant 
that, again, the service types do not differ significantly and hypothesis H1b 
was also rejected. The different character of interactions between planned 
maintenance to the outside of dwellings and reactive maintenance inside 
dwellings was thus not affected by different perceived importance ratings of 
related determinants of maintenance service quality.
Despite these conclusions, we have to take into account the differences in 
measurement outcomes between the stated importance ratings and the im-
pact of determinants of maintenance service quality identified in Chapter 6 
(see Appendix 3). It appeared that few of the determinants of maintenance 
service quality listed for the ‘broad’ group had positive coefficients with ten-
ant satisfaction for reactive maintenance inside the dwelling, while this was 
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Table 7.1 Workmen characteristics
Workmen characteristics in a narrow sense Workmen characteristics in a broader sense
The politeness of maintenance workers
The competence of maintenance workers
Having maintenance workers wear smart, 
uniform overalls
•
•
•
The politeness of maintenance workers
Avoiding damage to personal property
The competence of maintenance workers
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the 
work site
Limiting the time taken by the work
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform 
overalls
Being addressed in your own language
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
not the case for planned maintenance to the exterior of the building. There-
fore, the application of the regression outcomes instead of the stated impor-
tance ratings might have resulted in different outcomes.
 7.6.3 Differences with regard to the need for 
perceived control over service delivery
Unlike planned maintenance, which is planned by a housing association, re-
active maintenance is conducted in response to requests from tenants. From 
the tenant’s perspective, there is a certain degree of urgency connected with 
reactive maintenance, due to the fact that it is the tenant who takes the ini-
tiative. The urgency for the tenant can be particulary high in those cases 
where broken building components are directly causing dissatisfaction, such 
as broken heating and water systems, lifts, and roofing. This high degree of 
urgency implies a need for control over the service encounter, in order to ac-
celerate and improve problem-solving.
As mentioned in Section 7.4, another aspect that might lead to a greater 
need for control in the case of reactive maintenance inside dwellings (as op-
posed to planned maintenance to the outside of dwellings) is related to ten-
ants feeling more personally responsible for and attached to in-house main-
tenance than (more public) outside maintenance.
The importance of various attributes relating to perceived control was test-
ed for both reactive maintenance inside dwellings, and planned maintenance 
to the outside of dwellings. The following hypothesis was formulated:
H2: Attributes relating to perceived customer control are more important for tenants 
in the case of reactive maintenance inside dwellings than in the case of planned main-
tenance to the outside of dwellings.
Table 7.2 lists the determinants of maintenance service quality that influ-
ence tenants’ perceptions of their control over the service.
The average importance of determinants of maintenance service quality 
for reactive maintenance was 6.20, while the average figure for planned main-
tenance was 6.08. A pairwise t-test was performed in order to test whether 
the average importance differed for each type of service. The outcome of the 
test was t=-11.892 with df=4489 and p<0.01. Hypothesis H2 was thus support-
ed. For tenants, attributes relating to perceived customer control appear to be 
more important for reactive maintenance inside dwellings than for planned 
maintenance to the outside of dwellings. In order to ensure tenant satisfac-
tion, this differentiation should be incorporated into the service specifica-
tions.
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Table 7.2 Aspects attributing to perceived control over the services
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints
Flexibility in making appointments
Sticking to execution planning agreements
Tenant participation in maintenance through options
•
•
•
•
 7.7 Results of the document analysis
 7.7.1 Introduction
Turning to the results of the document analysis, the determinants of main-
tenance service quality were examined in 28 documents used by the six se-
lected organisations (46 were reviewed in total). In total, 236 determinants of 
maintenance service quality relating to the two selected maintenance ser-
vices were found in these documents. The degree to which the specifications 
address determinants of maintenance service quality varies greatly between 
housing associations and between maintenance services.
By far the best-covered service among those selected was that of (reactive) 
maintenance to heating and water systems. ‘Covered’ in this context means 
that important determinants of maintenance service quality are included in 
a certain service’s specifications. Given the fact that tenants rate this as the 
most important maintenance service for residential satisfaction (see Chapter 
5), this would appear to be commendable.
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show the coverage of determinants of maintenance service 
quality in maintenance specifications. In the tables, the relative weights of the 
sections for covering the specific determinants of maintenance service quality 
are presented. The researchers determined the weights according to the degree 
of specificity, measurability, feasibility of the section, and the degree of coverage 
of the specific determinant of maintenance service quality in the specific sec-
tion. A distinction was made between weak, medium and strong coverage.
 7.7.2 Maintenance of heating and water systems
The item most frequently included in specifications for maintenance of (indi-
vidual) heating and water systems is that suppliers must be available to an-
swer questions and receive complaints. When it comes to requested repairs, 
accessibility is a key factor, and is indeed essential if carrying out such main-
tenance is to be possible at all. Much attention was also given to flexibility 
in making appointments, and preventing damage to personal property. The 
documents gave no attention to ‘tenant participation by providing mainte-
nance options’ and ‘addressing tenants in their own language’ (in cases when 
tenants and workmen do not speak the same language). However, these were 
not among what tenants considered to be the most essential determinants of 
maintenance service quality. Likewise, little attention was paid to completing 
maintenance work in a single visit and limiting the time taken by work.
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 7.7.3 Exterior paintwork
The best-covered service quality determinant for exterior paintwork was the 
prevention of damage to personal property. ‘Limiting and tidying up litter and 
dust around the work site’ also received much attention, followed by ‘limit-
ing noise and vibration’ and ‘ensuring satisfactory provision of information 
before the start of maintenance work’. No attention was given to ‘complet-
ing maintenance in a single visit’, ‘having maintenance workers wear smart, 
uniform overalls’, and ‘tenant participation in maintenance (availability of 
options)’. Because exterior work takes place outside the home, failing to com-
plete maintenance in a single visit usually has no direct impact on residents’ 
satisfaction. Overalls are apparently not considered important outside the 
home, although they could have some merit from the point of view of feelings 
of reliability and identity.
 7.7.4 Tenants’ priorities versus specifications
Generally speaking, the sequence of determinants of maintenance service 
quality in the specifications differs from the priorities given by the tenants in 
the questionnaire on maintenance services. From the analyses conducted, it 
appears that completing maintenance in a single visit is insufficiently docu-
mented in maintenance specifications, in view of its importance from a ten-
ant’s perspective. Although it should be possible to take this aspect for grant-
ed, (it is, after all, only sensible that work should be completed in a single 
visit), tenants’ dissatisfaction on this point suggests a need for specification.
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Table 7.3 Results of document studies for maintenance of heating and water systems
Determinant of maintenance service quality Weak (x1) Medium (x2) Strong (x3) Score %
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints 5 5 6 33 19.2
Flexibility in making appointments 6 6 3 27 15.7
Avoiding damage to personal property 2 10 22 12.8
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site 6 2 3 19 11.0
The politeness of maintenance workers 5 5 1 18 10.5
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration 2 3 3 17 9.9
The competence of maintenance workers 5 4 13 7.6
Sticking to execution planning agreements 5 1 7 4.1
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls 3 6 3.5
Limiting the time taken by the work 3 1 5 2.9
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit 1 2 5 2.9
Being addressed in your own language
Tenant participation in maintenance through options
Total 172 100%
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
In Tables 7.3 and 7.4, the factors that enable tenants to feel in control re-
garding urgent reactive maintenance are printed in bold. The tables show that 
the specifications for heating and water systems have more relative and abso-
lute coverage of determinants of maintenance service quality with regard to 
perceived customer control than specifications for exterior painting: 67 sec-
tions of six housing associations relate to perceived customer control. This 
means that 39% of all sections relating to any of the determinants of main-
tenance service quality is devoted to the four determinants of maintenance 
service quality that add to perceived customer control. For exterior painting, 
these figures are respectively 28 sections, and 18.3%. From this research, we 
can confirm that the aspect of maintenance services that is most specifically 
needed, that of perceived customer control, is being taken into account in the 
specification process.
 7.8 Conclusions and discussion
The purchasing of services that are passed on to the buying company’s cus-
tomers is becoming an increasingly important phenomenon. Given the large 
impact that such services can have on end-customers, it is important to take 
end-customer requirements properly into account when specifying these ser-
vices.
The context of the research was maintenance services purchased by Dutch 
housing associations that were to be delivered to tenants’ dwellings. We con-
ducted a survey of tenants’ perceptions of the relative importance of various 
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Table 7.4 Results of document studies for exterior painting
Determinant of maintenance service quality Weak (x1) Medium (x2) Strong (x3) Score %
Avoiding damage to personal property 5 13 1 34 22.4
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site 3 8 4 31 20.4
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration 1 6 4 25 16.4
The politeness of maintenance workers 2 5 12 7.9
Sticking to execution planning agreements 3 4 11 7.2
Flexibility in making appointments 5 3 11 7.2
The competence of maintenance workers 1 5 11 7.2
Limiting the time taken by the work 3 3 9 5.9
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints 4 1 6 3.9
Being addressed in your own language 1 2 1.3
Tenant participation in maintenance through options
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls
Total 152 100%
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007 
determinants for maintenance service quality, and investigated whether dif-
ferences exist between planned and reactive maintenance.
Overall, the results of the survey indicate that for both types of mainte-
nance, the outcome as well as process of the service are essential for tenant 
satisfaction and therefore for the success of service delivery. We found that 
the character of interactions during the maintenance works does not differ 
significantly across the two types of maintenance service. The hypotheses 
that workmen’s characteristics in both a narrow and a broad sense would dif-
fer for the two types of maintenance service were rejected. Apparently, when 
designing tenant-supplier interactions, it would not seem relevant to distin-
guish between the two types of maintenance services with regard to this as-
pect.
Aspects that contribute to tenants’ perceptions of control are more impor-
tant in the case of reactive than in the case of planned maintenance services. 
This need for perceived control over the service encounter stems from the ur-
gency of the need for a service, which is generally higher for reactive mainte-
nance than for planned maintenance. In addition, tenants might feel greater 
responsibility for maintenance inside dwellings than for maintenance con-
ducted outside, and therefore feel a greater need to control the service. Thus, 
the two types of maintenance are different in terms of the perceived need for 
control. This should be taken into account the service specifications.
We found that the purchasers who took part in this study do emphasise 
this need for control and its implications for the service delivery process in 
the specifications. As a result, greater attention is given to determinants of 
maintenance service quality that give tenants a feeling of control over a situ-
ation in the case of reactive maintenance, than for planned maintenance.
However, we found that housing associations do not include all determi-
nants of maintenance service quality that contribute to tenant satisfaction 
in their service specifications. For example, tenants mentioned ‘completing 
maintenance in a single visit’ as being important, yet it is hardly documented 
in maintenance specifications. Furthermore, the maintenance specifications 
(planned and reactive) do not cover involvement of customers in the mainte-
nance process by making various maintenance options available. This would 
suggest that there is still room for improvement of the specifications devel-
oped by housing associations.
Furthermore, the determinants of service quality tend to be covered in a 
number of different documents, rather than in a single document. Therefore, 
for a supplier to be successful in meeting all the requirements, an extensive 
search must first be conducted to identify them. Moreover, much duplication 
can be found with respect to sections that deal with determinants of mainte-
nance service quality. In addition, there is usually no attempt to differentiate 
technical from process-related specifications. In order to stimulate readabil-
ity and compliance, attention should be paid to the way in which the deter-
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minants are structured and built up in the various documents related to the 
specifications.
In general, this research suggests that component services seem to be in-
sufficiently recognised as such by purchasers, leading to inadequate coverage 
of important determinants of service quality in service specifications. This 
situation may not only apply to maintenance services bought by housing as-
sociations, but also to other kinds of component services. For example, Tate 
and Van der Valk (2006) used the context of call centre services to discuss the 
importance of having an end-customer perspective for end-customer satisfac-
tion and, ultimately, buying-company success. Other examples could include 
catering for patients and visitors in hospitals, or baggage-handling at airports. 
The insights that this chapter has offered with regard to service specifications 
could help to optimise service delivery from the end-customer’s perspective 
for other component services as well.
 7.9 Managerial implications
Buying companies can use the knowledge obtained in this chapter to criti-
cally reflect on which aspects of service delivery contribute to perceptions of 
high-quality services, and how they should thus specify these for providers. 
Proper service specification, which should take into account what end-cus-
tomers deem to be important, will help a company to acquire and retain sat-
isfied customers.
Recognising that services such as maintenance services are component 
services has implications not only for specifications, but also for other ele-
ments of a commodity strategy. First of all, performance measurement should 
ensure that the requirements are indeed fulfilled. According to the specifica-
tions, for example, workmen may be not allowed to smoke inside dwellings. 
This needs to be monitored in order to ensure compliance, e.g. by means of 
periodical output measurements by a third party. Key requirements that must 
be met by housing associations could be included as award criteria. For reac-
tive maintenance to heating and water systems, for instance, it may be essen-
tial to have a supplier with a proven record of accessibility in order to achieve 
tenant satisfaction. Housing associations could demand that suppliers are 
able to give evidence of past successes based on convincing figures. Contract-
related incentives could be used to stimulate performance relating to deter-
minants of service quality that enhance tenant satisfaction. They could be 
used in addition to the standards set for execution requirements. Contract-re-
lated incentives are an interesting option due to the fact that it is difficult to 
assess service quality beforehand. Housing associations could specify a mini-
mum level of performance for individual service quality determinants, and 
any deviations could be linked to bonuses or penalties.
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Supplier suitability requirements (or selection criteria) are essential for 
verifying whether a maintenance service supplier indeed has the resources 
and capabilities needed to provide high-quality service delivery. In addition to 
diplomas showing the proficiency of maintenance workers, a proven ability to 
deal with tenants in a client-friendly manner may be required.
Finally, as was mentioned earlier, the readability and clarity of specifica-
tion documents could be improved. For example, it might prove helpful and 
would add to transparency to use separate documents for technical specifica-
tions and for issues related to interaction with tenants (functional quality).
 7.10 Limitations and future research
Despite the merits of the study presented in this chapter, one should note 
a few critical points. The first relates to our choice of empirical domain. Ad-
mittedly, the social rented sector may not be an obvious choice for studying 
the specification of component services. However, given that direct services 
are becoming increasingly important to the success of buying companies, and 
that such services are increasingly being sourced from external suppliers, we 
would argue that the subject is highly relevant and topical. The fact that the 
context of our research is unusual does not diminish the value of our findings. 
However, in order to enhance the robustness of the results, the study would 
need to be repeated in other contexts and for other services.
Second, this chapter has focused on how component services should be 
specified in order to enhance customer satisfaction. No attention, however, 
was given to the effects of these presumably better specifications. Future re-
search should address whether more appropriate specifications for compo-
nent services indeed result in higher customer satisfaction.
In addition, future research could also examine the related costs for secur-
ing end-customer preferences by means of specifications. The cost associated 
with component service activities is a major issue, and any actions (e.g. mon-
itoring performance) that can be taken to ensure a high level of quality and 
customer satisfaction are therefore extremely important. Such actions need 
to be cost-effective, however. Finally, end-customer satisfaction is not the on-
ly objective of housing associations. A more comprehensive decision model 
that included aspects such as value, liveability and sustainability would to 
comply with the objectives of the purchasing organisations in question to a 
greater extent.
This chapter focused primarily on the theoretical relationship between de-
terminants of service quality and specifications. In Chapter 8, we extend our 
investigations concerning maintenance service specifications to other main-
tenance services, and to the structure of documents. Chapter 9 examines oth-
er aspects of commodity strategies that may help to improve end-customer 
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satisfaction, such as the configuration of the buyer-supplier relationship, and 
use of suitability requirements, award criteria and contract-related incentives.
This chapter is based on a paper written with Wendy van der Valk (Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam/Technische Universiteit Eindhoven), which has been submitted to an inter-
national journal.
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 8 The end-customer focus 
of maintenance service 
specifications for 
purchasing
 8.1 Customer-oriented specifications
 8.1.1 Introduction
Chapter 7 concluded that specifications form a crucial part of the service pro-
cess. They determine which service will be created and how this will satisfy 
client wishes (Swan et al., 2002). Specifications cover a service’s requirements, 
that is, the type of service, when and how it is to be delivered, and its charac-
teristics (Van Raaij and Pruyn, 1998). One can find various opinions as to what 
should be understood by the term, ‘specifications’. Nellore et al. (1999) con-
ducted a survey on the meaning of the term for automotive industry suppli-
ers. The definition most frequently mentioned by respondents was: ‘require-
ments of the customer/user that the product has to fulfill’. This definition 
does not prescribe a specification method, unlike some of the less popular 
definitions: ‘a very careful description of a product or a process’, and ‘techni-
cal descriptions of products and processes which may contain drawings’. This 
study adopts the most popular definition, which gives buyers and suppliers 
the most freedom to adopt a particular style, while still allowing success.
Referring to the contracts used for construction projects, Clough (1986) long 
ago noted that due to the complexity of the projects, such contracts tend to 
be lengthy and painstakingly drafted so as to precisely specify legal, financial, 
and technical aspects. Maintenance projects may well be less complex than 
other building projects, but the nature of the contracts involved is comparable.
This chapter addresses purchasing specifications (execution requirements) 
for maintenance services, as used by housing associations in the Netherlands. 
Award criteria, of course, are another means of securing high-quality service 
delivery. Due to the fact that award criteria are seldom used by Dutch housing 
associations, however, we do not address them in this study. Chapter 9 exam-
ines the potential advantages of using award criteria.
The objective of our survey was to discover the extent to which mainte-
nance service specifications focus on the end-customer, and therefore the 
degree to which they take service aspects that are important to tenants into 
account. The survey question was: To what extent do maintenance service speci-
fications cover the service aspects that are important to tenants? The subsequent 
analyses addressed the following questions:
Which types of maintenance are specified in the most customer-oriented 
ways?
Which service aspects receive most attention in the specifications?
Do housing associations differ in their customer focus, as expressed in 
specifications?
■
■
■
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Does the emphasis on certain service aspects differ across the various 
types of maintenance?
Does the emphasis on certain service aspects differ across the various 
housing associations?
Does the customer always receive attention in the same kind of docu-
ments? In other words, do housing associations ensure customer-friendli-
ness in similar ways?
 8.1.2 Purchasing documents
We analysed the documents concerned with the definition of specifications 
introduced above: ‘requirements of the customer/user that the product has 
to fulfill’. One should note at the outset that documents cannot capture ev-
erything. Some agreements may go undocumented, as may be the case if a 
partnership has existed for many years. A complete survey of the content of 
maintenance specifications would therefore demand more than a document 
study and several interviews. It would require a more extensive research 
method that would allow the above-mentioned undocumented matters to be 
investigated, preferably at first hand. However, the survey that was performed 
does give a clear initial indication of the customer-friendliness of mainte-
nance specifications in the Dutch social rented sector.
Contracts are the most important specification documents. The term, ‘con-
tract’, is far from clearly defined, however. Framework agreements, for ex-
ample, have multiple meanings in practice. Parties will often be initially con-
tracted using a framework agreement, and then engaged later by means of 
separate contracts or orders. Alternatively, a framework agreement may be 
used as a form of, or in combination with, general conditions.
Other documents that are often physically available are calls for proposals 
or for information. Such documents set out the requirements that proposals 
must satisfy in order to have any chance of success.
Besides the actual maintenance service contract, general conditions are 
among the most important documents for specifications. Bubshait and Al-
mohawis (1994) observe that general conditions need to be applicable to all 
projects in an organisation, or even a country. General conditions are devel-
oped by various professional bodies and are widely used in the construction 
industry. Bubshait and Almohawis (1994) suggest that this constitutes an ac-
knowledgement by the construction industy of the benefits of using standard 
general conditions:
Standard general conditions create opportunities for improving specifica-
tions. Using the same standard conditions for a lengthy period allows the 
clarity, fairness and efficiency of the clauses to be tested, and to be cor-
rected as necessary.
An advantage of standard contracts is that the contracted parties will be 
■
■
■
1.
2.
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familiar with the relevant contract clauses. This familiarity will limit the 
time and effort needed to prepare and review documents for a contract, 
and will help improve clarity in a tender.
Bubshait and Almohawis (1994) also mention some disadvantages of gener-
al conditions: they are often biased in favour of the organisation that wrote 
them, and they reflect assumptions that can be irrelevant to some applica-
tions (Gilberth, 1983).
This survey investigates the extent to which maintenance service speci-
fications are focused on the customer. It should be noted that this is not to 
negate the importance of other elements that determine the success of speci-
fications, such as clarity, completeness, consistency, practical applicability, 
fairness, and impacts on quality, costs, planning and safety.
 8.1.3 Buyers and tenants
Purchasing can be considered to be customer-oriented when issues that cus-
tomers consider to be important are taken into account. A 2006 survey ex-
amined maintenance-related issues that customers, or tenants, considered to 
be important for their level of comfort (see for an extensive analysis e.g. Van 
Mossel et al., 2006; and the Chapters 5-8). This survey revealed that both for 
planned maintenance to the exterior of a dwelling and reactive maintenance 
within dwellings, the quality of the result was ultimately the most important 
factor. The next most important aspects were the competence of the main-
tenance workers, the completion of maintenance in a single visit, and avoid-
ance of damage to personal property. Process-related matters, such as being 
available to answer questions and receive complaints, flexibility in making 
appointments, and limiting the time taken by work, were found to be more 
important for reactive maintenance in dwellings than for planned mainte-
nance to the exterior of dwellings. Thus repairs involve more interaction with 
the resident than planned maintenance.
Buyers’ expectations
In order to gain an approximate idea of the degree of consistency in the spec-
ification process, we asked five employees from five independent (local) de-
partments at a major housing association to state their expectations of what 
tenants consider important in maintenance. All five employees were involved 
in the specification of maintenance. With regard to planned exterior mainte-
nance, it was expected that sticking to execution planning agreements would 
be the most important fact, followed by avoiding damage to personal property, 
and the quality of the result. With respect to requested repairs in the dwelling, 
the expectations varied somewhat. In this case, flexibility in making appoint-
ments was expected to be most important factor for residents, followed by 
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sticking to execution planning agreements, completing maintenance work in 
a single visit, being available to answer questions and receive complaints, and 
avoiding nuisance and tidying up litter and dust around the work site. These 
differences show that purchasing employees differentiate between planned 
exterior maintenance and reactive maintenance in the dwelling.
If we compare the buyers’ assessment with tenants’ opinions, it is striking 
that tenants attached even more importance to the results of maintenance 
than the association staff had expected. Sticking to execution planning agree-
ments is still extremely important, but less important than the quality of the 
result. The same applies to flexibility in making appointments for reactive 
maintenance in dwellings. The aspects considered to be most important by 
(the very modest sample of) association staff were broadly in line with those 
that the residents rated highly.
 8.1.4 Survey method and data
The data include all applicable documents in the maintenance purchasing 
process, such as contracts, calls for proposals and tendering documents (see 
Section 7.5). Data were gathered from four major housing associations locat-
ed in western and central regions in the Netherlands. The characteristics of 
the participating housing associations are displayed in Table 5.2 in Chapter 5. 
The survey was conducted at department-level for one of the housing associa-
tions, and three separate departments were involved. The data therefore relate 
to six different purchasing organisations. The selected housing associations 
were known to engage in innovative tendering methods, such as performance-
based partnerships, which is reflected in the content of the documents.
The survey covered four different maintenance services, thereby extending 
the survey introduced in Chapter 7:
maintenance of individual heating and water systems;
maintenance of individual ventilation systems;
exterior paintwork;
cleaning of shared building elements.
The first two maintenance services take place within the home, while the oth-
er two occur externally (one on the building exterior, and the other in shared 
building elements). The maintenance of heating and water systems normal-
ly occurs in response to residents’ request and has some degree of urgency. 
Maintenance of ventilation systems may be carried out on the basis of what 
are usually indirect complaints related to people’s home environments. Exte-
rior paintwork is initiated by the housing association and can be regarded as 
an upkeep measure. The cleaning of shared building elements, if performed 
on a regular basis, is normally a housing association initiative.
See further Section 7.5 for an explanation of the research methods used.
■
■
■
■
[  ]
 8.2 Results
 8.2.1 Maintenance types and documents
Dozens of documents were scrutinised for service quality determinants. In all, 
340 relevant clauses were found in 28 documents.
The number of relevant clauses per housing association varied between 
29 and 78, where the last would initially appear to have the most customer-
friendly specifications, leaving aside the duplication of aspects in multiple 
documents. 130 of the 340 relevant clauses related to the maintenance of 
heating and water systems, 106 to exterior paintwork, 52 to the cleaning of 
shared building elements, and 50 to the maintenance of ventilation systems. 
It is important to note that contracts for cleaning shared building elements 
and ventilation system maintenance are still under development, and that 
many associations have yet to conclude a contract for these services. These 
types of maintenance are not carried out in many cases. For many housing 
associations, therefore, the first step for improving service delivery to tenants 
would simply be to set up and organise the relevant maintenance activities.
Table 8.1 sets out the documents that were analysed and that deal with 
service aspects in some way.
 8.2.2 Documents and determinants of 
maintenance service quality
Only those documents that included any determinants of maintenance ser-
vice quality were included in the analysis. Table 8.2 lists the determinants of 
maintenance service quality and the specification documents that refer to 
them for the selected housing associations. The list indicates which types of 
document housing associations are using in their attempts to optimise ser-
vice to end-customers.
The ‘contract documents’ are generally technical in nature, especially 
those for exterior paintwork. Contract documents stipulate the provision of 
information to tenants, as well as physical matters related to the actual ac-
tivities. These physical matters might be concerned with avoiding damage to 
tenants’ property, and preventing nuisance caused by noise, vibration, dust 
and litter.
The issues covered by calls for proposals are broadly similar to those cov-
ered by contracts. A possible explanation for this is that a call for proposals 
will specify requirements and thus functions as a direct precursor to the con-
tract. Those aspects that are mentioned relatively frequently in both calls 
for proposals and contracts are: being available to answer questions and re-
ceive complaints, the provision of information to tenants, and the speed of 
response. ‘Completing maintenance work in a single visit’ was mentioned in 
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the calls for proposals examined, but not in contracts. The same applies to 
‘sticking to execution planning agreements’. ‘Evaluation and restoration of 
service’ is one aspect that was mentioned somewhat more often in contracts 
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Table 8.1 Documents with ‘customer-friendly’ clauses
Association Maintenance Document
A Maintenance of heating 
and water systems
Performance contract for central heating maintenance; General conditions for 
performance contract for central heating maintenance + Appendix; Process 
description for performance-based partnership; Framework agreement for 
performance-based partnership
Exterior paintwork General purchasing and contracting conditions; Framework agreement for 
performance-based partnership + Appendix 1
B Maintenance of heating 
and water systems
General conditions association B + Appendix III: conditions for customer 
contacts; Request for proposal for maintenance; Request for information
Exterior paintwork General conditions association B + Appendix III: conditions for customer 
contacts
C1 Cleaning of shared areas Framework agreement, certificates of integrity, and general conditions
Maintenance of heating 
and water systems
Maintenance contract for individual heating and hot water and framework 
agreement
Maintenance of mechanical 
ventilation systems
Maintenance contract for mechanical ventilation; Framework agreement, 
certificates of integrity, and general conditions
Exterior paintwork Contract documents for maintenance paintwork; Framework contract, 
certificates of integrity, and general conditions; UAV
C2 Cleaning of shared areas Contract for cleaning shared areas; Framework agreement, certificates of 
integrity, and general conditions
Maintenance of heating 
and water systems
Maintenance contract for individual heating and hot water; Framework 
agreement, certificates of integrity, and general conditions
Maintenance of mechanical 
ventilation systems
Framework agreement, certificates of integrity, and general conditions
Exterior paintwork Contract documents for external paintwork; Memo x residents’ information PLO; 
Framework agreement, certificates of integrity, and general conditions; UAV
C3 Cleaning of shared areas Cleaning contract; Framework agreement, certificates of integrity, and general 
conditions
Maintenance of heating 
and water systems
Maintenance contract for individual heating and hot water; Framework 
agreement, certificates of integrity, and general conditions
Maintenance of mechanical 
ventilation systems
Maintenance contract for mechanical ventilation; Framework agreement, 
certificates of integrity, and general conditions
Exterior paintwork Request for proposal, description of work; Framework agreement, certificates of 
integrity, and general conditions
D Cleaning of shared areas Contract for cleaning activities
Maintenance of heating 
and water systems
Requirements specification for maintenance, service and replacement of heating 
equipment for individual installations; Performance contract
Exterior paintwork General conditions for planned maintenance
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
than calls for proposals. The same applies to ‘flexibility in making appoint-
ments’, and ‘limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site.’ All 
in all, there is no clear pattern in the listed differences between the two docu-
ment types. Differences may have more to do with the type of maintenance 
service concerned than the differences between the two document types.
Only two performance-based contracts were included in the selection (see 
Table 8.3), too few to allow any conclusions to be drawn regarding this type of 
contract.
The ‘framework agreement, certificates of integrity, and general conditions’, 
several of which were included in the selection, were either based on one oth-
er, or the same document proved to be valid for multiple housing association 
products and branches. This is one explanation for the large range of service 
aspects ‘covered’ in this way. The same is true for the documents that consti-
tuted the ‘general conditions’ part of the specifications. Many service aspects 
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Table 8.2 Aspects of service and the documents in which they are specified
Service quality determinants
Document I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV Total
Contract documents 2 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Request for proposal 2 1 5 0 4 1 1 1 1 2 0 5 1 2 0 28
‘Traditional’ contract 1 5 7 5 9 1 0 4 3 0 0 8 1 0 1 46
Performance-based 
contract
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 6
Framework 
agreement
2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Framework contract, 
certificates of 
integrity, and general 
conditions
22 22 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 155
General terms and 
conditions
13 6 5 15 3 8 10 4 5 4 4 2 1 1 1 83
Selection criteria 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Informal work 
description
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
Total 44 37 34 34 30 25 25 23 23 19 16 16 4 3 2 340
IX The competence of maintenance workers
X Sticking to execution planning agreements
XI Limiting the time taken by work
XII Speed of response
XIII Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform 
overalls
XIV Completing maintenance activities in a single visit
XV Being addressed in your own language
I Avoiding damage to personal property
II Flexibility in making appointments
III Provision of information before the start of maintenance work
IV Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site
V Being available to answer questions and receive complaints
VI Politeness of maintenance workers
VII Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration
VIII Evaluation and restoration of service
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
are mentioned in the general conditions. It would thus appear to be better to 
discuss the aspects that are rarely mentioned, or not mentioned at all. For ex-
ample, addressing residents in their own language, completing maintenance 
work in a single visit, having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform over-
alls, and response speed were all aspects that were seldom stipulated in these 
documents. ‘Offering options for maintenance’ was never covered in the spec-
ifications. Some of these aspects were not mentioned frequently in any of the 
documents examined. Speed of response, by contrast, was usually handled in 
contracts, which are more specific to the maintenance service concerned.
The selected associations frequently use general conditions to address as-
pects of service quality. One association uses a framework agreement includ-
ing general conditions as a basis for each form of partnership with mainte-
nance firms. Selection criteria are scarce and, if they exist, are seldom applied. 
Some contracts address resident-related matters, but others make no men-
tion of them. Contract documents for paintwork are particularly unlikely to 
do so. One association is known to have formulated internal agreements on 
dealing with residents. These internal agreements are applied within the as-
sociation, mainly at an operational level. While it is true that internal agree-
ments will always be made, they will not always be recorded in writing. Final-
ly, one housing association uses calls for proposals to outline the necessary 
requirements regarding quality of service to tenants.
Preventing damage to personal property, and sticking to agreements (with 
tenants) are generally addressed in general conditions and calls for proposals, 
not via contracts. Speed of response, as mentioned above, is an aspect that is 
addressed in contracts and calls for proposals, but not in general conditions. 
Other service quality determinants are represented in all document types.
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Table 8.3 The number of documents applied in the analysis
Document
The number of documents 
applied in the analysis
Contract documents 2
Request for proposal 3
‘Traditional’ contract 8
Performance-based contract 2
Framework agreement 2
Framework contract, certificates of integrity, and general conditions 11
General terms and conditions 7
Selection criteria 1
Informal work description 1
Total 37
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
 8.2.3 Types of maintenance and quality 
of service determinants
Tables 8.4-8.7 outline the scores for each maintenance service on the vari-
ous service quality determinants. Due to the fact that not every housing as-
sociation studied performs maintenance of ventilation systems or cleaning of 
shared areas, the score is also calculated per association. In other words, the 
score is divided by the number of associations with specifications.
Comparing the tables, it can be observed that clauses relating to mainte-
nance of heating and water systems receive the greatest coverage, and exte-
rior paintwork is also well covered. Specifications for the cleaning of shared 
areas appeared to be at a lower level of coverage from the customer’s point 
of view. The same is true, to a lesser extent, for the maintenance of ventila-
tion systems. This would appear to be consistent with the general attention 
given to the first types of maintenance mentioned, but less for the cleaning 
of shared areas and the maintenance of ventilation systems, and the subse-
quent development of contracts in these areas.
Cleaning of shared building elements
The documents relating to the cleaning of shared building elements give most 
attention to preventing damage to tenants’ personal property. The evaluation 
of the service and any restoration of service also receive attention, as does 
the competence of the cleaners. Completing maintenance work in a single 
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Table 8.4 Service quality determinants for cleaning of shared building elements
Service quality determinant Weak (x1) Average (x2) Strong (x3) Score Score
Avoiding damage to personal property 0 7 0 14 3.50
Evaluation and restoration of service 2 2 2 12 3.00
The competence of maintenance workers 0 4 1 11 2.75
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site 0 0 3 9 2.25
Flexibility in making appointments 3 3 0 9 2.25
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration 0 0 3 9 2.25
Politeness of maintenance workers 0 4 0 8 2.00
Provision of information before the start of maintenance work 3 2 0 7 1.75
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints 4 0 0 4 1.00
Sticking to execution planning agreements 3 0 0 3 0.75
Limiting the time taken by work 3 0 0 3 0.75
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls 0 0 1 3 0.75
Being addressed in your own language 0 1 0 2 0.50
Speed of response 0 1 0 2 0.50
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit 0 0 0 0 0.00
Tenant participation by providing maintenance options 0 0 0 0 0.00
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
visit and tenant participation (availability of maintenance options) are not ad-
dressed, which makes sense given the nature of the service. The efficiency of 
cleaners only has a limited impact on tenants’ satisfaction. Furthermore, one 
can make few choices when it comes to cleaning work. What is more strik-
ing is that ‘being addressed in your own language’, and ‘having cleaners wear 
smart, uniform overalls’, receive little attention, despite the fact that these 
kinds of issues can have a direct impact on the impression given to tenants.
Maintenance of heating and water systems
The item that is mentioned most frequently is ‘being available to answer 
questions and receive complaints’. Accessibility is the key factor for reactive 
maintenance, and is indeed essential for being able to carry out such mainte-
nance at all. Much attention is also paid to flexibility in making appointments, 
and preventing damage to personal property. The documents give no atten-
tion to allowing tenant participation by providing a range of maintenance 
choices, and addressing tenants in their own language. Little attention was 
also paid to ‘completing maintenance work in a single visit’ and ‘limiting the 
time taken by work’.
Maintenance of ventilation systems
Contracts for this type of maintenance give most attention to flexibility in 
making appointments. ‘Preventing damage to personal property’ also (again) 
receives substantial coverage. This also applies to ‘limiting and tidying up 
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Table 8.5 Service quality determinants for maintenance of heating and water systems
Service quality determinant Weak (x1) Average (x2) Strong (x3) Score Score
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints 5 5 6 33 5.50
Flexibility in making appointments 6 6 3 27 4.50
Speed of response 1 7 4 27 4.50
Avoiding damage to personal property 2 10 0 22 3.67
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site 6 2 3 19 3.16
Politeness of maintenance workers 5 5 1 18 3.00
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration 2 3 3 17 2.83
The competence of maintenance workers 5 4 0 13 2.17
Provision of information before the start of maintenance work 11 1 0 13 2.16
Evaluation and restoration of service 3 3 0 9 1.50
Sticking to execution planning agreements 5 1 0 7 1.17
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls 0 3 0 6 1.00
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit 1 2 0 5 0.83
Limiting the time taken by work 3 1 0 5 0.83
Tenant participation by providing maintenance options 0 0 0 0 0.00
Being addressed in your own language 0 0 0 0 0.00
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
litter and dust around the work site’ and ‘limiting noise and vibration’. No 
attention was given to ‘completing maintenance work in a single visit’, ‘al-
lowing tenant participation,’ ‘addressing tenants in their own language’ and 
‘having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls’.
Exterior paintwork
‘Preventing damage to personal property’ is the best-covered service quality 
determinant for this type of maintenance. ‘Limiting and tidying up litter and 
dust around the work site’ also receives a great deal of attention, followed by 
‘limiting noise and vibration’ and ‘ensuring satisfactory provision of informa-
tion prior to the start of maintenance work’. No attention is given to ‘complet-
ing maintenance in a single visit’, ‘having maintenance workers wear smart, 
uniform overalls’, and ‘speed of response’. Due to the fact that exterior work 
takes place outside the home, failing to complete maintenance in a single vis-
it usually has no direct impact on residents’ satisfaction levels. Overalls are 
apparently not considered to be important outside the home, although they 
could have some merit from the point of feelings of reliability and identity. 
Speed of response is generally unimportant in this case, as paintwork is usu-
ally planned maintenance.
Differences according to types of maintenance
Documents relating to all types of maintenance contract paid particular at-
tention to preventing damage to (tenants’) personal property. This would ap-
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Table 8.6 Service quality determinants for the maintenance of ventilation systems
Service quality determinant Weak (x1) Average (x2) Strong (x3) Score Score
Flexibility in making appointments 3 4 1 14 4.67
Avoiding damage to personal property 0 6 0 12 4.00
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site 2 0 3 11 3.67
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration 0 0 3 9 3.00
The competence of maintenance workers 0 3 0 6 2.00
Politeness of maintenance workers 0 3 0 6 2.00
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints 4 1 0 6 2.00
Speed of response 0 3 0 6 2.00
Provision of information before the start of maintenance work 5 0 0 5 1.67
Sticking to execution planning agreements 3 0 0 3 1.00
Limiting the time taken by work 3 0 0 3 1.00
Evaluation and restoration of service 3 0 0 3 1.00
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit 0 0 0 0 0.00
Tenant participation by providing maintenance options 0 0 0 0 0.00
Being addressed in your own language 0 0 0 0 0.00
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls 0 0 0 0 0.00
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
pear to be mainly related to limiting the risk to the client by avoiding damage 
claims from tenants. It is also a way of preventing tenants from having valid 
grounds for complaints. Another complaint-related aspect of service that re-
ceives much attention in the documents examined is ‘limiting and tidying up 
litter and dust around the work site’.
‘Completing maintenance in a single visit’ is not addressed in the specifica-
tions, and it is likely that the purchasing party takes this aspect for granted. 
One might reasonably expect documents related to paintwork and cleaning 
not to cover this aspect, in view of the nature of the services provided. For 
these types of maintenance, the distance between service provider and ten-
ant is relatively large. The omission is more surprising in the case of mainte-
nance heating and water installations, and maintenance of ventilation sys-
tems, both of which take place closer to tenants. This is reinforced by the fact 
that the tenants’ survey on maintenance (See Chapter 6) revealed that it is 
precisely this aspect that is particularly important for tenants. Furthermore, 
the same survey reveals that tenants are relatively dissatisfied with this ser-
vice aspect.
Housing associations
One might expect there to be many similarities in how housing associations 
cover aspects of services in their specifications, given the degree of coopera-
tion between them and, in particular, between the different departments of 
housing association C. Despite this, however, there are considerable differ-
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Table 8.7 Service quality determinants for exterior paintwork
Service quality determinant Weak (x1) Average (x2) Strong (x3) Score Score
Avoiding damage to personal property 5 13 1 34 5.67
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site 3 8 4 31 5.17
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration 1 6 4 25 4.16
Provision of information before the start of maintenance work 9 2 1 16 2.67
Politeness of maintenance workers 2 5 0 12 2.00
The competence of maintenance workers 1 5 0 11 1.83
Sticking to execution planning agreements 3 4 0 11 1.83
Flexibility in making appointments 5 3 0 11 1.83
Evaluation and restoration of service 5 3 0 11 1.83
Limiting the time taken by work 3 3 0 9 1.50
Being available to answer questions and receive complaints 4 1 0 6 1.00
Being addressed in your own language 0 1 0 2 0.33
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit 0 0 0 0 0.00
Tenant participation by providing maintenance options 0 0 0 0 0.00
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls 0 0 0 0 0.00
Speed of response 0 0 0 0 0.00
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
ences between them (see Table 8.8). Although it is necessary to take account 
of differences caused by the absence or otherwise of specifications for certain 
types of maintenance for certain housing associations, Table 8.8 gives a rea-
sonable impression of the scale of the differences.
The specifications used by housing association departments C2 and C1, 
which generally had the widest coverage for service aspects, took no account 
of four service aspects: (1) having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform 
overalls, (2) completing maintenance in a single visit, (3) addressing tenants 
in their own language, and (4) allowing tenant participation by providing a 
choice of maintenance options.
It is striking that ‘completing maintenance in a single visit’ was mentioned 
by only two of the four housing associations. ‘Flexibility in making appoint-
ments’ appears to be a key issue for a few housing associations, but a non-is-
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Table 8.8 Cover of relevant clauses per housing association
Service quality determinant
Association 
C2
Association 
C1
Association 
C3
Association 
B
Association 
A
Association 
D Total
Avoiding damage to personal property 12 11 8 4 6 3 44
Flexibility in making appointments 9 10 10 5 3 0 37
Limiting and tidying up litter and dust 
around the work site
7 8 6 6 5 2 34
Provision of information before the 
start of maintenance work
8 7 8 1 4 6 34
Being available to answer questions 
and receive complaints
8 7 7 5 1 2 30
Politeness of maintenance workers 5 4 4 8 2 2 25
Limiting nuisance caused by noise and 
vibration
6 6 4 5 3 1 25
The competence of maintenance 
workers
5 6 5 4 1 2 23
Evaluation and restoration of service 7 4 4 1 5 2 23
Sticking to execution planning 
agreements
5 4 4 3 1 2 19
Limiting the time taken by work 4 4 4 2 1 1 16
Speed of response 2 4 2 3 3 2 16
Maintenance workers wearing smart, 
uniform overalls
0 0 1 1 1 1 4
Completing maintenance activities in 
a single visit
0 0 0 2 1 0 3
Being addressed in your own language 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Tenant participation by providing 
maintenance options
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 78 75 68 50 37 27 335
Source: Document study specifications, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2007
sue for others. Finally, tenant participation via being able to choose between 
various maintenance options was not mentioned at all in the agreements ex-
amined. It is possible, however, that this aspect is dealt with separately from 
the purchasing process (for example, in advance).
Perception and effect
How consistent are buyers’ expectations regarding what is important for end-
customers in the actual specifications? For planned exterior maintenance, 
damage to personal property is indeed given considerable attention. Sticking 
to execution planning agreements also receives reasonable attention in gen-
eral conditions and framework agreements.
For tenants, the most important point for maintenance carried out in re-
sponse to requested repairs in the dwelling was that of ‘flexibility in mak-
ing appointments’. As we concluded in the previous section, the occurrence 
of this aspect in the specifications is extremely variable. In general, however, 
this factor is mentioned fairly comprehensively in the various documents 
concerned with the maintenance of individual heating and water systems 
and the maintenance of individual ventilation systems, both of which both 
take place inside the home. A striking point, again, is that purchasers identi-
fied ‘completing maintenance in a single visit’ as an aspect that they would 
expect tenants to find important, and yet this element was always absent 
from the maintenance specifications.
 8.3 Conclusions and recommendations
 8.3.1 Conclusions
In conclusion, to what extent do maintenance specifications cover those ser-
vice aspects that tenants consider to be important? One should first note that 
the extent to which the occurrence of service aspects is deemed to be ‘sat-
isfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ is a matter of opinion, and therefore subjective. 
However, we aimed for ‘sufficient’ intersubjectivity by using three assessors. 
Another significant point to note is that there was no assessment of cover in 
a legal sense.
For many housing associations, the first step for improving service delivery 
to tenants would simply be to arrange the maintenance needed. In particular, 
contracts for cleaning shared building elements and ventilation system main-
tenance have yet to be developed in many cases.
Overall, many service aspects are mentioned in the general conditions. 
These general conditions usually apply to multiple, if not all, maintenance 
services put out to tender. Response time is not mentioned in general condi-
tions, but is mentioned in the applicable individual contracts (in other words, 
[  ]
for maintenance in response to requested repairs). This is probably due to the 
variability of the desired level of service per type of maintenance. Service as-
pects that may vary in presence or level of service per maintenance service 
might indeed be better recorded per maintenance service, and therefore per 
contract. It is preferable to record service aspects that have, or should have, 
the same service level in general conditions, however, in view of the greater 
transparency achieved (as opposed to a variety of different clauses in mul-
tiple contracts).
It is particularly clear from the analyses that ‘completing maintenance in 
a single visit’ is insufficiently documented in maintenance specifications, in 
light of the importance attached to it by tenants. Although it should be pos-
sible to take this aspect for granted, it being only sensible that work should be 
completed in a single visit, tenants’ dissatisfaction on this point suggests the 
need for further specification. If specified and included in agreements, then 
compliance with this aspect could be measured using output evaluations. 
Moreover, non-compliance is equal to default, as is the case for all aspects 
included in agreements.
The regression analyses that were conducted using satisfaction with 
planned maintenance as the dependent variable, and satisfaction figures for 
service aspects as independent variables (see Chapter 6), show that provid-
ing maintenance options for planned maintenance substantially contributes 
to satisfaction. However, this factor is not included in the specifications used 
in maintenance purchasing. If addressed at all, then this apparently occurs 
through the housing association in consultation with its residents, possibly 
represented by a residents’ committee. Provisionally, the maintenance com-
pany plays no role in responding to individual or group differences concern-
ing end-customer preferences. If the maintenance company were to have 
some capacity in this regard, however, in future steps could be taken to give 
companies more responsibility and control.
Comparable regression analyses were performed (see Chapter 6), with satis-
faction with maintenance in response to requests and repairs in the home as 
the dependent variable. The importance of aspects such as ‘being available to 
answer questions and receive complaints’ and ‘flexibility in making appoint-
ments’ is reflected in the attention that maintenance specifications give to 
them. To a much lesser extent, this also applies to ‘sticking to execution plan-
ning agreements with tenants’ and ‘limiting the time taken by work’, along-
side ‘completing maintenance work in a single visit’. If more attention were 
to be given to these aspects in specifications, then this might result in a more 
satisfactory assurance of service. However, there would be little point in speci-
fying such factors without measuring output, and tenants could be periodical-
ly questioned about the extent to which the requirements had been met.
Service quality determinants find their way to maintenance companies 
along a variety of paths. The current system of specifications has a number 
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of roots: contracts are copied from earlier projects and modified, derived from 
consultants or fellow housing associations, or are based on older documents 
from the same housing association. This means that contractual documents 
tend to acquire different structures for each maintenance type, and moreover, 
these structures are not particularly transparent.
 8.3.2 Recommendations
The fact that housing associations record various service aspects (and thus 
specification components) across many different documents appears to be 
detrimental to the transparency of the specifications, and the likelihood that 
they will be observed. There would appear to be much in favour, where pos-
sible, of distinguishing between technical documents and separate service 
(or interaction-related) documents (possibly bundled together). A distinction 
could be made between the various service aspects that can differ per main-
tenance service and would therefore be recorded at contract level, and ‘fixed’ 
service aspects that are standard for all activities and could be recorded in 
the general conditions (see Figure 8.1).
Finally, despite the important contribution that these specifications make 
to service quality, agreements should not be so detailed and extensive as to 
make fulfilling them impossible.
An adapted version of this chapter is also included in the Habiforum report Inkoop van 
onderhoud en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007).
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 9 Optimising commodity 
strategies
 9.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the following research question: Which commodity 
strategies facilitate the optimisation of tenant satisfaction with maintenance services? 
The structure of the chapter, as summarised below, follows that of the tender 
process, and the related requirements for contractors, relationships, and ser-
vices. The commodity strategy consists of the choices made during the tender 
process outlined here.
The process is as follows:
Execution requirements, formulated into specifications: in short, what has 
to be delivered? We make recommendations for the specifications, and at-
tention is also given to their form (input, throughput, output or outcome, 
Sub-Section 9.2).
Suitability requirements, also known as proficiency requirements for the 
supplier or selection criteria (Sub-Section 9.3).
The choice of award criteria for suppliers (also Sub-Section 9.3).
The contract, or more specifically, the relationship. How should risk shar-
ing be approached, for what period should relationships be entered into, 
and what requirements should be made regarding these? (Sub-Section 9.4).
Incentives in the actual contract (Sub-Section 9.5).
Finally, we briefly examined the issue of whether maintenance services 
should be insourced or outsourced. In this study, this is approached primarily 
from the perspective of core competencies.
The various options for optimisation, in particular those related to the 
contract/relationship, are mainly handled using the tools provided by new in-
stitutional economics, as introduced in Chapter 2 (‘Supply, rules of the game, 
and tools for analysis’, Section 2.4).
 9.2 Execution requirements
 9.2.1 Introduction
This section addresses the execution requirements drawn up by clients in the 
form of specifications. In line with this chapter’s objective, we first define the 
position of specifications in relation to the end-customer. Because execution 
requirements directly determine a service’s form, they are linked to the ac-
tual maintenance service delivered to the tenant (see Figure 9.1). It is thus es-
sential to have clear and focused execution requirements in order to achieve 
tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance.
The sequence below describes the document form used to for specifica-
tions, the form of the actual execution or performance requirements, suppli-
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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ers’ qualities, and the specification decision-making process.
Sub-Section 9.2.2 focuses on choosing suitable performance requirements 
for optimal service delivery. This sub-section is based on the findings of Chap-
ter 8 (The end-customer focus of maintenance service specifications). The 
recommendations made with regard to the form of performance indicators, 
which are presented in Sub-Section 9.2.3, are connected to the findings that 
were presented in Sub-Section 6.6.2 (Performance measurement). Sub-Sec-
tion 9.2.4 discusses how suppliers might contribute to specifications. Property 
rights theory (introduced in Sub-Section 2.3.4) is used to assess the possible 
benefits of supplier contributions. Sub-Section 9.2.5 examines problems relat-
ed to rational decision-making when specifying maintenance services. These 
problems pose a threat to optimal specifications and therefore service qual-
ity. The concept of bounded rationality, which was introduced in Sub-Section 
2.3.3 as part of transaction cost theory, is used to identify these problems and 
to suggest solutions. Finally, in Sub-Section 9.2.6, we look at how selection 
criteria and award criteria have the potential to add emphasis to certain per-
formance requirements, with reference to the findings of Chapters 6, 7 and 
8. Table 9.1 offers an overview of the links between Section 9.2 and preceding 
sections of the thesis.
 9.2.2 The choice of performance requirements
Specifications and tenant satisfaction
The tenants’ survey presented in the Chapters 5, 6, and 7, suggests a prioriti-
sation of service aspects from the end-customer’s point of view. The quality 
of the results, completing maintenance work in a single visit and accessibility 
were found to be the most important aspects. Without repeating the list of 
service quality determinants and associated priorities, it would be advisable 
for housing associations to specify these requirements well, in order to guar-
antee quality. The contents of specifications could be adapted to the demands 
of specific groups, such as the elderly, which may differ from more general 
demands.
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The character of maintenance and performance requirements
The character of a service has a significant impact on its specifications. The 
amount of interaction between maintenance firms and tenants in the course 
of service provision should be reflected in the specifications. Chapters 7 and 
8 took the end-customer’s perspective in focusing on the impact that main-
tenance as a component service has on the attention given to service-quality 
aspects in specifications. The specifications for reactive maintenance inside 
dwellings devote more attention to aspects that give end-customers a sense 
of control. This is in view of first, the often urgent nature of this kind of main-
tenance, and second, the greater sense of responsibility that tenants feel for 
maintenance inside dwellings, as compared with planned maintenance to the 
outside of dwellings. The aspects addressed include accessibility, flexibility in 
making appointments, sticking to agreements and providing choices regard-
ing maintenance possibilities. It would be advisable for housing associations 
to examine all of these issues further.
 9.2.3 The form of performance indicators
Specifications can focus on any combination of input, throughput, output and 
outcome. The form of performance indicators determines their potential for 
performance requirements. The choice of form, however, is subject to certain 
limitations. In Chapter 6, various options for the form of performance indica-
tors in the context of performance measurement were discussed, with impli-
cations for specifications. Indeed, performance must first be specified before 
it can be measured.
Outcome indicators
Outcome indicators, such as end-customer satisfaction, are suitable for over-
all performance monitoring as a form of management information. This in-
formation can be used to enhance the purchasing function. One problem with 
outcome indicators is that causality can be hard to establish, given that end-
customer satisfaction also depends on many factors other than maintenance 
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Table 9.1 The links between Section 9.2 and preceding sections of this thesis
Sub-section: Is primarily related to chapter or (sub-) section:
9.2.2 The choice of performance requirements 8 The end-customer focus of maintenance service 
specifications
9.2.3 The form of performance indicators 6.6.2 Performance measurement
9.2.4 Adapting specifications to suppliers’ qualities 2.3.4 Property rights theory
9.2.5 Rational decision-making and specifying maintenance 
services
2.3.3 Transaction cost theory
9.2.6 Giving extra emphasis to performance requirements 6 Securing high performance maintenance service 
delivery
7 Securing customer satisfaction through component 
service specifications
8 The end-customer focus of maintenance service 
specifications
service. Outcome indicators are not specific enough for maintenance specifi-
cations, and using outcome indicators for explicit and objective monitoring 
and holding suppliers accountable would be a laborious process. Maintenance 
service suppliers will rarely be able to optimise service using outcome indica-
tors, unless additional details are provided.
Output indicators
Output indicators that form part of the functional specifications have the po-
tential to be specific, and may be objectively measurable. When referring to 
buildings, output indicators are also known as functional performance indica-
tors. The success of output indicators depends on the capacity and quality of 
service suppliers, which we will discuss further below. Output in this case re-
fers to aspects related to the maintenance result and aspects of service qual-
ity, with respect to the interaction between the service supplier and the end-
customer. Where output indicators are concerned, a housing association has 
to be very clear about its objectives and expectations regarding maintenance 
assignments. In other words, the key question is how maintenance can con-
tribute to objectives such as customer satisfaction. Housing associations must 
be able to translate such needs into unambiguous, transparent and measur-
able indicators.
Throughput indicators
Throughput indicators, which document the steps of a maintenance process, 
facilitate the objective measurement of supplier performance, meaning that 
the activities carried out are traceable and verifiable. Compared with output 
indicators, a disadvantage of this specification method is that the supplier 
has fewer opportunities to optimise processes. Detailed specifications, which 
are commonly used by housing associations, primarily consist of throughput 
indicators. The use of throughput indicators obliges housing associations to 
know exactly how a service breaks down into activities, and how it has to be 
delivered (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002). Throughput indicators can be used 
for maintenance and application processes. The maintenance process is con-
cerned with the management of maintenance activities, and the application 
process refers to carrying out the actual activities.
Input indicators
Input indicators are used when purchasing competencies. There are two im-
portant types: purchasing additional capacity, and purchasing specialised 
competencies. Consultancy on maintenance solutions is a specialised form of 
consultancy (the ‘engineering consultant’; see Straub and Van Mossel, 2007).
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 9.2.4 Adapting specifications to suppliers’ qualities
Classification
An important principle relating to specifications is that the latter will not 
work unless they are adapted to suppliers’ qualities and needs. The key ques-
tion, then, is whether all suppliers are equal in their capacities to comply 
with specifications.
Kamath and Liker (1994) classify suppliers into four types: Partner, Mature, 
Child and Contractual (or Article) suppliers. Partners are independently able 
to design and develop entire subsystems and work with multiple concepts. 
Mature suppliers need rough specifications on which to base development. 
Child suppliers need detailed specifications from the outset, which determine 
the materials, dimensions and functionality of components, and the supplier 
is obliged to deliver the component as specified. Contractual suppliers are on-
ly capable of performing standard services. A continuum is thus drawn from 
functional to descriptive requirements.
Output specifications or throughput specifications?
One advantage of using functional specifications for maintenance (or specifi-
cations based on output indicators), is that contractors are able to make the 
most effective use of their qualities in designing optimum services and main-
tenance solutions. However, the question is whether maintenance firms are 
capable of approaching specifications in this way. The same applies to hous-
ing associations: they have to be capable of drafting authoritative functional 
specifications, based on the housing association’s objectives. There have been 
some notable developments in this regard. For instance, a select group of con-
tractors in the property maintenance sector, most whom are members of the 
employers’ association ‘WVB’ together with housing associations and OTB Re-
search Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies, are involved in de-
veloping functional specifications. Ongoing tests suggest that a select group 
of companies do have capability in this regard, with the implication that add-
ed value can be created for customers.
The capacities needed by maintenance firms for maintaining relationships 
with end-customers can be deduced from the supplier categories defined by 
Kamath and Liker (1994). As mentioned above, Partners are able to design 
complete subsystems. This means that they are independently capable of de-
signing services provided to end-customers. This implies, for instance, that 
contractors know the tenants and their preferences. For Partner suppliers, 
outcome and possibly few output indicators might be sufficient for monitor-
ing purposes. Mature suppliers, meanwhile, use client output indicators to 
optimise their services. Contractors are responsible for designing activities 
and interactions so as to fulfill output indicators. However, unlike Partners, 
Mature suppliers are not independently capable of determining what is im-
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portant for end-customers.
Child suppliers are not able (or at any rate, no better than the client) to 
determine for themselves how to arrange activities so as to fulfill output in-
dicators. The contractor is capable of performing the activities prescribed by 
the client. The Child supplier is not independently capable of improving the 
service to the end-customer. Finally, Contractual suppliers are only capable 
of performing standard services. This situation rarely arises in maintenance, 
with the possible exceptions of maintenance of shared installations or green-
ery. Standard effectiveness is not the same as standard service. As soon as 
interaction with the end-customer comes into play, the service ceases to be 
standard. A maintenance service supplier that is capable only of providing 
standard services for similar systems could be classified as a Contractual sup-
plier.
In general, maintenance suppliers can be categorised as Child suppliers. 
Many maintenance firms are capable of producing services in conformity with 
specifications, which currently, are usually technical. We know of no Dutch 
maintenance firms that would fit the description of ‘Partner’. A few firms may 
be classified as Mature suppliers. In technical terms at least, these firms are 
capable of defining services themselves. There may be scope for development 
in non-technical areas, possibly and preferably in partnership with the hous-
ing association.
Suppliers’ contributions to specifications
Property rights theory (presented in Sub-Section 2.3.4), which is part of new 
institutional economics, states – ceteris paribus – that more property rights 
allow actors greater freedom of action, and as a result, their decisions lead 
to greater efficiency for society as a whole. This insight also applies to main-
tenance service specifications. Firstly, a contractor will reap the rewards of 
his own efforts if he is contractually bound to a client or given building com-
plex for a lengthy period. Secondly, the more a contractor can contribute to 
designing solutions or services, the broader the contractor’s outlook will be, 
and it is likely that the contractor will put more effort into solving mainte-
nance problems and delivering better services. There are two ways to achieve 
this. Together, service suppliers and housing associations could refine speci-
fications to produce ‘the best solution’. Alternatively, the housing association 
could structure specifications in such a way as to leave sufficient freedom for 
maintenance firms to optimise their services as they saw fit. With respect to 
the end-customer, property rights theory suggests that maintenance firms 
will come up with better services as soon as they are made responsible and 
accountable for tailoring services to end-customers’ wishes, or those of cus-
tomer groups. To do so, they need more knowledge regarding end-customers.
If European procurement Directives are applicable, then there are certain 
obstacles to involving maintenance firms in drawing up specifications prior 
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to selection. In 1994, the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement was negotiated. One noteworthy part of this Agreement 
is the ‘Chinese wall clause’, which states that the principle of equal treat-
ment of suppliers must be guaranteed when contracting entities accept ad-
vice on drawing up (technical) specifications. This implies that a consultant 
who provides support in drawing up technical specifications may compete for 
the contract only if his consultancy function has given him no actual advan-
tage over other potential suppliers, or that they have the same information 
available to them. In other words, discrimination between contractors is not 
permitted (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1999). As long as the European 
Directives are not considered to be applicable, however, this will not become 
an issue.
 9.2.5 Rational decision-making and specifying 
maintenance services
Ideally, purchasers would know everything that is important to know, suppli-
ers would be able to read their minds, and excellent service delivery would 
be the result. In reality, however, perfect rational decision-making remains a 
utopian dream.
In Sub-Section 2.3.3, bounded rationality was introduced as one of the key 
concepts in transaction cost theory. Bounded rationality means that although 
people might intend to make rational decisions, their capacity to evaluate all 
possible decisions accurately is physically limited. Decision support systems 
can help to reduce the limitations brought by bounded rationality.
Although decision-making on purchasing processes actually extends beyond 
commodity strategy, which is the main subject of this chapter, below we briefly 
comment on to the issue in view of its importance to commodity strategy.
Bounded rationality and maintenance purchasing
Bounded rationality problems occur in housing association maintenance pur-
chasing. Maintenance is still strongly budget-driven, for example, and too few 
trade-offs are made between investment and management expenses. There 
are also barriers to housing associations’ decision-making with regard to 
budgets for planned maintenance, reactive maintenance, and home improve-
ments. A further example that is relevant to bounded rationality is that of 
complex contracts. Bounded rationality means that complex contracts are of-
ten incomplete, which is detrimental to the level of service.
Achieving optimum service to tenants implies possessing the necessary 
information about tenants for service optimisation. These data concern the 
wishes of client groups, and even individual preferences. It is clearly also im-
portant to have sufficient information about the building elements and sys-
tems to be maintained, by means of condition measurements and inspections, 
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so as to facilitate efficiency (completing maintenance in a single visit; limiting 
the time taken by the work), and to allow appropriate preventive measures to 
be taken. In many cases, it will be appropriate to share information with the 
service supplier, precisely because it is unique. One might even consider the 
possibility of making suppliers responsible for information systems related to 
tenants. These may include, for instance, analysis of complaints and the use 
of service maintenance by (specific groups of) tenants. If suppliers are capa-
ble of using this information to improve services, this would simultaneously 
provide a positive (‘property rights’) incentive; suppliers would develop their 
sense of responsibility for tenant satisfaction.
In addition, the structure of the purchasing team (buying centre) could 
contribute to rational decision-making. Having the right purchasing team 
composition would increase the availability of information and increase po-
tential for optimising decisions. This means that for maintenance services 
that are crucial to tenant satisfaction, in particular the maintenance of heat-
ing and water systems, the purchasing team must have knowledge about the 
end-customer. One possible way of achieving this would be to involve market-
ing specialists in purchasing. It is also important to provide strategic support 
to the purchasing function (Cousins, 2006: 778): ‘Not only does top manage-
ment play an important role in influencing the organisation’s attitude toward 
purchasing, they can also devote resources in terms of time, personnel and 
finances toward improving the capability of the function.’
The purchasing function must also be able to handle the various partner-
ships that some services need in order to ensure a stable delivery at a high 
level, which goes beyond price negotiations alone. This subject is discussed 
later in this chapter.
Services and documents
The structure of specifications can add to the understandability of require-
ments (it may help to resolve bounded rationality) and therefore to suppliers’ 
performance.
When specifying services, it is important to recognise whether what is in-
volved is a completely new service (a ‘new task’), a modified service (a ‘modi-
fied rebuy’) or a frequently-applied ‘copy’ (a ’straight rebuy’) (Robinson et al., 
1967). The more that it is a case of the latter, the more material can be re-
cycled from previous tenders.
Planned maintenance, void repairs and reactive maintenance qualify as 
‘modified rebuy’. Building complexes are fairly predictable, as are the main 
features of the processes involved in maintenance. Nonetheless, almost ev-
ery housing block, and almost every maintenance assignment, involves some-
thing different. However, rather than purchasing single assignments for main-
tenance in response to requested repairs, it is more common to purchase an 
agreed service for a defined period. This service may involve various standard 
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activities, meaning that reactive maintenance can often have many charac-
teristics of a straight rebuy. Depending on the situation, this may reduce ef-
fort expended on drawing up specifications. Many specification components 
can then be reused.
General conditions are used to record matters that do not vary between 
the different services (and products) purchased. Because large parts of speci-
fications are reused in maintenance (new tasks are not involved), from the 
perspective of transparency, matters that seldom vary across the various 
contracts should be shifted to a separate specification component. Rather il-
logically, however, the contractual documents investigated in the survey de-
scribed in Chapter 8 mix these aspects with others that are subject to change.
 9.2.6 Giving extra emphasis to performance requirements
Execution requirements are the right means for housing associations to spec-
ify all relevant determinants of maintenance service quality desired for a par-
ticular contract. For the housing associations that focus on tenant satisfaction 
with maintenance, the execution requirements of component maintenance 
services should include essential determinants of maintenance service quality 
(see Chapter 7). In Chapter 6, attention was paid to the essential determinants 
of maintenance service quality, while Chapter 8 evaluated the use of essen-
tial determinants. Some determinants of maintenance service quality, how-
ever, are so important that they should be considered in the supplier selection 
phase. Although execution requirements are obligatory, rather than voluntary, 
considering them in the selection phase (usually in the form of award criteria) 
forces potential suppliers to prove beforehand that they are indeed able to per-
form, thus reducing the risk of inadequate performance. Housing associations 
have to ensure that suppliers have the resources and capabilities to deliver ad-
equate quality. In the following sub-sections, we examine the use of selection 
criteria (suitability requirements) and award criteria.
 9.3 Suitability requirements
 9.3.1 Introduction
Suitability requirements are also known as proficiency requirements for the 
supplier, or selection criteria. Using suitability requirements in the selection 
phase can help to reduce the number of potential suppliers for the award 
phase, thereby increasing the chances for potential suppliers. One would ex-
pect this to raise the quality of proposals, and is a method that is particularly 
applicable to very complex projects. In addition, the costs of potential suppli-
ers are limited, given that they have a greater chance of winning the contract. 
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Particularly from the perspective of tenant satisfaction, the requirements 
should include quality guarantees related to human resources.
Suitability requirements are related directly to the maintenance firm that 
is suitable for supplying the services (see Figure 9.2).
This section examines the supplier requirements necessary for delivering 
high quality maintenance services. Sub-Section 9.3.2 discusses which resourc-
es are needed from suppliers in order to enable high quality service delivery 
(supported by findings from Chapters 6 and 7). In Sub-Section 9.3.3, we turn to 
the issue of opportunism. This threat to quality is assessed using transaction 
costs theory, as introduced in Sub-Section 2.3.3. Supplier selection can help to 
reduce opportunism and thereby reduce the possibility of inadequate service 
delivery. The question, ‘What can be demanded from the maintenance firm?’ 
(Sub-Section 9.3.4) is assessed using information from Section 2.2 regarding 
maintenance market. This leads us to identify the problem of making too many 
requirements of potential service suppliers (for an overview, see Table 9.2).
 9.3.2 Maintenance service suppliers’ resources
Which resources should a (maintenance) service supplier possess? Axelsson 
and Wynstra (2002) identify the following four categories of resources:
Financial resources – Certainly for highly transaction-specific investments, 
it is important to have guaranteed continuity of service, and the firm must 
have sufficient financial power. Liquidity is also important for timely pay-
ment.
Material resources – Maintenance firms must have the right production re-
sources, such as a sufficient number of vehicles. Material resources could 
also be leased by the maintenance firm.
Intangible resources – This refers to learning capacity/knowledge, business 
contacts, and brand/image. With respect to learning capacity, the selection 
procedure could involve enquiring about past performance, thus provid-
ing a certain guarantee for the future. The supplier’s network of service 
and materials suppliers (subcontractors) is ultimately important for ser-
■
■
■
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vice quality. The firm’s reputation can be valuable for gaining the end-cus-
tomer’s confidence and, of course, that of the housing association itself. If 
maintenance firms provide consultancy to housing associations on main-
tenance solutions, then it is important that they have knowledge of and 
experience in designing maintenance solutions.
Human resources – Maintenance firms must employ the right people. How-
ever, when they come into contact with the end-customer, it is important 
for service quality that they are able to (see Chapter 6):
work flexibly in terms of time;
stick to agreements with tenants and therefore also to plan well;
work efficiently;
take care of personal presentation and the impression made by their ac-
tivities (including tidying up litter, if possible, and being polite);
speak the tenant’s language;
plan their activities so as to complete reactive maintenance in a single 
visit. This aspect is also influenced by how well the maintenance re-
quest is recorded.
If the maintenance firm is also responsible for taking/recording requests 
for repair requests, or for (initial) contact with tenants, then the follow-
ing communication skills can be added to the requirements:
to be accessible to residents via various means of communication and 
to have sufficient capacity in this respect (possibly 24/7);
to be able to respond to tenants’ preferences, possibly in a differenti-
ated way.
To ensure high-quality maintenance service delivery, more is thus needed 
than ‘simply’ proficiency and being able to coordinate work with other par-
ties. The fact that maintenance firms play a ‘front-office’ role means that they 
need knowledge and skills to deal with consumers. If subcontractors are used, 
then the requirements made of them should reflect the amount of responsi-
bility they are given.
 9.3.3 Supplier selection as means of limiting 
opportunistic behaviour
Opportunism poses a direct threat to high-performance maintenance service 
delivery. Transaction cost theory (see Sub-Section 2.3.3) offers tools that can 
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
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Table 9.2 The links between Section 9.3 and preceding sections of this thesis
Sub-section: Is primarily related to chapter or (sub-)section:
9.3.2 Maintenance service suppliers’ resources 6 Securing high performance maintenance service 
delivery
7 Securing customer satisfaction through component 
service specifications
9.3.3 Supplier selection as means of limiting opportunistic 
behaviour
2.3.3 Transaction cost theory
9.3.4 What can be demanded from the maintenance firm? 2.2 Maintenance market
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enable housing associations to deal with this type of threat. The most direct 
way of dealing with opportunism is to select partners that are unlikely to in-
dulge in opportunistic behaviour, or that are inherently cooperative with re-
spect to a particular task (Orbell and Dawes, 1993; Wathne and Heide, 2000). It 
therefore makes sense to select partners that have an intrinsic desire to suc-
ceed. Wathne and Heide mention two possible limitations to selection:
passive opportunism may occur, despite selection, because a contractor 
disregards the agreements once he has been selected;
changed circumstances can make selection unnecessary; the requirements 
stated are no longer applicable.
Wathne and Heide (2000) suggest a number of solutions to combat opportun-
ism, of which those relating to supplier selection are certification and ‘reputa-
tion management’.
Certification as means of limiting opportunistic behaviour
Customised certification reduces information asymmetry related to a contrac-
tor’s qualities, and ensures that only suppliers that meet the certification cri-
teria are selected. Furthermore, maintenance firms demonstrate through the 
effort involved in certification that they are keen to enter into a relationship 
with the client. For a relationship of this kind, it is necessary that the costs 
of participation exceed the short-term gains of opportunistic presentation. 
In addition, the ultimate profits for participating suppliers must exceed the 
costs of participation (Farrell and Gibbons, 1995).
Certification is one a way to reduce opportunistic tendencies. The contrac-
tor is certified for suitability from a particular perspective or for certain activi-
ties. This instrument can thus supplement suitability requirements used by a 
housing association. There are three approaches to certification:
the client develops internal certification systems (i.e. customised certifica-
tion) for suppliers;
adoption of standardised systems (e.g. ISO 9000 series), with the expecta-
tion that suppliers (maintenance firms) will adhere to them;
self-certification by suppliers (VGO quality mark for performance-based 
exterior maintenance: this quality mark is intended to become a stan-
dardised system; or the quality standard for companies specialising in dai-
ly maintenance ‘Maintenance Quality Management’ (MQM), which focuses 
on better quality of service; or focused on a particular technical activity, 
such as the AF certification scheme for painters and Dakmerk for roofing 
contractors) (Maass et al., 1990).
Client internal certification systems have the advantage of giving one control 
over the process and scope of certification, and allow certification to be cus-
tomised per client. On the other hand, internal systems demand much devel-
1.
2.
■
■
■
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opment time and capital, and a contractor inundated with questions about 
the system will be distracted from providing good service. The disadvantage 
of standardised systems, however, is that it is usually expensive for suppli-
ers to go through a certification process, and clients complain that it does not 
guarantee continuous improvement and quality, merely a documented qual-
ity process (for example in the case of ISO 9000) (Avery, 1993). An alternative 
approach would be to combine an existing standardised system with a cus-
tom system.
Certifications are thus means of simplifying the selection process. Apart 
from certification of employees, using certification as a suitability require-
ment enables housing associations to choose service suppliers with proven 
track records e.g. in relation to minimal tenant satisfaction ratings regarding 
maintenance service delivery. Particularly for maintenance services that have 
high impact on tenant satisfaction, certain certification procedures may be 
set up and used for supplier selection. Certification, however, should be used 
with care. Performance indicators should exclusively and precisely measure 
key factors leading to tenant satisfaction. Using unnecessary indicators will 
lead to non-essential or even undesirable actions and a reduction in the num-
ber of suitable, (pre-)selected suppliers.
Reputation as means of limiting opportunistic behaviour
Reputation also counters opportunistic behaviour. Reputations, however, re-
quire public transparency regarding output (Sappington, 1991). In competitive 
relationships, firms are not always inclined to be honest about the perfor-
mance of their suppliers. However, in the case of housing associations, where 
there are no such competitive relationships, it should be possible to make use 
of the (public) reputations of maintenance firms. This requires, however, that 
criteria used are objective, and that there is no tendency to manipulate the 
information used to verify the criteria. Moreover, the situation is unbalanced: 
poor performance by a supplier is not necessarily the supplier’s fault, but it 
might be in the housing association’s interest to give the supplier a bad repu-
tation. For a housing association, however, many of which operate in a tight 
housing market, having a bad reputation will be less harmful than for a com-
pany that is dependent on market demand. This difference stems from hous-
ing associations’ special position of power relative to their customers, and the 
lack of opportunities for competition in tight housing markets.
Thus while certification appears to be a useful selection means of limiting 
opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, ‘reputation management’ would appear 
to be less useful. Still, the clearest benefit of supplier selection relates to get-
ting an indication of the supplier’s potential ability to help achieve the hous-
ing association’s objectives. The housing association should avoid setting the 
standards too high, however.
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 9.3.4 What can be demanded from the maintenance firm?
When using suitability criteria, the housing association is dependent on the 
nature of the maintenance market (the market characteristics). If too few 
suppliers are able to satisfy what the client is demanding, then this will have 
consequences for power relations.
The power relations between the supplier and the housing association de-
pend on factors such as the size of the firm (Campbell, 1985), the number of 
suppliers, dependence on resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), how critical a 
purchase is in view of a lack of substitutability (Krapfel, Salmond, and Spek-
man, 1991), and technical and commercial competence. Market characteris-
tics are defined in a similar way by Kraljic (1983, supply market complexity) 
and Elliott-Shircore and Steele (1985, supply sensitivity). In the case of main-
tenance, the firm is usually smaller than the purchasing party (the housing 
association). Lift maintenance firms tend to be larger than other maintenance 
firms and exercise a certain degree of market power, partly due to the fact 
that there is a small number of companies and there is limited substitutabil-
ity. This, in turn, is due to the fact that maintenance is mainly performed by 
lift manufacturers of the same brand.
As client requests become more specific and demanding, this has impli-
cations for the number of suppliers able to satisfy the requests. Contractors 
must therefore ascertain whether there are enough suppliers that are able, for 
example, to offer engineering consultancy capacity for devising maintenance 
solutions, as well as operational capacity. In other words, if various transac-
tion-specific investments are requested, such as providing input into the de-
sign of a service, the result may be a lack of possible suppliers and therefore, 
in addition to higher prices, possibly a greater need to secure the delivery. At 
the same time, as mentioned above, transaction-specific investment by the 
supplier leads to what Bensaou (1999) describes as the ‘captive supplier’ (for 
low specific investment by the purchasing organisation), or a strategic part-
nership, whereby the purchasing party also performs substantial transaction-
specific investment.
 9.4 Award criteria
Unlike suitability requirements, award criteria relate to the suitability of the 
delivery (see Figure 9.3). Like execution requirements, they are linked to the 
actual maintenance service delivered to the tenant. Award criteria have the 
potential to highlight essential execution requirements.
The award criteria that will be presented in this section as potentially in-
teresting for housing associations are based on the aspects that tenants in-
dicated as important for satisfaction (see Chapters 6 and 7) Current procure-
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ment customs and regulations (see Section 2.4) are taken into account in the 
analysis.
When awarding contracts to (candidate) maintenance service suppliers, 
two award criteria can be applied. As explained earlier, in accordance with 
ARW 2005 and the European Public Procurement Directive, contracts can be 
awarded to maintenance firms on the basis of (Municipality of Overbetuwe, 
2006: 11):
1. The lowest price – When a contract is awarded based on the lowest price, 
the assessment of the proposals is fairly clear. The proposals will be checked 
against the selection criteria for irregularities and for completeness. The price 
then decides. The contract documents or requirements specification then 
have to contain a detailed (technical) specification. This methodology must be 
used for supplies, services or works for which the technical, quantitative and 
qualitative requirements can be specified in detail in a requirements speci-
fication, or in contract documents, where the probability of upward contract 
variation is negligible. Candidate suppliers are then unable to distinguish 
themselves with the content of their proposal, but only with the price.
2. Most economically advantageous tender – For other contracts the criterion of 
most economically advantageous tender must be used. Additional award cri-
teria are stipulated alongside ‘the price’. The criteria may be concerned with 
the product to be purchased (e.g. standard prices, quality, environmental 
friendliness and delivery time), but could also be concerned with the execu-
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Table 9.3 The links between Section 9.4 and preceding sections of this thesis
Section: Is primarily related to chapter or (sub-)section:
9.4 Award criteria 2.4 Procurement customs and regulation
6 Securing high performance maintenance service delivery
7 Securing customer satisfaction through component service specifications
tion, management or maintenance of the product (e.g. execution term, cus-
tomer-friendliness, service and quality). The most relevant award criteria will 
be used for each contract. A clear assessment method is used when applying 
this award criterion.
Tenant satisfaction appears to be best secured through the use of ‘the most 
economically advantageous tender’, rather than the lowest price. This may re-
sult in some direct price disadvantages, but these may be countered in the 
longer run (total costs of ownership). For instance, more satisfied tenants may 
result in fewer complaints, thus fewer burdens on the system, and lower costs 
as a result.
It is in the interests of tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance that the 
essential determinants of maintenance service quality are included as award 
criteria, including the appropriate weights. Clear emphasis is thus given to 
specific items, which may be overlooked in execution requirements. However, 
only those determinants of maintenance service quality should be included 
that can be measured, and can be compared objectively at this stage of pro-
cess. For instance, for reactive maintenance inside dwellings, the flexibility 
of making appointments is a determinant of service quality that significantly 
adds to tenant satisfaction with maintenance. Availability for appointments 
is one aspect of this flexibility, and is made a precondition. One award crite-
rion could relate to the range of hours (e.g. day or night) that the contractor 
is available for appointments, for instance, for urgent maintenance of hinges 
and locks of windows and external doors. Other determinants of mainte-
nance service quality could be perceived as minimum requirements. Inad-
equate compliance leads to dissatisfied tenants, and using selection criteria, 
the ability of potential suppliers to meet such requirements could be tested. 
For example, the ability to be available to answer questions and receive com-
plaints (accessibility) may be best guaranteed by having a call centre, which 
might be made a suitability requirement. The required level of service deliv-
ery can, subsequently, be described in the execution requirements. At con-
tract-level, an incentive structure may be used in order to further stimulate 
high accessibility ratings (see further Section 9.5 for contract-related incen-
tives).
Besides the contents of the award procedure, the nature of the procedure 
itself may influence that quality that is finally delivered by selected suppliers. 
According to the literature, the decision to opt for either an open or a restrict-
ed award procedure should be based on the following criteria: the expected 
level of market competition, the expected tendering costs, and the amount of 
time that will be involved (Heijboer and Telgen, 2002). These criteria will vary 
per commodity. However, Section 2.1 explained how most maintenance mar-
kets are characterised as having a local scope. This restricts the expected level 
of market competition, and also restricts the possibility of combining parcels. 
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Therefore, it will often be the case that a restricted award procedure may be 
sufficient and ‘exotic’ suppliers will not be able to deliver extra added value.
 9.5 The relationship between the 
housing association and the 
maintenance service supplier
 9.5.1 Introduction
This section discusses the configuration of the relationship between the 
housing association and the contractor that is chosen in the selection phase. 
In this case, the ‘relationship’ is that between the client and contractor, and 
thus only has indirect consequences for the service provided to the end-cus-
tomer. Figure 9.4 shows how the subjects dealt with in this section are posi-
tioned in a triangular relationship.
Sub-Sections 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 focus on coordination mechanisms, using the 
categories of ‘hierachy’ and ‘market’ developed by Malone et al. (1987) and 
others. These categories were introduced in Section 2.3, and are based on 
transaction cost theory. In an ideal hierarchy, a department of the housing as-
sociation would conduct maintenance activities. In an ideal market operation, 
the housing association as purchasing entity would evaluate various offers 
from the market. A hybrid form is applicable in cases of cooperation between 
housing associations and suppliers to determine the characteristics of main-
tenance service delivery.
Sub-Section 9.5.3 focuses on choosing an optimal coordination mechanism 
to deal with risk related to asset specificity and specification complexity. The 
choice of the coordination mechanism can have consequences not only for 
price, but also for the quality of service delivery.
Sub-Section 9.5.4 examines the agency risks that appear in the relationship 
between housing associations and maintenance service suppliers, and which 
may threaten high-quality maintenance service delivery. Finally, Sub-Section 
9.5.5 is concerned with possible solutions for limiting opportunism risks in 
the buyer-supplier relationship. Opportunism risks can also be considered a 
threat to high-quality service delivery, and therefore to tenant satisfaction re-
garding maintenance (see Table 9.4 for an overview of the links between the 
items studied in Section 9.5 and preceding sections of the thesis).
 9.5.2 Using coordination mechanisms 
to optimise service quality
A number of theoreticians have analysed the relative benefits of hierarchy 
and market, including Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979; 1981a; 1981b). With 
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respect to this, Coase (1937) describes the different situations within and out-
side of the firm: ‘Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which 
is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. 
Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the 
complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the 
entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production.’ Coase then describes hy-
brid forms, observing (1937: 389): ‘As it is evident, the amount of ‘vertical’ in-
tegration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, var-
ies greatly from industry to industry and from firm to firm.’ Coase assumes 
that as soon as there is not anymore a price mechanism, there is no longer 
any element of market, but instead of a firm. Vertical cooperation may be con-
sidered to be a relationship type lying between vertical integration (hierarchy) 
and the market. The rest of this thesis refers to the ‘hierachy-market con-
tinuum’ to denote how close this partnership is (i.e. how much hierarchy is 
present, as opposed to market, without going beyond the boundaries of firm 
formation or integration).
Which coordination mechanisms are most effective depends on the spe-
cific situation. A general assumption is that hierarchies are rationally more 
logical than markets if coordination costs (the transaction or management 
costs needed to coordinate the work of people and machines to facilitate pri-
mary processes) are high compared with production costs (physical and other 
primary processes needed to create the goods and services to be produced). 
Various factors determine the relative importance of production and coordi-
nation costs, and therefore the relative desirability of markets and hierarchies. 
The more specific the assets that are bound to the maintenance activities, the 
greater the coordination costs compared with production costs. Hierarchy 
would then appear to be the most appropriate coordination mechanism. Al-
so, the more complicated the specifications are, the more difficulties a client 
should expect from markets. The next sub-section will look at asset specific-
ity and complexity, both of which can influence the nature of the optimal co-
ordination mechanism (with the objective of maximising tenant satisfaction).
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 9.5.3 The choice of the most suitable 
coordination mechanism
Asset specificity: Types of asset specificity in maintenance
Asset specificity is usually defined as the extent to which the investments 
made to support a particular transaction have a higher value to that trans-
action than they would have if they were redeployed for any other purpose 
(McGuinness, 1994). Asset specificity is involved in many areas of home main-
tenance.
Every building is different. Sometimes buildings have the same design, 
but have different environmental characteristics, such as the setting, the be-
haviour of residents, and management. Every maintenance solution is thus 
unique in some sense, with the implication that working methods, applica-
tions, and even innovations (in so far that the term applies) can sometimes 
only be applied once. A relatively complex building design is more likely to in-
volve unique solutions, and therefore increases the challenges posed by asset 
specificity. A positive consequence of (close) cooperation in the case of unique 
works is that the risks of failure are discussed (for instance, by quality teams) 
and can therefore be limited. The following types of asset specificity can be 
identified:
Besides knowledge of maintenance solutions, knowledge of the property 
of the client is also specific and not replicable. This problem can be mini-
mised through objective inspections and inventories.
Knowledge of the (ideal approach to) cooperative processes, in particular at 
an operational level between the client and the maintenance firm, is spe-
cific. In other words, the maintenance firm’s processes and work-flows can 
be adapted to those of the client. For example, what kind of coordination 
exists between the foreman and the project leader?
The maintenance solution can be considered to be a specific asset if the 
development of a maintenance solution is part of the partnership between 
the client and the maintenance firm.
Estimates in procurement processes are already transaction-specific. This 
does not imply that the supplier making the investment also deserves the 
actual contract.
In some cases, the maintenance firm will have built up experience and 
knowledge of the needs and wishes of the end-customer. Complaint pat-
terns are one example of this.
■
■
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Table 9.4 The links between Section 9.5 and preceding sections of this thesis
Sub-section: Is primarily related to chapter or (sub-)section:
9.5.2 Using coordination mechanisms to optimise service quality 2.3.3 Transaction cost theory
9.5.3 The choice of the most suitable coordination mechanism 2.3.3 Transaction cost theory
9.5.4 Limiting agency risks 2.3.5 Agency theory
9.5.5 Limiting risks of opportunism 2.3.3 Transaction cost theory
Asset specificity: Contract duration
In general, the degree of asset specificity in a relationship, if there is any sub-
stantial interaction between the parties, increases as the contract continues.
When maintenance solutions are standardised, and there is thus less 
unique optimisation, having extremely long-term relationships might be det-
rimental to flexibility and price advantages. In other words, market advantag-
es could play a greater role in such cases. This is the case for installations, for 
example, where the manufacturer may have chosen the design specifications 
and the maintenance solutions at the outset.
Asset specificity: Knowledge of the residential complex and performance pat-
terns of building elements
Knowledge of the residential complex is another specific ‘asset’ that could 
lead to a preference for hierarchical control. Knowledge of the complex can 
be acquired in two ways:
inventories and inspection;
experience with maintenance of the building and knowledge of the perfor-
mance pattern of building elements.
The first aspect is independently measurable and tradable. The client could 
also be primarily responsible for making such measurements, and thus would 
not be dependent on the maintenance firm in this respect. However, it would 
appear that in practice, if a housing association performs an inspection, the 
contractor feels obliged to repeat it, in view of the considerable differences 
in measurements and associated interpretations that can arise. A shared 
measurement team, or an independent one that is accepted by both parties, 
would appear to be the most appropriate option.
The second point, relating to experience with maintenance of the building 
element, and, even more importantly, knowledge of the building element’s 
performance pattern, will be effective if there is sufficient repetition and du-
ration of maintenance (when there will be a transaction-specific investment 
as opposed to expenses alone). This would appear to apply to relatively large 
maintenance assignments relating to the exteriors of buildings. One precon-
dition for this is to select a contractor with sufficient stamina. Stamina is 
related to both long-term solvency and what could be described as a stable 
knowledge base, so that knowledge and experience are not lost once they 
have been acquired.
Asset specificity: Repetition of maintenance works
Besides complexity, the degree of repetition of maintenance works is an im-
portant factor for determining the advantage of hierarchy over market for 
maintenance. Knowledge of processes, dwellings and the end-customer is 
acquired from the start of a relationship, but only pays off at a later stage 
1.
2.
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(sometimes only years afterwards). Repetition is more likely to be an element 
of reactive maintenance within dwellings than for planned maintenance. 
However, planned maintenance is generally more complex, so that previously 
gained knowledge and experience can still have a relatively high value, pro-
vided it is still up to date.
Complexity of specifications
Besides asset specificity, another factor influences the choice of the most 
suitable coordination mechanism: the complexity of the specification of the 
maintenance solution that is the basis of the service. The more complicated 
the specification, the more communication expenses (and accompanying 
risks of failure) will be involved in tendering, and the more reason to adopt 
hierarchical coordination mechanisms. Complex specifications suffer from 
higher coordination costs, such as with maintenance to the exterior of build-
ings (‘total maintenance’), where many interrelated applications are some-
times needed (for the roof, pointing, bricklaying, concrete maintenance, oth-
er substrates, paintwork, etc.), in particular when the end-customer is also 
involved in the process. On the other hand, most of the costs for cleaning 
shared building elements are directly connected to primary process. There 
is no question of dependence on interaction with tenants and the housing 
association as such, only the complex. The same is true of lift maintenance. 
The applicable performance requirements vary little across installations, the 
reputation of maintenance firms is generally reasonably well known, and only 
limited coordination is necessary to be able to perform the maintenance. In-
tensive cooperative relationships would appear to make less sense for these 
last two types of maintenance than for complex bilateral types, such as ‘total’ 
maintenance (to the building façade).
 9.5.4 Limiting agency risks
Risks
Agency risks are inherent in maintenance purchasing. They pose a threat to 
high-quality maintenance service delivery, and therefore to tenant satisfac-
tion regarding maintenance. Chapter 2 introduced agency theory as a tool for 
analysing problems in the client-contractor relationship. From this perspec-
tive, a particularly relevant aspect of this theory is the distribution of risk be-
tween the two parties.
There may be various ‘sources’ of risk, and maintenance can entail the fol-
lowing:
the risk of fluctuating demand related to requested repairs or other main-
tenance demands from tenants;
the risk of fluctuating demand for planned maintenance, because of insuf-
ficient knowledge of the performance pattern (the degradation process) in 
■
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long-term relationships;
the risk of technological change (This risk lies in the danger that suppliers 
are unable to keep up with technological developments. This is less of a 
risk for housing associations than for commercial firms, which operate in 
a competitive setting.);
risks of quality; in other words, the risk that suppliers cannot meet the 
specifications;
the risk of price rises, or conversely, an inability to set a competitive price;
the risk of late or no delivery.
Behaviour-based management techniques
In the case of an agency risk, behaviour-based management techniques may 
help to match the supplier’s objectives with those of the client (Anderson and 
Oliver, 1987, see Sub-Section 2.3.5). Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) identify the fol-
lowing four approaches:
1. The certification of suppliers that consistently meet the objectives of qual-
ity, costs, service and delivery requirements (see Sub-Section 9.3.3).
2. The implementation of quality management programmes, which im-
proves the competence and activities of the supplier needed to meet the cli-
ent’s quality requirements and expectations. The costs of these programmes 
should not exceed the benefits. The ‘Excellence model’ provided by the Eu-
ropean Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) is popular among hous-
ing associations, and they may demand that service suppliers implement this 
(see Straub and Van Mossel, 2007).
3. Target costing is defined as a structured approach to determining the cost 
at which the proposed product (with specified functionality and quality) must 
be produced in order to generate the desired level of profitability at the prod-
uct’s anticipated selling price (Cooper, 1995). This concept was developed by 
Toyota in the 1960s (Tanaka, 1993), and includes a detailed evaluation of ser-
vice (or product) attributes, and of the desired attributes. The objective is ra-
tionalisation, rather than minimisation, of costs (Lockamy III and Smith, 2000). 
Target costing represents a shift from the notion of functional cost objectives 
(budgets) that disregard the creation of customer satisfaction, to a determina-
tion of the total costs of the chain taking customer requirements as pont of 
departure. The development of target costing may demand substantial discus-
sion and negotiation between the client and its suppliers. This leads to cost-
saving programmes involving objectives agreed by the supplier and the client 
(Ellram, 1999). Despite its name, target costing is oriented less towards costs 
than towards customer preferences. Costs may be considered to be a result, or 
an ‘economic umbrella’, whereas customer preferences are considered to be 
a binding constraint. While this might appear to be a useful concept for im-
proving the construction supply chain (see Nicolini et al., 2000), the improve-
ment possibilities for the maintenance supply chain appear to be restricted. 
■
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This is due to the many limiting conditions, such as those related to safety, 
that are associated with maintenance. In addition, for social housing, rents 
are not linked to the costs of providing housing, which means that the target 
costs are difficult to determine.
4. Supplier development, which refers to the effort made by a purchasing or-
ganisation to improve its suppliers’ performance or capabilities, so that the 
client’s short- and long-term supply needs can be satisfied (Hartley and Choi, 
1996; Krause, 1999; Krause and Ellram, 1997). The goals of supplier develop-
ment include creating and maintaining a network of competent suppliers 
(Watts and Hahn, 1993); limiting costs (Hartley and Choi, 1996); upgrading 
technical, quality-related and delivery capabilities; and encouraging continu-
ous improvement (Watts and Hahn, 1993). Krause and Ellram (1997) suggest 
several possible supplier development activities:
providing feedback on supplier performance;
raising performance expectations regarding the supplier;
instructing and training supplier personnel;
qualifying suppliers;
posting technical or other client personnel to work with the supplier;
providing investment capital to the supplier.
These various supplier development activities could be combined. A housing 
association could, for instance, organise an annual ‘quality day’ for its sup-
pliers, when it would communicate policy changes and its (raised) expecta-
tions concerning suppliers. This might help create common understanding 
between housing associations and suppliers.
Activities relating to supplier development and quality management are 
closely related to socialisation activities (discussed in Sub-Section 9.5.6). The 
success of the techniques described above would clearly depend on the will-
ingness and qualities of the maintenance firms and the housing association 
in question.
Outcome-based management techniques
In addition to behaviour-based techniques, outcome-based techniques can 
be used to manage risks. These are also referred to as ‘buffer-oriented tech-
niques’, because they entail the creation of buffers to absorb risk. These are 
mainly used in situations involving stockpiling and demand fluctuations. 
Stocks can be ‘played’ with in maintenance by trading off planned mainte-
nance against reactive maintenance. The use of timely, preventive, planned 
maintenance can help to avoid the peak loads created by requested repairs. 
Delivery risk is also limited. Buffering in maintenance therefore serves to lim-
it risks both ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’. Both the supplier and the housing 
association can make the trade-off between planned maintenance and reac-
tive maintenance. Trading off planned maintenance against complaints main-
■
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tenance can also help to reduce nuisance for tenants.
Another way of covering possible supplier-related risks (such as quality, de-
livery, price and innovation) is to arrange delivery from several sources, which 
is known as multiple sourcing. However, having too many sources of delivery 
can lead to inefficiencies.
 9.5.5 Limiting opportunism risks
Monitoring: The merits of monitoring
Monitoring is a way of countering the opportunistic tendencies of suppliers, 
which can threaten the quality of service delivery. In theory, there are two 
reasons why monitoring can reduce opportunism. First, from a behavioural 
perspective, the monitoring process may place uncomfortable social pressure 
on a party and thus improve compliance (Blau and Scott, 1962; Murry and 
Heide, 1998). Second, from an economic perspective, increased monitoring 
enhances an actor’s capacity to detect opportunism and ultimately makes it 
possible to link rewards and sanctions to a partner’s behaviour (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000). Otherwise, monitoring only works when the source of opportun-
ism is asymmetrical information. In other words, if a maintenance firm has 
more information than a housing association concerning the ins and outs of 
the delivery of the service, monitoring may limit opportunistic behaviour that 
is expensive for the housing association. The selection of criteria for monitor-
ing is vital to its success. See Chapter 6 for appropriate determinants of ser-
vice quality that can be applied for performance measurement.
On the other hand, monitoring can be counterproductive, and it must be 
accepted by the party being monitored. If not, opportunistic behaviour will 
still arise. Monitoring can have a positive side-effect, however, in that oppor-
tunistic contractors may decide not to participate in a tender if they know 
that they will come under scrutiny.
Monitoring in maintenance service delivery
Inspections by foremen, usually on a random basis, are common for planned 
maintenance. Particularly for relatively large maintenance projects, the re-
sults of these measurements can be combined with tenants’ surveys. For re-
active maintenance, the handling of complaints is registered. One possibility 
is to monitor all contractor activities, but that can lead to duplication of ac-
tivities and high costs. It is advisable both to measure and to insist on those 
aspects that constitute a guarantee of the envisaged level of service, in terms 
of process and results. The details are then the maintenance firm’s respon-
sibility. Joint quality-management teams can be given responsibility for per-
formance measurements, and thereby directly initiate process improvements. 
Such an investment only makes sense if there is a certain level of interest 
in the relationship (e.g. financial interest, interest for the tenant). In order to 
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achieve a greater level certainty, which is reasonable given the purchasing 
party’s information disadvantage, additional information regarding the main-
tenance firm’s processes could be used as a basis for assessment. The theory 
underlying this is that the quality of service is strongly related to the organi-
sation of the maintenance firm. This could imply an audit, for example, of the 
service supplier’s materials and quality systems. Quality systems are mainly 
of interest in the cases of strategically significant maintenance services (i.e. in 
a financial or customer satisfaction sense), and for those cases where perfor-
mance measurement is complex, such as exterior maintenance.
In order to prevent opportunistic behaviour, it is important to state in ad-
vance (i.e. before the tender) that monitoring will be used. In addition, the 
chances of opportunism can be decreased through advance attention to sup-
plier assessments (based on suitability criteria), past results, management 
quality, quality systems, and available resources and qualities. A contract could 
also stipulate that if a contractor consistently performs below the agreed stan-
dard, then it will not be eligible for a follow-on contract, whereas good perfor-
mance can be rewarded with additional contracts. The latter can be considered 
a contract-related incentive (see Section 9.6). However, this is an expensive op-
tion if significant price advantages can be obtained via multiple tenders, the 
specification is unambiguous (it should be specified properly and simply), and 
synergy benefits between the supplier and the client are scarce and involve 
little transaction-specific investment. This is the case, for example, for mainte-
nance of paving. Price advantages that only pay out when a high performance 
level is achieved can also be an extra incentive for good performance (see fur-
ther Sub-Section 9.3.3 for other measures for countering opportunism).
Socialisation
‘Socialisation’ was introduced in Sub-Section 2.3.3 as strategy for managing 
opportunism in cooperation with contractors (see Wathne and Heide, 2000), in 
the context of transaction cost theory. It was defined as social integration, or 
assimilation into a certain culture. In this context, it is significant that oppor-
tunistic behaviour depends partly on the role played by the individual or firm 
in question. In other words, depending on the situation, socialisation may 
involve particular employees (e.g. management, or subcontractors) from the 
maintenance firm, or the company as a whole.
If a housing association intends to work with a supplier in the long term, a 
strategically important service is involved, and if supplier volume is sufficient-
ly large, then the maintenance firm might take part in a ‘socialisation’ pro-
gramme. This could take the form of training, possibly oriented towards issues 
that are important to the end-customer and that fit within the housing associ-
ation’s values. A related example is that of quality management programmes 
(see Sub-Section 9.5.4 for the use of quality management and supplier devel-
opment programmes as means of limiting agency-related opportunism).
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 9.6 Contractual incentives
 9.6.1 Introduction
Contractual incentives can form part of the relationship between the client 
and the contractor (see Figure 9.5), and have the potential to encourage sup-
pliers to optimise results for the end-customer.
Studies of ‘self-enforcing’ contracts (e.g. Kaufmann and Lafontaine, 1994; 
Telser, 1980) suggest that parties’ interests can be aligned by creating an in-
centive structure in contracts that ensures that the long-term benefits of co-
operative behaviour exceed the short-term proceeds of opportunism. There 
are various forms of ‘self-enforcing’ contracts:
transaction-specific investments may be required, raising the exit barriers 
from the relationship (Williamson (1983) calls these investments ‘hostages’.);
price or margin premiums (These are premiums for suppliers that ensure 
that the price paid to them is higher than the market price, providing an 
incentive to continue the relationship (Rao and Bergen, 1992). If the deliv-
ery of quality is deficient, the maintenance firm will lose the relationship 
as well as the premium, and therefore additional profit.).
Transaction-specific investments are means of limiting the possibility that op-
portunism may occur, and this concept is derived from transaction cost the-
ory (Sub-Section 2.3.3, see Table 9.5). Price premiums are a more direct way of 
stimulating the desired performance and reducing inadequate performance.
 9.6.2 Transaction-specific investments
Transaction-specific investments to support commodity strategies
In the case of transaction-specific investments, the elements that are impor-
tant for tenant satisfaction may be emphasised. This is particularly worth-
while for strategic services. For example, for exterior maintenance, depending 
on the housing association’s objective, the competence of the maintenance 
firm can be used to achieve benefits in terms of costs over the lifetime of the 
complex. A contribution from the maintenance firm to optimising a main-
tenance scenario, assuming that the maintenance firm has the appropriate 
qualities, and provided that at least some of the costs are covered by the 
maintenance firm, will ensure that the latter is committed to the success of 
the maintenance. For the maintenance of heating and water systems, for ex-
ample, maintenance firms could be required to invest in designing an opti-
mum service. Interaction structures could be developed, in which the main-
tenance firm earns back the investment depending on success over time. An 
investment in a call centre might be one example of an applicable transac-
tion-specific investment.
■
■
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Another possibility is to have the contractor invest in an information sys-
tem that is oriented, say, towards the end-customer’s product and process 
preferences. This information system may include, for instance, the analysis 
of complaints, and the use of service maintenance by (specific groups of) ten-
ants (see Sub-Section 9.2.5). One possible positive effect of an investment of 
this kind is that the interactions and outcomes between the contractor and 
the end-customer might be better tailored to one another. Depending on the 
circumstances, it might also be sensible for a system to be jointly owned by 
the two parties involved, so as to prevent the housing association from be-
coming dependent on the contractor (rather than vice versa).
Transaction-specific investments through the form of specifications used
Transaction-specific investments do not necessarily have to be prescribed. If 
outcome or output specifications are used, a maintenance firm might have 
to make related investments in order to satisfy a certain performance. It is 
then desirable for the joint output variables used (which are often more con-
venient than outcome variables, because they are specifically measurable) to 
approach the envisaged outcome as closely as possible. Different customers 
or groups may use different requirements. One step further, which implies 
even more transaction-specific investment, is for a maintenance firm to be 
responsible for (optimum) differentiation and therefore to investigate tenant 
preferences on its own.
Transaction-specific investments through long-term outcome responsibility
Another possible transaction-specific investment (known as ‘hostage’) con-
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Table 9.5 The links between Section 9.5 and preceding sections of this thesis
Sub-section: Is primarily related to chapter or (sub-)section:
9.6.2 Transaction-specific investments 2.3.3 Transaction cost theory
cerns giving long-term (output and) outcome responsibility to the contractor. 
A contractor that is responsible for the state of a building element or system 
and for handling requested repairs for ten years, rather than two years, might 
opt for a different solution, taking cost and other benefits into account. Long-
term responsibility implies the freedom to generate maintenance solutions. It 
also implies that the contractor is more capable than the client of combining 
knowledge regarding the performance pattern, complex strategy, and project 
organisation in order to devise sustainable solutions (which are therefore less 
expensive over the lifetime of a building element or system). This option is 
especially feasible for a complex combination of types of maintenance, such 
as exterior and roof maintenance (as mentioned above). In this case, there is 
a need for advanced logistics capacities.
 9.6.3 Price premiums
In the case of maintenance services, price premiums are difficult to realise. It 
is difficult to determine the market value in advance, in view of constantly 
changing contracts. One possibility would be to use unit prices, in combina-
tion with quantities and activities. If a price premium is promised in advance, 
however, then it will be calculated into the proposal, which cancels out the in-
centive. The precise performance of maintenance service delivery is likewise 
difficult to determine. Therefore, this form of incentive only appears to work 
when combined with monitoring. In that case, it can be an excellent measure 
for those maintenance services for which quality is essential.
Contract-related incentives can be used to stimulate performance on de-
terminants of maintenance service quality leading to tenant satisfaction (see 
Chapter 6 for an overview of these). They can be used alongside the standards 
set in execution requirements, and are suitable for determinants of main-
tenance service quality that require a minimum level of performance (and 
which may improve over time). Incentives can imply a bonus or a penalty. If 
the determinant of service quality is a satisfier for tenants, then over-per-
formance could result in a bonus. If the determinant of service quality is a 
dissatisfier for tenants, however, underperformance could be followed by a 
(severe) penalty for the service supplier. In addition, significant underperfor-
mance may imply default, and lead to a breach of contract.
 9.7 The core competence approach 
and insourcing
The core competence approach
The essence of the core competence approach (also known as the dynamic 
capabilities approach), is that only those goods and services that are consid-
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ered to be an organisation’s core competencies are produced internally (Pra-
halad and Hamel, 1990). Prahalad and Hamel define core competence as the 
combination of individual technologies and production skills that underlie a 
company’s myriad product lines. Core competencies combine three elements 
(Krüger and Homp, 1997):
the characteristics must be relevant from the point of view of the customer, 
and must differentiate between the organisation and its competitors.
resources and knowledge regarding the product or service must be unique 
at all times, in order to achieve competitive advantage. (It must be possible 
to protect the product or service from imitation by competitors. In other 
words, the competitive advantage must be sustainable.);
these resources become core competencies, and should remain within the 
organisation concerned (They should only be contracted out when when 
they can be used for multiple purposes.).
The functions of housing associations and core competencies
Every housing association is entitled to establish individual, unique objec-
tives, provided that these are compatible with the relevant public framework 
(BBSH). Core competencies, in this case, are the combination of individual 
technologies and production skills that play a key role in achieving an organ-
isation’s objectives. From this point of view, housing associations that aim for 
growth in property values, for example, will need different core competencies 
from housing associations that aim for excellent service. A housing associa-
tion involved in major neighbourhood improvement tasks needs yet other set 
of core competencies. On the other hand, no organisation has an inexhaust-
ible source of core competencies, and indeed the opposite is more likely to 
be the case. The core competencies that are present help to determine the 
organisation’s strategic flexibility.
Housing associations’ core competencies can help to determine the func-
tion that they perform best. They are, however, not the only determinant of 
the function to be performed. A function can be performed properly even if 
important parts of the production essential for this function are outsourced. 
Wolters and Verhage (2001) identify four functions for housing associations 
(but note that hybrid forms can also occur):
the housing manager function;
the project developer function;
the public housing investor function; and
the maintainer function.
The housing manager function is particularly concerned with the front office 
of housing associations. If a housing association decides to establish a profile 
based on this function, then it is important to have matching core competen-
cies, such as those relating to its interaction patterns with the end-customer. 
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
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On this basis, a case could be made for retaining internal control of mainte-
nance services that involve frequent interaction with tenants, or at any rate 
to perform these in close collaboration with suppliers. After all, the technolo-
gies and skills needed to perform satisfactorily would be present, and further 
synergy could be achieved. Therefore, interaction with the tenant would have 
to be the necessary competence for making the maintenance a success. If the 
nature of the maintenance is technically specialised and complex, technical 
competence will also be needed, and then the question will be whether the 
housing association is able to perform such maintenance internally.
Housing associations that wish mainly to fulfil a project developer func-
tion need to have different core competencies. Logically, these would be re-
lated to the proper initiation and financing of projects, and the assumption 
of associated risks. This means that regular maintenance would normally be 
performed entirely by external parties, and control would be as efficient as 
possible.
The core activities of a ‘typical’ public housing investor reside mainly in 
the supply of public housing performance. The necessary core competencies 
are normally those relating to entering into and maintaining fruitful relations 
with partners, in order to achieve satisfactory public housing performance. 
With respect to maintenance, it can also be useful for this type of associa-
tion to optimise the processes of the types of maintenance that contribute 
to the better liveability of neighbourhoods, such as maintenance of paving 
and maintenance of plants and shrubs. However, this contribution is limited, 
and therefore the core competencies would probably not be related directly to 
maintenance.
Finally, a housing association that concentrates on the maintainer function 
may also play a significant implementation role. Practical difficulties, such as 
the scarce availability of high quality maintenance workers, may limit the 
housing association’s ability to do this, however. In addition, while housing 
associations may concentrate on the maintainer function, there could be well 
many parties that are better able to perform maintenance, and partnerships 
may be useful for this reason.
Vertical integration
The more that resources and capabilities in which the housing association 
is lacking become critical to achieving its objectives, the more likely integra-
tion with service suppliers will be. In extreme cases, this can lead to complete 
vertical or horizontal integration, by means of mergers or takeovers. While in-
house resources and skills might be available, the housing association cannot 
easily acquire a particular competence. Prahalad and Hamel use the metaphor 
of a large tree to describe the core competence approach as applied to a com-
pany. The trunk and main branches are the core products, the smaller branch-
es are the business units, and the flowers and fruit are the end products.
[ 0 ]
There are three ways to test the logic of vertical integration (Porter, 1987):
the attractiveness test: the business must be structurally attractive or ca-
pable of being made attractive;
the cost-of-entry test: the cost of entry must not capitalise all future prof-
its of the integration;
the better-off test: whether the integrating organisation, or the integrated 
business, is to benefit from the integration (in other words, synergy must 
be possible).
If a housing association does decide to purchase external maintenance, then 
it is obviously essential to select the right partner (a process that is described 
in Sections 9.3 and 9.4).
 9.8 Conclusions
Using the analyis and tools presented above, we are now in a position to draw 
conclusions relating to the following research question: Which commodity 
strategies facilitate the optimisation of end-customer satisfaction with main-
tenance services?
This chapter discussed the five phases outlined below. Suggestions were 
made for improving services to end-customers (tenants), by means of mainte-
nance purchasing:
execution requirements;
suitability requirements;
selection of award criteria for suppliers;
the definition of the client-contractor relationship; and
incentives in the actual contract. 
Figure 9.6 shows how these phases interrelate in the chain. The figure shows 
that execution requirements and award criteria are most directly related to 
service delivery to the end-customer (the tenant). Improving specifications 
■
■
■
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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and award criteria will probably have the greatest direct impact on improving 
services to tenants. However, in the longer run, service suppliers may need 
additional stimulation (or even development driven by the housing associa-
tion) to encourage them to strive for tenant satisfaction.
Specifications
Specifications are a direct means of establishing relevant service aspects. 
What are the minimum service requirements for keeping tenant satisfaction 
at a particular level? In order to answer this question, one needs to take the 
nature of the maintenance service into account. Reactive maintenance inside 
dwellings usually has a degree of urgency. In addition, maintenance inside 
the dwelling probably entails a greater feeling of responsibility on the part of 
tenants than maintenance outside dwellings. This means that service aspects 
that give the end-customer a sense of control over the situation are more im-
portant for reactive than for planned maintenance.
The issue of which form of indicator can best specify the desired level of 
service depends on the situation. If a housing association is capable of trans-
forming the needs of end-customers into unambiguous, measurable and 
transparent output indicators, and if the selected contractor is capable of 
optimising output indicators in execution, then output indicators are prefer-
able to throughput indicators. Output indicators enable the service supplier 
to make the best use of his qualities and specialisms to optimise a service. 
Property rights theory holds that suppliers will provide a better service if they 
have more property rights. It may therefore be expected that maintenance 
firms will be more motivated to provide optimum performance (which is in 
the interest of end-customers) if they define the service themselves. How-
ever, if neither of the conditions for using output indicators can be satisfied, 
throughput indicators can better guarantee optimum service.
Execution requirements are the correct means of specifying all the relevant 
determinants of maintenance service quality that housing associations would 
like to see implemented during the execution of the contract. Service speci-
fications for maintenance services that affect tenant satisfaction should in-
clude the essential determinants of maintenance service quality. Some deter-
minants of maintenance service quality, however, are of such importance that 
they should be addressed in the selection phase. In such cases, housing asso-
ciations should be confident that the supplier can deliver adequate quality.
Suitability requirements and award criteria
In order to achieve a satisfactory implementation of specifications, both the 
service supplier and the relationship between the client and the service sup-
plier must satisfy certain conditions. The desired service supplier may emerge 
from the selection procedure as a result of suitability requirements or award 
criteria. The quality of human resources is a crucial factor, in view of the high 
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degree of interaction involved in certain maintenance services that are im-
portant to tenants. In addition, the requirements to be made of the direct 
partners of housing associations, the maintenance firms, must be transferred 
down the chain to the supply companies.
Care must be taken not to specify the requirements for suppliers so strictly 
that too few possibilities remain. The housing association might then become 
dependent on a single maintenance company for a certain service.
Tenant satisfaction appears to be best secured through the use of ‘the most 
economically advantageous tender’ when awarding contracts, instead of the 
lowest price. It is in the interests of tenant satisfaction that the essential de-
terminants of maintenance service quality form part of the award criteria, in-
cluding appropriate weights, giving clear emphasis to specific items. However, 
only those determinants of maintenance service quality should be included 
that can be measured, and be compared objectively in this stage of process. 
In addition, not too many aspects should be included. (The degree of) being 
available to answer questions and receive complaints may qualify as a suit-
able award criterion. Another determinant of service quality that could also 
be used as an award criterion is ‘flexibility in making appointments with ten-
ants’.
For complex works, candidate service suppliers can be asked to present a 
risk assessment plan. This may help to limit quality risks beforehand, and the 
quality of this plan can function as an award criterion. In a risk assessment 
plan, candidate suppliers can give their opinion regarding the nature of the 
project’s risks, and how these could be miminised. Parties that make a good 
assessment and propose adequate remedies would score higher than parties 
that are unable to do so.
The definition of the client-contractor relationship
The partnership between the client and the contractor can take several dif-
ferent forms. Transactions between people, official bodies and other organisa-
tions take place within a structure, which can resemble a market, hierarchy 
or a hybrid form. In a market structure there are no entry rules, and in theory 
anyone may join. In a hierarchy, the party with power determines who is ad-
mitted to the process. Figure 9.7 sets out a list of the relevant dimensions for 
determining the best coordination mechanism.
The more unique or complex specifications, maintenance projects, or so-
lutions are, the more appropriate a hierarchical partnership structure will be. 
In this case, it may be worthwhile to invest in a close cooperation (partner-
ship) with a maintenance company that is able to tackle the problem. The 
more a relationship grows and knowledge of the features, maintenance solu-
tions, and end-customers increases, the greater the benefits of such a part-
nership become. In addition, routines may be developed and price increases 
may occur.
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Furthermore, risk may also play a part in the choice of coordination mech-
anism. Examples of risks include fluctuations in complaints and maintenance 
needs, or the maintenance firm’s inability to consistently meet the required 
standards or terms of delivery. Managing these sorts of risks becomes easier 
when the purchasing company is more closely linked with the activities of 
maintenance firms, and can intervene more directly if necessary. This is ac-
tually only worthwhile if the intention is to work together for a lengthy pe-
riod. If possible, the quality risk must be covered in the selection phase, for 
instance through the use of supplier certification. Supplier management pro-
grammes and supplier development activities by housing associations may 
help to limit the possibility of agency risks. Housing associations may, for in-
stance, organise an annual quality days for suppliers, for communicating pol-
icy changes and expectations to suppliers. This may help to create common 
understanding.
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Maintenance works that do not imply risks, for example those that are 
simple and transparent, may instead be put to tender regularly in order to 
secure the lowest price. For instance, cleaning of shared areas probably quali-
fies for this, and if a housing association succeeds in specifying the desired 
service, the service may be occasionally put out to a multiple tender.
Finally, the strategic importance of a maintenance service, in combination 
with the above-mentioned factors, is decisive for the choice of the best co-
ordination mechanism. It is more important to invest in a close partnership 
with suppliers if the importance, for example in terms of customer satisfac-
tion, is significant. Some examples of such maintenance services include ex-
terior maintenance and maintenance of heating and water systems.
In general, there appear to be few service suppliers specialised in promot-
ing tenant satisfaction. Therefore, for those housing associations that really 
want tenant-friendly maintenance for essential maintenance services, it may 
be worthwhile to invest in close cooperation with maintenance service sup-
pliers. Via close cooperation, suitable suppliers can acquire knowledge about 
tenants and become familiar with the housing association’s processes, en-
abling maintenance processes to be fine-tuned.
An asymmetrical information situation will arise if a housing association 
has less knowledge than the maintenance firm regarding the maintenance 
processes, and monitoring may help to limit the opportunistic tendencies of 
maintenance firms in such a case. The optimum deployment of the knowl-
edge and qualities of maintenance firms, as mentioned above, in the form 
of transaction-specific investment, will also restrain urges for opportunistic 
behaviour. A related possibility is long-term delegation of responsibility for 
the condition of a building element. Finally, transferring the values upheld by 
a housing association to maintenance firms or their employees through in-
struction or even a training course may help reduce the risk of opportunism. 
One possibility is to set up a course oriented towards fulfilling agreements 
made with residents, if there are signs that this is becoming a problem (or 
this is already a problem).
In order to manage relationships with service suppliers, the number of 
suppliers should be restricted, although not to such a degree that dependency 
is created. Three to six suppliers per commodity (depending on the size and 
the spread of the commodity) may be advisable in most circumstances.
Incentives in the actual contract
Besides specifications, and the structure of the relationship, contract-related 
incentives may motivate maintenance firms to optimise service to end-cus-
tomers. Guarantees, or investment in knowledge of end-customers, are mat-
ters that can be stipulated in a contract with maintenance firms, and may 
curb opportunistic tendencies. Another possible incentive is to present the 
prospect of a premium if, with hindsight, monitoring shows that the mainte-
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nance firm has performed positively.
Although contract-related incentives are not easy to implement for main-
tenance service delivery, and only in combination with some kind of monitor-
ing, the instrument can be a valuable tool. Due to the lack of possibilities for 
purchasers to check the quality of delivery beforehand, compared to products, 
an incentive structure could be very helpful as means to stimulate perfor-
mance.
Problem solving
Figure 9.7 shows the important factors for the assessment of the appropri-
ate coordination mechanism. Figure 9.8 shows a list of elements from new 
institutional economics (as presented in Section 2.3) that offer problem-solv-
ing tools.
It is difficult to assess the position of the elements on the scales presented 
in Figure 9.7. Such an exercise is subjectively sensitive, and calls for an inter-
subjective approach. For instance, the question of which risks can and cannot 
be assessed may need to be answered by specialists. Assessing the strategic 
importance of purchasing is particularly precarious, and could result in a de-
cision to insource large parts of maintenance. Tenant satisfaction with main-
tenance, which may be one of the strategic objectives of housing associations, 
can be assessed using the findings presented in Chapter 5.
Core competencies
The decision concerning whether or not to carry out parts of maintenance 
internally, or to buy maintenance, may be influenced or even determined by 
a housing association’s core competencies. If a housing association sees its 
main role as that of a housing manager, with an emphasis on optimum cus-
tomer contact, then it would make sense to seek strategic partners for those 
types of maintenance that make a significant contribution to this (such as the 
maintenance of heating and water systems). This might be the best way of 
guaranteeing high-quality delivery that is tailored to the preferences of the 
tenant. In such cases, it may even be advisable for the housing association to 
consider undertaking maintenance itself.
An adapted version of this chapter is included in the Habiforum report Inkoop van onder­
houd en goede dienstverlening (Van Mossel and Straub, 2007).
[  ]
[  ]
References
Anderson, E. & R. Oliver, 1987, Perspectives on Behavior-Based versus Out-
come-Based Salesforce Control Systems, in: Journal of Marketing, 51 (4), pp. 
76-88.
Avery, S., 1993, Where Does ISO 9000 Fit?, in: Purchasing, January 14, pp. 75-77.
Axelsson, B. & F. Wynstra, 2002, Buying Business Services, Chichester (John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd.).
Bensaou, M., 1999, Portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships, in: Sloan Man-
agement Review, 40 (4), pp. 35-44.
Blau, P.M. & R.W. Scott, 1962, Formal organizations: A comparative approach, 
Philadelphia (Richard D. Irwin).
Campbell, N.C.G., 1985, An interaction approach to organizational buying 
behavior, in: Journal of Business Research, 13, pp. 35-48.
Coase, R.H., 1937, The nature of the firm, in: Economica, New Series, 4 (16), pp. 
386-405.
Cooper, R., 1995. When Lean Enterprises Collide; Competing through Compe-
tition, Boston, MA (Harvard Business School Press).
Cousins, P.D., B. Lawson & B. Squire, 2006, An empirical taxonomy of purchas-
ing functions, in: International Journal of Operations & Production Manage-
ment, 26 (7), pp. 775-794.
Elliott-Shircore, T.I. & P.T. Steele, 1985, Procurement Positioning Overview, in: 
Purchasing and Supply Management, December, pp. 23-26.
Ellram, L.M., 1999, The Role of Supply Management in Target Costing, Tempe, 
AZ (Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies).
Farrell, J. & R. Gibbons, 1995, Cheap talk about specific investments, in: Jour-
nal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (2), pp. 313-334.
Hartley, J. & T. Choi, 1996, Supplier Development: Customers as a Catalyst of 
Process Change, in: Business Horizons, 39 (4), pp. 37-44.
[  ]
Heijboer, G. & J. Telgen, 2002, Choosing the open or the restricted procedure: A 
big deal or a big deal?, in: Journal of Public Procurement, 2 (2), pp. 187-216.
Kamath, R.R. & J.K. Liker, 1994, A second look at Japanese product develop-
ment, in: Harvard Business Review, 72 (6), pp. 154-166.
Kaufmann, P.J. & F. Lafontaine, 1994, Costs of control: The source of economic 
rents for McDonald’s franchisees, in: Journal of Law and Economics, 37 (2), pp. 
417-453.
Kraljic, P., 1983, Purchasing must become supply management, in: Harvard 
Business Review, 61 (5), pp. 109-117.
Krapfel, R.E., Jr., D. Salmond & R.E. Spekman, 1991, A strategic approach to 
managing buyer-seller relationships, in: European Journal of Marketing, 25, 
pp. 22-37.
Krause, D., 1999, The Antecedents of Buying Firms’ Efforts to Improve Suppli-
ers, in: Journal of Operations Management, 17 (2), pp. 205-224.
Krause, D. & L. Ellram, 1997, Critical Elements of Supplier Development: The 
Buying-Firm Perspective, in: European Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, 3 (1), pp. 21-31.
Krüger, W. & C. Homp, 1997, Kernkompetenz-Management: Steigerung von 
Flexibilität und Schlagkraft in Wettbewerb, Wiesbaden (Gabler).
Lockamy III, A. & W.I. Smith, 2000, Target costing for supply chain manage-
ment: criteria and selection, in: Industrial Management & Data Systems, 100 
(5), pp. 210-218.
Maass, R.A., J.O. Brown & J.L. Bossert, 1990, Supplier Certification - A continu-
ous Improvement Strategy, Milwaukee (ASQC Quality Press).
Malone, T.W. & J. Yates, R.I. Benjamin, 1987, Electronic markets and electronic 
hierarchies, in: Communications of the ACM, 30 (6), pp. 484-497.
McGuinness, T., 1994, Markets and Managerial Hierarchies, in: Thompson, G. 
J. Rances, R. Levacic & J. Mitchell (eds.), Markets, Hierarchies and Networks, 
London, England (Sage), pp. 66-81.
[  ]
Murry, J.P. & J.B. Heide, 1998, Managing promotion program participation 
within manufacturer-retailer relationships, in: Journal of Marketing, 62 (Janu-
ary), pp. 58-69.
Nicolini, D., C. Tomkins, R. Holti, A. Oldman, & M. Smalley, 2000, Can Target 
Costing and Whole Life Costing be Applied in the Construction Industry?: 
Evidence from Two Case Studies, in: British Journal of Management, 11, pp. 
303-324.
Orbell, J.M. & R.M. Dawes, 1993, Social welfare, cooperators’ advantage, and 
the option of not playing the game, in: American Sociological Review, 58 (De-
cember), pp. 787-800.
Pfeffer, J. & G.R. Salancik, 1978, The External Control of Organizations: A Re-
source Dependence Perspective, New York (Harper & Row).
Porter, M.E., 1987, From competitive advantage to corporate strategy, in: Har-
vard Business Review, 65 (3), pp. 43-59.
Prahalad, C.K. & G. Hamel, 1990, The core competence of the corporation, in: 
Harvard Business Review, 68 (3), pp. 79-91.
Rao, A.R. & M.E. Bergen, 1992, Price Premium Variations as a Consequence of 
Buyers’ Lack of Information, in: Journal of Consumer Research, 19 (Decem-
ber), pp. 412-423.
Robinson, P., C. Faris & Y. Wind, 1967, Industrial Buying and Creative Market-
ing, Boston (Allyn and Bacon).
Sappington, D., 1991, Incentives in principal-agent relationships, in: Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 5, pp. 45-66.
Straub, A. & H.J. van Mossel, 2007, Contractor selection for performance-based 
maintenance partnerships, in: International Journal of Strategic Property 
Management, 11, pp. 65-76.
Tanaka, T., 1993, Target costing at Toyota, in: Journal of Cost Management, 7 
(1), pp. 4-11.
Telser, L.G., 1980, A theory of self-enforcing agreements, in: Journal of Busi-
ness, 53 (1), pp. 27-44.
[  ]
Wathne, K.H. & J.B. Heide, 2000, Opportunism in interfirm relationships: 
Forms, outcomes, and solutions, in: Journal of Marketing, 64 (October), pp. 
36-51.
Watts, C. & C. Hahn, 1993, Supplier Development Programs: An Empirical 
Analysis, in: International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, 
29 (2), pp. 10-17.
Williamson, O.E., 1979, Transaction cost economics: the governance of con-
tractual relations, in: Journal of Law and Economics, 22, pp. 233-262.
Williamson, O.E., 1981a, The economics of organization: The transaction cost 
approach, in: The American Journal of Sociology, 87 (3), pp. 548-575.
Williamson, O.E., 1981b, The modern corporation: Origins, evolution, attri-
butes, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 19 (4), pp. 1537-1568.
Williamson, O.E. & 1983, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange, in: The American Economic Review, 73 (4), pp. 519-540.
Wolters, A.G. & R.W. Verhage, 2001, Concurrentie in corporatieland, DGVH/
Nethur Partnership program, The Hague/Utrecht.
Zsidisin, G.A. & L.M. Ellram, 2003, An agency theory investigation of supply 
risk management, in: Journal of Supply Chain Management, 39 (3), pp. 15-27.
[  ]
[ 0 ]
 10 Conclusions and 
recommendations
 10.1 Introduction
This doctoral research was conducted from a business perspective. The ag-
gregation level of study is that of the individual organisation (in this case, the 
Dutch housing association), and the leading perspective is that of the pur-
chasing organisation. The point of departure was the recognition that a hous-
ing association is a social entrepreneur, which implies that housing associa-
tions are responsible for their own organisational and commodity strategies, 
and for implementing them. Keeping this starting point in mind, this doctoral 
research has tried to offer insights into the current situation and perspectives 
of Dutch housing associations, in their role as purchasers of maintenance ser-
vices.
This research had two aims: (1) to improve our understanding of Dutch 
housing associations’ commodity strategies relating to maintenance services; 
and (2) to provide insights into development opportunities for these commod-
ity strategies, and how maintenance policy choices might be made that would 
increase tenant satisfaction. Theoretical research was also included as part of 
these aims.
These research aims were achieved by addressing three primary research 
questions over the course of Chapters 3-9:
To what extent do the different types and characteristics of maintenance services 
purchased by the Dutch social rented sector influence tenant satisfaction?
To what extent are the current Dutch housing associations’ commodity strategies 
for maintenance tenant-focused?
Which commodity strategies facilitate the optimisation of tenant satisfaction with 
maintenance services?
(Sub)questions were formulated in order to provide extra structure for an-
swering the research questions. The first research question is addressed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. These chapters focus on the important elements for end-
customers in maintenance service delivery:
Which maintenance services are of primary importance for tenant satisfaction 
with maintenance?
Which determinants of maintenance service quality are of primary importance for 
tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance, and how can performance measure-
ment of maintenance service delivery in the social rented sector encourage tenant 
satisfaction regarding maintenance?
The second research question is dealt with in Chapters 3, 4, 7 and 8, and com-
promises the following subquestions:
Which determinants of service quality are important for customer satisfaction 
when buying component maintenance services, and to what extent are these taken 
into account in the specification of these services?
1.
2.
3.
■
■
■
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To what extent do maintenance service specifications cover the service aspects that 
are important to tenants?
Chapters 3, 4 and 8 primarily focus on the nature of the purchasing of main-
tenance services by Dutch housing associations. In Chapter 7, research ques-
tions 1 and 2 are both considered, and a connection is made between the two. 
Chapter 9, meanwhile, focuses on the third research question. The structure 
of the research is presented in Figure 10.1. Section 10.2 presents the main 
conclusions of this study.
 10.2 Findings
The Dutch social rented sector, like those in other European countries, has 
recently undergone major changes. The introduction to this thesis examined 
institutional developments in European social housing (see Sub-Section 1.2.2), 
including an increasing orientation towards the market demands of tenants 
and future tenants. This situation was taken as the point of departure for this 
doctoral research.
 10.2.1 Goals for purchasing maintenance services
Maintenance services are an important means of fulfilling both the private 
objectives of housing associations and acting within a public framework. 
Maintenance services can contribute to high-quality service delivery to ten-
ants. They may contribute to the liveability of a neighbourhood, and they can 
be used optimally from a financial point of view. In this research, the focus 
lies on the possible contribution made by (purchasing of) maintenance ser-
vices to tenant satisfaction. The relevant arena concerns the buying centre 
(including all actors involved in purchasing), its relations, supplier selection, 
and specifications.
 10.2.2 Characteristics of the housing 
association and its customers
Social enterprises such as housing associations share characteristics with 
both the private and the public sector. They operate in a market situation, but 
they also have to use their means to serve society. In particular, housing as-
sociations have to provide services for target groups that need special support 
in the housing market.
As a customer, the tenant is in a vulnerable position. Often, the target 
groups spend a high percentage of their income on rents. Moreover, the choice 
of dwellings and accompanying housing services is very restricted, particu-
larly in a tight housing market (suction). High exit barriers exist for tenants, 
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Figure 10.1 Overview of research questions
and their position can be considered a ‘captive’ one. This means that tenants 
are, to a large degree, dependent on housing associations, e.g. for the quality 
of the (maintenance) services delivered. In addition, there is a very limited 
choice of services and service attributes. The law offers certain protection for 
tenants, such as the existing restrictions on rent increases. In addition, ten-
ants can become involved with their housing association’s policy.
Unlike activities performed in a competitive setting, there are limited in-
centives for housing associations to make efficient investments. Despite this, 
public, and in particular European, procurement rules are not currently ap-
plied, and the degree of actual transparency is therefore limited. Given this 
situation, it would be advisable to apply transparent procedures that would 
enable fair competition among candidate suppliers.
 10.2.3 Characteristics of the maintenance sector
What effect do the maintenance market’s characteristics have on maintenance pur-
chasing optimisation possibilities from the end-customer’s perspective?
Maintenance markets tend to be fragmented markets, with the exception of 
the lift maintenance market. In general, there are many small companies of-
fering their services. Entry barriers are low, despite the efforts made by main-
tenance companies to raise these. Improving productivity can be difficult due 
to the large share taken by labour costs, and price is the key order-winning 
criterion. Therefore maintenance companies are proficient at keeping costs 
low, but not necessary at maximising end-customer satisfaction. This prob-
ably restricts possibilities for optimising end-customer satisfaction. There-
fore, additional efforts may be needed from the purchasing organisation, the 
housing association, to ensure that they receive the right combination of re-
sources and capabilities from service suppliers. Supplier selection is impor-
tant, but not always sufficient. When the requested capabilities do not match 
the available capabilities in the supply market, supplier development efforts 
may be needed in order to be able to achieve the desired goals. In addition, 
due to low margins, the capacity to initiate new developments for the sake of 
end-customers is limited. The fragmentation of the maintenance market has 
also makes it difficult to combine different types and forms of maintenance, 
which hampers synergy. This may lead to more frequent annoyance and dis-
ruption for tenants.
Thus the character of the maintenance markets implies a lack of end-cus-
tomer focus and a lack of opportunities for synergy, and the opportunities for 
optimising commodity strategies from the end-customer perspective are thus 
limited.
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 10.2.4 Regulatory purchasing requirements
What effect do existing procurement regulations and trends in the regulations have 
on maintenance purchasing optimisation possibilities from the end-customer’s per-
spective?
Purchasing opportunities are restricted by regulatory demands and the char-
acteristics of the maintenance market. When public control of the social rent-
ed housing sector increases, European tender laws may become obligatory. For 
individual housing associations, these regulations would imply some restric-
tions on purchasing possibilities, and in some cases, higher costs due to more 
extended procedures. This may potentially restrict opportunities for synergy 
(combining maintenance activities) and optimisation by means of long-term 
partnering. On the other hand, for core maintenance expenses, European ten-
der laws may help to develop a transparent purchasing process. For the sec-
tor, it may mean a ‘forced’ professionalisation of purchasing practice through 
structured procedures.
Before conclusions could be drawn with respect to the actual optimisation 
of the commodity strategy, attention should be given to the question of what 
affects tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance, as the objective for optimi-
sation.
 10.2.5 Maintenance services and tenant preferences
Which maintenance services are of primary importance for tenant satisfaction 
with maintenance?
The perceived importance of maintenance was measured by conducting a 
large-scale questionnaire among tenants in the Dutch social rented housing 
sector. In this research, the perceived importance of maintenance services 
was measured in two ways:
by asking the respondents to indicate the importance of maintenance ser-
vices directly;
by estimating the importance of maintenance services in a regression 
analysis, with satisfaction with maintenance in general as the dependent 
variable and satisfaction scores for the distinct maintenance services as 
predictors.
The direct importance measurement (the first concept above) included two 
different measures: a rating and a top-three ranking.
Maintenance to heating and water systems, and maintenance of hinges 
and locks of windows and external doors, are considered to be among the 
most important factors for tenant satisfaction. These maintenance services 
■
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directly contribute to the physiological and safety needs of tenants. In addi-
tion, while maintenance services that are clearly visible to tenants, such as 
exterior paintwork and maintenance to bathrooms, receive lower-than-aver-
age importance ratings, their impact on tenant satisfaction with maintenance 
in general is significant. These services are related to the ‘esteem’ needs of 
tenants, or the ‘fashion-dedicated needs’. On the other hand, there are main-
tenance services for which inadequate service is not directly visible to ten-
ants, until there is a breakdown. Examples of this type of services include 
maintenance to drains and lifts. These services do not regress significantly 
with tenant satisfaction with maintenance in general, but the stated impor-
tance ratings are high. For certain groups, such as the elderly and the disabled, 
lift maintenance has an impact on physiological needs. For other groups, lift 
maintenance can be perceived more or less as a luxury.
Tenants with comparable maintenance preferences can be distributed 
across housing associations’ properties. In the exceptional case of hous-
ing estates with a relatively homogeneous population (e.g. including a high 
percentage of students or elderly people), planned maintenance to commu-
nal facilities lends itself well to the application of a segment-based mainte-
nance purchasing policy. The latter may imply adapted specifications, adapt-
ed supplier selection or adapted award criteria. As reactive maintenance is 
often delivered to individual tenants, customising the service is easier than 
for planned maintenance. Housing associations should evaluate the possible 
price advantages that may accompany bundling tenant preferences for reac-
tive maintenance, compared to anticipating individual preferences with re-
gard to the desired service level.
Which determinants of maintenance service quality are of primary importance for 
tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance, and how can performance measurement 
of maintenance service delivery in the social rented sector encourage tenant satis-
faction regarding maintenance?
According to tenants, the most important aspect is ‘the quality of the result 
of maintenance’, followed by ‘the competence of maintenance workers’ and 
‘completing maintenance activities in a single visit’. The latter implies that 
maintenance workers perform their maintenance job without unnecessary 
re-working or additional site visits. The stated importance ratings of deter-
minants of maintenance service quality are thus comparable for planned 
maintenance to the outside of dwellings and reactive maintenance inside 
dwellings. The regressions of determinants of maintenance service quality 
for planned maintenance, with the evaluation of planned maintenance to the 
exterior of buildings and for reactive maintenance, with the evaluation of re-
active maintenance to building interiors, offers a different picture from that 
implied by the importance ratings. The only determinants of maintenance 
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service quality regressing with the evaluation of planned maintenance to 
the exterior of buildings are ‘the quality of result of maintenance’ and ‘ten-
ant participation in maintenance through options’. For reactive maintenance 
to building interiors, the most important stated importance determinants of 
maintenance service quality regress also significantly with the evaluation in 
general.
When the phase of contracting a maintenance supplier is over, perfor-
mance measurement, or monitoring, constitutes an important means of se-
curing high-quality maintenance service delivery. Performance measurement 
should be based on indicators that are presented in the service specifications. 
The most relevant determinants of maintenance service quality should be 
included in order to secure end-customer satisfaction. The perceived impor-
tance of determinants of maintenance service quality were measured through 
stated importance ratings, and through regression analyses measuring the 
impact of attributes on satisfaction with reactive maintenance inside dwell-
ings and planned maintenance to the outside of dwellings.
While the essential determinants of service quality should be assessed for 
reasons of performance measurement, the same applies to earlier stages of 
the purchasing process.
 10.2.6 Characteristics of the maintenance service and the 
implications for commodity strategy development
Which determinants of service quality are important for customer satisfaction 
when buying component maintenance services, and to what extent are these taken 
into account in the specification of these services?
Maintenance services are services that are purchased by housing associations 
from maintenance service suppliers and delivered downstream to tenants. 
These services can be referred to as component services, and may have a sig-
nificant impact on end-customers. This should be taken into account when 
developing specifications for services. This impact is revealed both by the ser-
vice delivery process and by the outcomes of the service (the problem solution 
or prevention). Differences in service characteristics from the end-customer 
perspective should be taken into account when purchasing maintenance ser-
vices. Although the organisation and structure of the service is totally differ-
ent, in contrast to our expectations, given the stated importance figures, the 
demands put on the service encounter are not significantly different for reac-
tive maintenance inside dwellings and planned maintenance to the outside 
of dwellings. Instead, the increased urgency that is associated with reactive 
maintenance puts different demands on the service delivery process. In ad-
dition, tenants may feel more personally responsible for and attached to in-
house maintenance than for (more public) outhouse maintenance. Both may 
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result in a need for perceived control over the service encounter, which is rel-
atively high for reactive maintenance inside dwellings (compared to planned 
maintenance to the outside of dwellings). In order to incorporate tenant de-
mands into the purchasing phase, service specifications should reflect this 
difference. Moreover, supplier selection should yield service suppliers that 
have the quality and capacity to deal with this difference.
The results of this study suggest that component services are insufficiently 
recognised as such by purchasers, leading to inadequate coverage of impor-
tant determinants of service quality in service specifications.
 10.2.7 Optimisation of the commodity strategy
Which new institutional economics notions and theories are useful for analysing 
and developing coordination mechanisms for the maintenance client-contractor re-
lationship?
To what extent do maintenance service specifications cover the service aspects that 
are important to tenants?
Which commodity strategies facilitate the optimisation of tenant satisfaction with 
maintenance services?
Tools from new institutional economics proved to be useful for analysing this 
problem, and form the backbone of the possibilities that have been suggested 
with regard to optimising commodity strategies for maintenance. The ‘design’ 
is structured on the basis of the steps that constitute the purchasing process. 
Chapter 9 looked in detail at the optimisation of commodity strategies. In this 
sub-section, only the most important items for answering the research ques-
tion are discussed.
Purchasing process
The purchasing process consists of several steps that can be set by housing 
associations (the purchasing organisations) to set requirements for suppliers 
and services, which will affect service quality from the perspective of tenants. 
The purchasing process includes the following options:
execution requirements;
selection criteria (suitability requirements);
award criteria;
the contract as a means of managing the relationship between the housing 
association and the service supplier;
contract-related incentives.
1. Execution requirements
Execution requirements are a crucial prerequisite for successful service deliv-
ery. These requirements, elaborated into specifications, determine the service 
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that is delivered and how this corresponds to customer preferences. Execu-
tion requirements are the correct means of specifying all of the relevant de-
terminants of maintenance service quality that housing associations would 
like to be realised during the execution of a contract. From the document 
study, the conclusion can be drawn that not every important determinant of 
service quality is included in current specifications. Some determinants of 
maintenance service quality are so important that they should be addressed 
during the supplier selection phase. In this situation, housing associations 
should ensure that suppliers are able to deliver adequate quality.
Specifications usually include throughput-indicators. By means of inspec-
tions, the results of throughput-indicators can generally be measured without 
any difficulty, assuming that the housing association knows and has access 
to the relevant activities. Occasionally, functional – or output – indicators are 
used. In order to use these criteria, it is important that the housing associa-
tion is well aware of the potential benefits of maintenance for its strategic 
objectives. The advantage of using output-indicators is that the maintenance 
service supplier has more of an opportunity to optimise processes than with 
throughput-indicators. If this fits the capacities of maintenance contractors 
(and those of housing associations in setting up the relevant indicators), this 
could be an interesting opportunity for optimising maintenance service deliv-
ery. One prerequisite, however, is good coverage of the essential issues. ‘Com-
pleting maintenance activities in a single visit’, for example, is one output 
criterion that might be used (according to the situation), and may effectively 
improve service to tenants. It can be monitored through undertaking random 
checks with tenants. However, when performances are not measurable, or the 
maintenance contractor does not have the capabilities to come up with a bet-
ter design or solution than that provided by the housing association, the use 
of throughput-indicators in specifications is recommended.
If maintenance contractors have the relevant capabilities, they can add 
value to specifications. Housing associations may, however, also improve their 
own capacities for optimising specifications. The composition of the purchas-
ing function influences the quality of specifications. Maintenance services 
that have a large impact on tenant satisfaction can be purchased by a team 
that includes front-office employees. Decision support systems can help with 
the storage and use of knowledge regarding end-customer preferences about 
service results and service delivery processes.
There is room for improving the structure of specifications. Many differ-
ent documents are used for specifications, leading to duplication, (possibly) 
missed aspects, and at the very least, a lack of transparency, none of which 
stimulate compliance. In addition, transparent specifications reduce the 
chance of moral hazard by service suppliers.
Currently, specifications are often the responsibility of project lead-
ers, which reside at the operational level of the organisation. Because of the 
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growth of the size of housing associations, the business or corporate level 
lacks an overview of the specifications used and the actual service level that is 
delivered. There is some need for increased transparency. General conditions 
can be used to fix the service level of maintenance for aspects that are similar 
across all services. Framework agreements can be used for aspects that differ 
across different commodities and/or suppliers, but that do not differ among 
different housing blocks and target groups of tenants. When key performance 
indicators for the contents of these documents are settled at the business lev-
el of the organisation, service quality can be assured at a higher organisation-
al level. Finally, contracts are a good means of fixing determinants of service 
quality that vary between different maintenance projects and housing blocks.
Related to this, at the corporate level of housing associations, current stra-
tegic housing (stock) policies are primarily related to the physical aspects. A 
strategic policy that has some ambitions with regard to the promotion of ten-
ant satisfaction should include tenant preferences in maintenance service de-
livery. In strategic policy-making desired service levels can be agreed, which 
can subsequently be implemented in purchasing and commodity strategies.
2 and 3. Selection criteria and award criteria
If housing associations decide to purchase maintenance services from exter-
nal service suppliers, supplier selection is an essential means of ensuring the 
right resources and capabilities. In current Dutch practice, housing associa-
tions seldom use selection and award criteria. Known parties which are often 
locally based are repeatedly invited to conduct works. This may be to the ex-
clusion of other parties, which might raise the quality of service delivery to 
tenants and/or limit costs.
Some determinants of maintenance service quality can be perceived as 
minimum requirements. Inadequate compliance leads to dissatisfied ten-
ants. Through selection criteria, the ability of potential suppliers to meet set 
requirements may be tested. This is particularly interesting for maintenance 
services that have a large impact on tenant satisfaction, such as exterior 
paintwork, maintenance to hinges and locks of windows and external doors 
(for single-family dwellings), maintenance of porches, galleries, corridors and/
or stairways (for multi-family dwellings) and maintenance of bathrooms. In 
particular, the quality of human resources is a crucial factor, in view of the 
high degree of interaction involved in certain maintenance services that are 
important to tenants. Past successful projects may indicate success in future 
projects. In this context, ‘successful’ means a project that satisfies tenants. 
Only potential suppliers meeting the necessary criteria may continue to com-
pete for contract. Because there is a risk of too few potential suppliers being 
able to realise a certain criterion, and because of the administrative burden 
that accompanies each criterion, a limited number of criteria should be used.
Where selection criteria are related to the proficiency of potential suppliers, 
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award criteria are related to the maintenance solution offered. With regard to 
award criteria, tenant satisfaction seems to be best secured through the use 
of ‘the most economically advantageous tender’, rather than the lowest price 
(although the costs in the short-term may increase). It is in the interests of 
tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance that the essential determinants of 
maintenance service quality are included as award criteria, including appro-
priate weights. This gives clear emphasis to each specific item. However, on-
ly those determinants of maintenance service quality that can be measured, 
and be compared objectively in this stage of process, should be included. (The 
degree of) being available to answer questions and receive complaints may 
qualify as a suitable award criterion. Another determinant of service quality 
that may be well used as an award criterion is that of flexibility in making ap-
pointments with tenants.
4. The contract as a means of managing the relationship between the housing 
association and the service supplier
Close cooperation or market processes
One topical question, in light of the daily practices of housing associations, is 
whether one should put one’s trust in the market, or develop (long-term) co-
operation with service suppliers. The answer to this question depends on sev-
eral factors. In this research, close cooperation is understood to be a delicate 
form of the coordination mechanism ‘hierarchy’.
Highly complex specifications constitute one reason to cooperate closely 
with service suppliers. Without close cooperation, the risk of not being able to 
match expectations and service delivery output might be considerable. First, 
due to bounded rationality, specifications may be incomplete or suboptimal. 
Second, bounded rationality on the supplier’s side may lead to a different ser-
vice from the one that was expected. Both may have negative consequences 
for end-customer satisfaction.
Having a high level of asset specificity is another reason for close coopera-
tion. Asset specificity usually increases as a result of (intensive) cooperation 
with particular service suppliers. Usually, the longer a maintenance service 
supplier works on certain housing estates, the more dedicated the assets be-
come. One becomes familiar with the tenants and the characteristics of the 
building components’ degradation patterns, and unique solutions to prob-
lems are developed. In other words, previous successful cooperation is an eco-
nomic incentive for cooperation (with the same service supplier) in the future.
Finally, the housing association should consider its key objectives. If tenant 
satisfaction is a key objective for the housing association, for example, then 
the maintenance of hinges and locks of windows and external doors (a factor 
that is of central importance for tenants) should be considered to be a priority. 
It may be advisable to cooperate with service suppliers to manage services in 
order to reduce risks. This can take the form of close cooperation, or even ver-
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tical integration. For less important maintenance services, investing in close 
cooperation is less worthwhile.
Reducing opportunism
Opportunism is another factor that may negatively affect the quality of main-
tenance service delivery. If the housing association has an information disad-
vantage (information asymmetry) compared with the maintenance contractor, 
monitoring may be an effective means of reducing the chances of opportun-
ism, and thereby the negative consequences for end-customer satisfaction. 
Supplier development actions may be effective for reducing risks, such as 
those related to quality, secure delivery and price. Low-profile supplier de-
velopment actions include giving regular feedback to suppliers about their 
performance, acknowledging suppliers and raising expectations. More dras-
tic measures include training the personnel of maintenance service suppli-
ers, contributing investment capital, and placing one’s own personnel on the 
supplier’s premises.
Giving maintenance contractors an opportunity to bring their knowledge and 
experience to bear on improving specifications, as mentioned before, will lead 
to transaction-specific investments and reduce incentives for opportunism.
5. Contract-related incentives
Although contract-related incentives are not easy to implement for mainte-
nance service delivery, and can only be used in combination with some kind 
of monitoring, the instrument can be a valuable tool. Due to the lack of possi-
bilities for purchasers to check the quality of delivery beforehand, unlike with 
products, an incentive structure can prove very helpful as a means stimu-
lating performance. Housing associations have the option of using post-hoc 
price premiums as a means of curbing opportunism, which may be effective 
when combined with monitoring.
 10.2.8 Differentiated approaches
The decision to opt for a particular coordination mechanism (market, close 
cooperation, or complete hierarchy/integration), depends on the housing as-
sociation’s goals and strategy. From this research, one can conclude that this 
decision will be different for different maintenance services.
In the recommendations, most attention will be given to commodity strat-
egies relating to two particular maintenance services: those of maintenance 
of heating and water systems, and exterior paintwork. These two services are 
essential in terms of finance and tenant satisfaction with maintenance. Exte-
rior paintwork, in addition, may have a positive impact on the liveability of a 
neighbourhood.
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Maintenance of heating and water systems
Maintenance of heating and water systems is a service that is very impor-
tant for tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance. For housing associations 
that consider tenant satisfaction to be of paramount importance, the quality 
of service delivery for this service should be guaranteed.
The housing association in question should ensure the quality of the re-
sults of maintenance, and thus the reliability and safety of heating and water 
systems. People need warm water and an adequately heated living environ-
ment. However, given that this is a form of maintenance service that entails 
relatively intensive interactions with tenants, it is also important that service 
delivery is pleasant in order to assure satisfaction among tenants. It is im-
portant for tenants that maintenance workers execute maintenance with-
out needing to return for additional materials, or rectify mistakes (including 
breakdowns due to faulty maintenance). In order to reduce inconvenience, 
specifications may include an output criterion related to tenant satisfaction 
with the completion of maintenance activities in a single visit. When hous-
ing associations do not expect suppliers to be able to detail this condition, 
throughput indicators may be used to indicate the steps to be taken in order 
to ensure satisfaction.
The competence of maintenance workers is essential for suppliers to be 
able to perform works satisfactorily, and for tenant confidence. Therefore, in 
supplier selection procedures, housing associations should include minimum 
criteria relating to the competence of maintenance workers. If service sup-
pliers offering the necessary human resources are unavailable, then housing 
associations have no choice but to start development programmes for suppli-
ers in order to raise them to the desired level of competence. With regard to 
human resources, maintenance workers should also treat tenants courteous-
ly. Since there is no diploma for courtesy, this could be achieved by means of 
training or service specifications. Output specifications could measure tenant 
satisfaction with the politeness of maintenance workers and call centre em-
ployees. If the housing association does not expect maintenance service sup-
pliers to be able to handle these indicators, throughput indicators may estab-
lish the steps to be taken in order to secure satisfaction with the courtesy. This 
may include ‘to do’ and ‘not to do’ criteria. One example of a ‘to do’ criterion is 
to let maintenance workers introduce themselves. An example of a ‘not to do’ 
criterion is to forbid maintenance workers to smoke inside dwellings.
Maintenance to heating and water systems is often reactive maintenance. 
For reactive maintenance, determinants that give tenants a feeling of control 
over the urgent situation are important. For this reason, tenants must be able 
to easily access the right office, they must be able to arrange an appointment 
(preferably whenever they want), and most importantly, the maintenance 
workers must be present in line with arrangements. Call centres and main-
tenance workers thus need to work together. When maintenance and the call 
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centre are being run by different firms, additional coordination by the hous-
ing association is needed in order to guarantee service quality. In addition, 
irrespective of whether the call centre is outsourced, specifications need to 
include these determinants of maintenance service quality. Another determi-
nant of service quality that adds to the feeling of control is that of tenant par-
ticipation in maintenance by being able to choose from different maintenance 
options. Tenants might, for example, be given choices related to flexibility in 
making appointments. More flexibility implies paying a higher fee, however.
Maintenance of individual heating and water systems has high strategic 
value for housing associations, both in terms of finance and impact on ten-
ant satisfaction. To a great extent, orders are repeated and the complexity 
of both specifications and works is limited. Only when knowledge of tenant 
preferences is stored and used for improving the quality of the service de-
livery, can long-term agreements be productive. This assumes that mainte-
nance service suppliers are able to research and exploit tenant preferences, 
which is currently rarely the case. At the same time, giving service suppliers 
responsibility for improving and optimising heating and water systems may 
have positive consequences for their commitment and, eventually, service 
quality. Output specifications are an important means of making this ap-
proach possible.
Thus, if a service supplier can deal with output specifications, if a housing 
association can derive output specifications from its strategic maintenance 
objectives, and if the maintenance contractor is better able (than the hous-
ing association) to design optimal services, then output specification may be 
recommended. If these requirements cannot be fulfilled, however, housing as-
sociations should use throughput indicators. In both cases, performance mea-
surement is necessary in order to limit opportunism.
Aside from heating, adequate ventilation is important for ensuring com-
fort, and achieving harmony between heating and ventilation systems may be 
advantageous in this respect. In addition, harmony between maintenance (or 
replacements) of ventilation systems and maintenance of heating (and water) 
systems may limit disturbance to tenants. If a number of maintenance ser-
vice suppliers are able to deliver both types of maintenance in harmony, then 
combined specifications could be drawn up and put out to tender in order to 
stimulate tenant satisfaction.
Exterior paintwork
Exterior paintwork is crucial for tenants’ percpetions of maintenance servic-
es. A lack of adequate maintenance is easily visible, and this form of mainte-
nance can take a long time.
For tenants, the quality of the result of maintenance is essential. This as-
pect, however, is not always easily specified and measured. The quality of the 
result of painting influences the performance of a façade in the long-term. 
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Inadequate painting may, for instance, result in rotten windows. While ade-
quate specification of the quality of paintwork is necessary, the appropriate 
activities needed may be obvious for some projects but less obvious for oth-
ers. Output specification may provide opportunities for maintenance contrac-
tors to optimise services, if the maintenance contractor is better able than the 
housing association to design maintenance activities. The quality of the result 
from the tenant’s perspective may be increased if it fits their preferences with 
regards to the appearance, e.g. use of colours. Therefore it may be stimulating 
for satisfaction with maintenance to let tenants vote for or choose the co-
lours that are to be used.
For tenants, the competence of maintenance workers is important, and the 
selection procedure should take this into account. Not unlike the situation 
for maintenance to heating and water systems, avoiding damages to tenants’ 
personal property should be included into the specifications.
Given the complexity of degradation to building façades due to, for in-
stance, weather conditions, and the relative uniqueness of buildings and 
building components, these maintenance solutions are often highly specific. 
Specificity increases when different applications are combined, such as con-
crete repair and painting. The more complex and specific the situation and 
the needed specification, the more experience pays off in the longer term. In 
this case, it may be wise to contract a maintenance company for a certain 
length of time and give it responsibility for maintaining the building compo-
nent. Another important factor relating to exterior paintwork is risk, includ-
ing quality risks. When these are not easy to assess, it might be useful to co-
operate with maintenance contractors to map risks, value them jointly, and 
share them. The disadvantage of this may be a reduction in competition.
 10.3 Policy and managerial recommendations
The following managerial recommendations can be drawn from this research.
Maintenance commodity strategies should reflect the contribution made by specific 
maintenance services to a housing association’s strategic objectives.
Maintenance services are important means of fulfilling housing associations’ 
goals, and commodity strategy development can help housing associations to 
achieve these. Maintenance services can contribute to both public and private 
challenges, such as financial-economic objectives, liveability, sustainability, 
and tenant satisfaction.
Maintenance of dwellings is a service that is purchased by housing associations 
and delivered to tenants. The large impact that such services may have on these 
end-customers makes it important to effectively take end-customer requirements 
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into account in commodity strategy development.
Buying companies should know what is important to tenants. For the most 
important maintenance services, housing associations can constantly col-
lect and save information about tenant preferences in order to limit bounded 
rationality. Subsequently, this information can be used to draw up specifica-
tions, suitability requirements, award criteria, contract-related incentives, and 
to decide on the best form of cooperation with service suppliers.
Buying companies can use the knowledge obtained to critically reflect on 
which aspects of service delivery contribute to perceptions of high-quality 
services, and consequently, how they should specify the these services for 
providers. A proper service specification, which takes end-customer prefer-
ences into account, will help to acquire and retain satisfied customers. Sub-
sequently, performance measurement should ensure that execution require-
ments are indeed fulfilled. Critically important requirements, for which the 
housing association cannot risk underperformance, could be included as 
award criteria. Contract-related incentives can be used to stimulate perfor-
mance for determinants of service quality that enhance tenant satisfaction. 
They can be used alongside standards set for execution requirements, and are 
an interesting option due to the difficulties associated with making prior as-
sessments of service quality in this area. Housing associations could specify 
a minimum level of performance for individual service quality determinants, 
and any deviations could be linked to bonuses or penalties.
In the supplier selection phase, supplier suitability requirements (or selec-
tion criteria) are essential for verifying whether a maintenance service sup-
plier indeed has the resources and capabilities needed to provide high-quality 
service delivery. In addition, tenant satisfaction appears to be best secured 
through the use of ‘the most economically advantageous tender’ when award-
ing contracts, instead of the lowest price. It is in the interests of tenant satis-
faction that the essential determinants of maintenance service quality should 
be included as award criteria, including the appropriate weights, giving clear 
emphasis to specific items. However, only those measurable and objectively 
comparable determinants of maintenance service quality should be included. 
In addition, not too many aspects should be included. (The degree of) being 
available to answer questions and receive complaints could qualify as a suit-
able award criterion, with another possibility being ‘flexibility in making ap-
pointments with tenants’.
In order to stimulate tenant satisfaction, particular attention should be given to 
high-quality maintenance of heating and water systems and maintenance of hing-
es and locks of windows and external doors.
Maintenance of heating and water systems and maintenance of hinges and 
locks of windows and external doors should, based on this research, and at 
least for tenants of single-family dwellings, be designated as essential. In-
■
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adequate maintenance relating to these components is expected to severely 
harm wellbeing and reduce tenant satisfaction.
A transparent set of service specifications helps maintenance service suppliers to 
understand the service demands, and may therefore increase the probability of 
high quality service delivery.
The readability and clarity of specification documents is generally something 
that could be improved. For example, it may be helpful and transparent to use 
separate documents for technical specifications and issues related to interac-
tion with tenants. A further distinction could be made between various ser-
vice aspects that can differ for each maintenance service and should there-
fore be recorded at contract level, and ‘fixed’ service aspects that are standard 
for all activities and that should be recorded in the general conditions.
General conditions can be used to fix the service level of maintenance for 
aspects that are similar for all services. Framework agreements can be used 
for aspects that differ across different commodities and/or suppliers, but are 
equal for different housing blocks and tenant target groups. When key per-
formance indicators for the contents of these documents are settled at the 
business level of the organisation, service quality can be assured at a higher 
organisational level. Finally, contracts are good measures for fixing determi-
nants of service quality that vary across different maintenance projects and 
housing blocks.
The buying centre for a certain commodity should reflect that commodity’s contri-
bution to the organisation’s objectives.
In order to be able to treat suppliers as extensions of housing associations 
in delivering services to tenants, a closer connection is needed between the 
purchasing of technical management services and the strategic level of the 
organisation. For example, from the perspective of customer satisfaction, it is 
advisable to place marketing professionals or front-office staff in the buying 
centre for those services that have a significant impact on customer satisfac-
tion.
Housing associations should know which key process steps and parameters in 
maintenance service delivery can and should be measured to ensure tenant satis-
faction regarding maintenance.
Housing associations have to define key process steps and parameters for 
both their own and suppliers’ processes for maintenance service delivery. 
This will enable them to monitor and improve these issues. An analysis of 
tenant complaints can be a good starting point for the identification of these 
key process steps from the end-customer’s perspective.
Maintenance performance as a whole could be improved by integrating, as far as 
■
■
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possible, decision-making relating to reactive maintenance, planned maintenance 
and void repairs.
Currently, separate departments of housing associations are often respon-
sible for these three types of maintenance, despite the fact that the differ-
ent activities can influence and possibly hamper one another. For instance, 
maintenance to the building façade could be aligned with maintenance to 
installations in order to improve energy quality and to decrease energy bills. 
In addition, bundling types of maintenance (reactive maintenance, planned 
maintenance, and void repairs) and categories of maintenance (for example 
paintwork, roof maintenance and concrete work) may reduce both coordina-
tion costs and nuisance for tenants.
The performance of housing associations as a whole, and of maintenance in partic-
ular, could be improved by integrating decision-making for maintenance, improve-
ments, and new buildings.
Frequently, the optimisation of maintenance solutions is restricted due to 
building characteristics. Maintenance would benefit from direct participation 
in decision-making regarding requirements for new buildings and refurbish-
ment.
A strategic policy that has some ambitions relating to tenant satisfaction should 
include tenant preferences in maintenance service delivery.
At the corporate level of housing associations, current strategic housing 
(stock) policies are primarily related to physical aspects. Desired service levels 
should be agreed as part of strategic policy-making, which can subsequently 
be implemented in purchasing and commodity strategies.
Tenant satisfaction regarding maintenance can be positively influenced by actively 
managing tenant expectations about maintenance activities.
Although taking into account all determinants of maintenance service quality 
would be interesting from a tenant’s point of view, from the economic point 
of view, it may be undesirable. Maintaining realistic tenant expectations with 
regard to deliverable service levels is essential in order to limit the number of 
disappointed tenants.
Risk, in combination with the strategic importance of maintenance services for the 
organisational objectives of the housing association, constitutes the rational coor-
dination mechanism for managing maintenance service suppliers.
The more unique or complex the specifications, maintenance projects, or so-
lutions are, the more appropriate it is to have a partnership structure between 
the housing association and the maintenance service supplier. In such cases, 
it may be worthwhile investing in a relationship with a maintenance compa-
ny that is able to tackle the problems at hand. This enables the parties to dis-
■
■
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cuss risks (and give them a price) and thereby improve risk management. The 
more relationships grow, and thus knowledge of the features, maintenance 
solutions, and end-customers increases, the higher the benefits of a partner-
ship are.
On the other hand, long-term contracts with maintenance service suppli-
ers can restrict flexibility. For instance, it may be difficult to adapt a housing 
association’s strategic stock policy due to contracts made with service suppli-
ers. In addition, the competitiveness of arrangements may decrease over time, 
for instance due to innovations and price developments. Therefore, periodical 
tenders are usually advisable, where for ‘dynamic’ commodities the contract 
duration may be shorter than for less dynamic commodities. Alternatively, 
price actualisations during the contract period may increase the competitive-
ness of long-term agreements.
An advantage of close cooperation with suppliers for delivery of essen-
tial maintenance services is that this will probably lead to a reduction of the 
number of suppliers. This is particularly the case when maintenance to dif-
ferent building components is bundled for improved alignment of processes. 
Reducing the number of suppliers leads to an improved overview of existing 
relations with suppliers and therefore makes these relations more manage-
able.
When specifications, maintenance projects and solutions are predictable in 
terms of risks, market processes (competition) are important to ensure that 
the best supplier can indeed perform the maintenance. In this case, regular 
multiple tenders are advisable in particular for large volumes.
Examples of risks include fluctuations in complaints and maintenance 
needs, or the inability of the maintenance firm to consistently meet the de-
sired quality or terms of delivery. Managing these sorts of risks becomes eas-
ier as the purchasing company becomes more closely linked with the main-
tenance firms’ activities and can intervene directly if necessary. This is only 
worthwhile when both parties intend to work together for a lengthy period, 
however.
Finally, the strategic importance of a maintenance service, in combination 
with the above-mentioned factors, is decisive for the choice of coordination 
mechanism. It is more important to invest in a close partnership with suppli-
ers if a particular maintenance service is important (e.g. for customer satis-
faction).
For complex works, candidate service suppliers can be asked to present a 
risk assessment plan, and this may help to limit quality risks beforehand. The 
quality of this plan can function as an award criterion. In a risk assessment 
plan, candidate suppliers can give their assessment of the project risks, and 
how they will minimise them. Parties that make good assessments and pro-
pose adequate remedies will score higher than parties that cannot.
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Tenants may participate in setting priorities for maintenance purchasing.
Like owner-occupiers of homes, tenants may be more satisfied with mainte-
nance when they have had an opportunity to influence decision-making. They 
may, for instance, play a role in setting priorities for maintenance of shared 
areas. This may lead to a greater feeling of responsibility for these areas, re-
sulting in increased liveability.
For maintenance inside dwellings, tenants may participate by choosing be-
tween different options. The housing association or the maintenance service 
supplier may present certain options in combination with price consequenc-
es. In other words, sometimes in exchange for a fee, tenants can be offered 
certain product or delivery process upgrades, which in effect is an extension 
of service maintenance.
The final (policy) recommendations are primarily directed towards the branch 
organisation of the Dutch housing associations, Aedes.
For further professionalisation of the sector as a whole, the use of transparent pro-
cedures enabling fair competition among candidate suppliers is recommended.
In immobile housing services market, competition is very restricted. Unlike 
activities performed in a competitive setting, there is limited incentive for ef-
ficient spending. In order to stimulate effective spending, there seems some 
need for public monitoring, and therefore accountability and transparency, at 
least for regarding spending related to public duties. Nonetheless, public, and 
in particular European, procurement rules are usually not applied, and actu-
al transparency is therefore limited. Given this situation, the application of 
transparent procedures enabling fair competition among candidate suppliers 
is recommended.
For transparency relating to the quality of service delivered to tenants, housing 
associations may be obliged to present results related to the KWH-huurlabel to 
candidate tenants.
It would be a good idea to oblige housing associations to outline the results of 
KWH-huurlabel assessments in literature provided to candidate tenants. The 
grades provide candidate tenants with information about the quality of ser-
vice delivery. While the physical part of the housing service is visible, and can 
therefore be assessed by tenants, the quality of service delivery is not. Pre-
senting a service quality label in combination with each offered dwelling will 
help customers in their search for a suitable dwelling, which is particularly 
desirable in such a pressured housing market.
■
■
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 10.4 Recommendations for further research
This thesis has suggested several avenues for future purchasing of mainte-
nance services by Dutch housing associations. This section addresses the 
main recommendations for further research, which are:
To develop insights into the impact of determinants of maintenance service quality 
for the results of maintenance on tenant satisfaction.
This thesis has primarily focused on the determinants of service delivery 
quality. The result of maintenance has been summarised in one attribute, 
while in fact it consists of many sub-attributes or actions. Which actions are 
essential for different maintenance services and for different end-customers 
in order to secure tenant satisfaction?
To develop insights into tenants’ motives when rating maintenance services, and 
determinants of maintenance service quality.
This thesis has offered insights into relevant maintenance services and rele-
vant determinants of maintenance service quality from a tenant’s perspective. 
It did not, however, investigate tenants’ motives for rating attributes.
To develop insights into the effects of maintenance on the total costs of ownership 
for housing associations.
Housing associations make trade-offs between competing maintenance goals. 
One such goal is to limit the total costs of ownership. The consequences of 
maintenance for the value of assets should be evaluated, as well as commod-
ity strategies’ consequences for buildings’ life-cycle costs, in order to improve 
decision-making.
To develop insights into the effects of maintenance on liveability.
Maintenance can help to create a pleasant living environment for a wider 
population than that of tenants alone; it may improve liveability in a neigh-
bourhood. This is the case, for instance, for exterior paintwork and mainte-
nance of entrance halls and galleries. The relevant performance indicators for 
measuring the effects on liveability, however, are still to be determined.
To develop insights into the effects of an optimal commodity strategy on tenant 
satisfaction.
In this research, we designed an optimised commodity strategy for mainte-
nance services. However, we did not test the effectiveness of this commod-
ity strategy for improving tenant satisfaction with maintenance. Further 
research could give additional insights into the real-world effects of the pro-
posed choices.
■
■
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To develop insights into the extent to which suppliers can meet end-customer re-
quirements.
Data relating to optimal determinants of maintenance service quality was 
only collected from tenants and housing associations. Optimisation of inter-
action between (essentially) the maintenance service supplier and the tenant, 
however, also demands an assessment of service suppliers’ views on inter-
actions with tenants. Suppliers were not asked about how they perceive op-
timisation of maintenance service delivery for tenant satisfaction. Including 
suppliers’ perceptions more explicitly in future research would substantiate 
the findings with regard to the optimisation of service delivery and might, in 
addition, result in additional insights into the role and behaviour of housing 
association’s purchasers.
To develop insights into other housing-related services delivered to end-customers.
Maintenance services purchased by housing associations and delivered un-
changed to tenants are component services. Future research is needed in 
order to identify the essential determinants of service quality in other set-
tings, and to make cross-comparisons. Research still needs to be carried out 
into component or semi-manufactured services relating to void repairs and 
improvement activities. In addition, tenants’ experiences with maintenance 
subscriptions should be evaluated.
■
■
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 Appendix 1 Characteristics of the 
respondents
Socio-demographic and household characteristics of the respondents of the tenants’ 
survey about maintenance (n = 6037)
Sex (n = 5896, missing = 141)
Male (n = 2894) 49.1%
Female (n = 3002) 50.9%
Age (years, n = 5879, missing = 158)
Median 55 (range: 17 - 96)
Mean 55
Type of family (n = 5760, missing = 277)
Single (n = 2223) 38.6%
Couple without children living at home (n = 1746) 30.3%
Couple with children living at home (n = 1124) 19.5%
Single-parent family (n = 667) 11.6%
(Completed) Education (n = 5757, missing = 280)
No formal education/elementary school (n = 793) 13.8%
Lower secondary/vocational education (n = 2921) 50.7%
Higher secondary/intermediate vocational/pre-university education (n = 1166) 20.3%
University/higher vocational education (n = 733) 12.7%
Other (n = 144) 2.5%
Source of income (n = 5893, missing = 144)
Labour (n = 2634) 44.7%
Retirement pay (n = 2047) 34.7%
Scholarship (n = 34) 0.6%
Other allowances/and social security payments (n = 1178) 20.0%
Monthly net family income (n = 5450, missing = 587)
Less than 1000 euros (n = 1584) 29.1%
1000-2000 euros (n = 3090) 56.7%
More than 2000 euros (n = 776) 14.2%
Type of dwelling (n = 5985, missing = 52)
Single-family dwelling (n = 3783) 63.2%
Multi-family dwelling (n = 2202) 36.8%
Period of construction of the dwelling (n = 5493, missing = 544)
Before 1946 (n = 581) 10.6%
1946-1967 (n = 1584) 28.8%
1968-1975 (n = 1085) 19.8%
1976-1994 (n = 1939) 35.3%
After 1994 (n = 304) 5.5%
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
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Appendix 2 Tenant questionnaire 
Dutch version 
Uw persoonsgegevens
Hieronder volgen enkele vragen over uw persoonlijke situatie en uw woning. Wilt u svp omcirkelen wat 
voor u van toepassing is?
1. Wat is uw geslacht?
A. Man
B. Vrouw
2. Welk huishoudenstype weerspiegelt uw situatie?
A. Alleenstaand, ga door naar vraag 4
B. Paar zonder één of meer thuiswonende kinderen, ga door naar vraag 3
C. Paar met één of meer thuiswonende kinderen, ga door naar vraag 3
D. Eenoudergezin, ga door naar vraag 4
3. Hoeveel uur werkt uw partner in totaal buitenshuis in een normale werkweek? 
4. Hoeveel uur werkt u in totaal buitenshuis in een normale werkweek? 
5. Wat is uw leeftijd? 
6. Wat is uw hoogst genoten opleiding?
A. Lagere school, basisschool
B. Lager beroepsonderwijs (bijv. huishoudschool, LTS, LHNO, LEAO, VMBO)
C. Middelbaar algemeen onderwijs (MULO, MAVO, 3 jaar HAVO, VMBO)
D. Hoger algemeen onderwijs (bijv. HAVO, HBS)
E. Voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs (VWO)
F. Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (bijv. MTS, MEAO, INAS, VHBO)
G. Hoger beroepsonderwijs (HBO, HTS)
H. Wetenschappelijk onderwijs (universiteit)
I. Geen opleiding
J. Anders, namelijk: 
7. Wat is de grootste inkomensbron van uw huishouden?
A. Inkomen uit arbeid
B. Pensioen/AOW
C. Studiebeurs
D. Overige uitkering
8. Hoeveel bedraagt uw huishoudensinkomen per maand (gemiddeld, netto)?
A. Minder dan €  500,-
B. Tussen €  500,- en €  999,-
C. Tussen €  1000,- en €  1499,-
D. Tussen €  1500,- en €  1999,-
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E. Tussen €  2000,- en €  2499,-
F. Tussen €  2500,- en €  2999,-
G. €  3000,- of meer
H. Weet ik niet
9. Tot welke bevolkingsgroep rekent u zichzelf voornamelijk?
A. Nederlands
B. Surinaams
C. Antiliaans/Arubaans
D. Indonesisch
E. Turks
F. Marokkaans
G. Ander ‘westers’ land
H. Ander ‘niet-westers’ land
10. Op welke etage woont u?
A. Op de begane grond
B. Hoger dan de begane grond, namelijk op etage: 
11. Bent u van plan om binnen twee jaar te verhuizen?
A. Ja
B. Nee
12. Heeft u een serviceabonnement voor huurdersonderhoud?
A. Ja, ga door naar vraag 13
B. Nee, ga door naar vraag 14
C. Weet ik niet, ga door naar vraag 14
13. Waarom heeft u gekozen voor een serviceabonnement voor onderhoud?: 
Woongenot en onderhoud
De volgende vragen gaan over uw woongenot, het onderhoud aan uw woning en uw ervaringen daarbij 
in de afgelopen vijf jaar (of korter) met betrekking tot uw huidige woning.
Planmatig onderhoud is onderhoud dat periodiek uitgevoerd wordt om schade in de toekomst te 
voorkomen, veelal aan de buitenkant van de woning en eventuele gemeenschappelijke ruimtes.
Reparatieverzoek is een verzoek of klacht van u of één van uw medebewoners die al dan niet leidt tot 
een reparatie, veelal in uw woning en eventuele gemeenschappelijke ruimtes.
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U kunt bij deze vragen het antwoord selecteren dat het best bij u past. Als u twijfelt, geef dan het 
antwoord dat het dichtst in de buurt komt. Wilt u aankruisen wat van toepassing is?
14. Hoe ervaart u uw huidige woonsituatie?
Zeer negatief Neutraal Zeer positief
15. Hoe ervaart u het huidige onderhoud van uw woning?
Zeer negatief Neutraal Zeer positief
16. Hoe ervaart u het huidige planmatig onderhoud van uw woning?
Zeer negatief Neutraal Zeer positief
17. Hoe ervaart u het huidige onderhoud van uw woning naar aanleiding van reparatieverzoeken?
Zeer negatief Neutraal Zeer positief
18. Zou u extra geld overhebben voor beter onderhoud?
A. Ja
B. Nee
Uw eventuele toelichting op bovenstaande antwoorden:
Vraag 19 betreft verschillende onderhoudsactiviteiten.
19. Wilt u aankruisen hoe belangrijk het onderhoud is voor uw woongenot en hoe tevreden u hierover 
bent? Wanneer u uw tevredenheid niet kunt aanduiden omdat u de afgelopen vijf jaar niet te maken 
heeft gehad met onderhoud, kunt u “niet van toepassing” (n.v.t.) aankruisen.
Zeer  
onbelangrijk
Zeer  
belangrijk
Zeer  
ontevreden
Zeer  
tevreden
Onderhoud van hang- en sluit-
werk van ramen en buitendeuren
Onderhoud van dak en goten
Onderhoud van uw badkamer
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Zeer  
onbelangrijk
Zeer  
belangrijk
Zeer  
ontevreden
Zeer  
tevreden
Onderhoud van ventilatiesy-
stemen
Onderhoud van verwarming en 
waterinstallaties
Onderhoud van bestrating 
rondom uw woongebouw of 
woning
Onderhoud van uw keuken
Onderhoud van uw toilet
Schilderwerk aan de buitenkant 
van de woning
Onderhoud van de riolering
Voor de volgende onderhoudsactiviteiten geldt: wanneer uw woning een installatie, bouwdeel of 
voorziening niet heeft, kunt u dit aangeven door het (n.v.t.) vakje in de linker kolom aan te kruisen en 
deze deelvraag overslaan.
Zeer  
onbelangrijk
Zeer  
belangrijk
Zeer  
ontevreden
Zeer  
tevreden
Onderhoud van de gemeen-
schappelijke groenvoorziening 
rondom uw woongebouw
Onderhoud van verlichting in 
gemeenschappelijke ruimtes
Schoonmaak van gemeenschap-
pelijke ruimtes
Onderhoud van de portiek, gale-
rij, gangen en/of trappenhuizen
Onderhoud van liftinstallaties
Onderhoud van uw balkon
Het onderhoud aan welke bovengenoemde (16) aspecten is voor uw woongenot het meest van belang? 
Kunt u de top drie geven?
1.
2.
3.
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Uw eventuele toelichting op bovenstaande antwoorden:
Nu volgen vragen met betrekking tot de onderhoudsdienstverlening. In hoeverre acht u de genoemde 
zaken van belang voor uw woongenot, en hoe tevreden bent u?
20. Planmatig onderhoud aan de buitenkant van uw woning (bijvoorbeeld schilderwerk, dakonderhoud 
en onderhoud aan bestrating)
Heeft u ervaring met planmatig onderhoud aan de buitenkant van uw woning?
 Ja (in de afgelopen 3 jaar): vul de kolommen over belangrijkheid en tevredenheid in
 Ja (tussen de 3 en 5 jaar geleden): vul de kolommen over belangrijkheid en tevredenheid in
 Nee: vul slechts de kolom over belangrijkheid in (de linker kolom)
Wilt u nu aankruisen wat voor u van toepassing is? Hoe belangrijk is dit voor uw woongenot, en hoe 
tevreden bent u hierover?
Zeer  
onbelangrijk
Zeer  
belangrijk
Zeer  
ontevreden
Zeer  
tevreden
De bereikbaarheid voor informatie 
en klachten
Flexibiliteit in het maken van 
afspraken
Het nakomen van afspraken over de 
planning van uitvoering
Inspraak door keuzeopties bij 
onderhoud
Beperking van de tijdsduur van 
werkzaamheden
Het voorkomen van schade aan 
persoonlijke eigendommen
Het dragen van nette, herkenbare 
bedrijfskleding door onderhouds-
uitvoerders
Het beperken en opruimen van 
troep en stof rondom de werkplek
Het beperken van geluidsoverlast 
en trillingen
Het aanspreken in uw eigen taal
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Zeer  
onbelangrijk
Zeer  
belangrijk
Zeer  
ontevreden
Zeer  
tevreden
De vakbekwaamheid van onder-
houdsuitvoerders
De beleefdheid van onderhoudsuit-
voerders
De kwaliteit van het resultaat van 
onderhoud
Het in-één-keer goed uitvoeren van 
onderhoudswerkzaamheden
Anders, nl.: 
Welke van de bovengenoemde aspecten zijn bij planmatig onderhoud aan de buitenkant van uw 
woning voor uw woongenot het meest van belang? Kunt u de top drie geven?
Uw eventuele toelichting op bovenstaande antwoorden:
21. Het uitvoeren van onderhoud naar aanleiding van reparatieverzoek(en) in uw woning (bijvoorbeeld 
keuken, sanitair en verwarming)
Heeft u voor uw woning recentelijk een klacht of reparatieverzoek gemeld?
 Ja (in de afgelopen 3 jaar): vul de kolommen over belangrijkheid en tevredenheid in
 Ja (tussen de 3 en 5 jaar geleden): vul de kolommen over belangrijkheid en tevredenheid in
 Nee: vul slechts de kolom over belangrijkheid in (de linker kolom)
Wilt u nu aankruisen wat voor u van toepassing is? Hoe belangrijk is dit voor uw woongenot, en hoe 
tevreden bent u hierover?
Zeer  
onbelangrijk
Zeer  
belangrijk
Zeer  
ontevreden
Zeer  
tevreden
De bereikbaarheid voor informatie 
en klachten
Flexibiliteit in het maken van 
afspraken
1.
2.
3.
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Zeer  
onbelangrijk
Zeer  
belangrijk
Zeer  
ontevreden
Zeer  
tevreden
Het nakomen van afspraken over de 
planning van uitvoering
Inspraak door keuzeopties bij 
onderhoud
Beperking van de tijdsduur van 
werkzaamheden
Het voorkomen van schade aan 
persoonlijke eigendommen
Het dragen van nette, herkenbare 
bedrijfskleding door onderhouds-
uitvoerders
Het beperken en opruimen van 
troep en stof rondom de werkplek
Het beperken van geluidsoverlast 
en trillingen
Het aanspreken in uw eigen taal
De vakbekwaamheid van onder-
houdsuitvoerders
De beleefdheid van onderhoudsuit-
voerders
De kwaliteit van het resultaat van 
onderhoud
Het in-één-keer goed uitvoeren van 
onderhoudswerkzaamheden
Anders, nl.: 
Welke van de bovengenoemde aspecten zijn bij reparatieverzoeken in uw woning voor uw woongenot 
het meest van belang? Kunt u de top drie geven?
Uw eventuele toelichting op bovenstaande antwoorden:
Ik dank u vriendelijk voor het invullen en opsturen van deze vragenlijst!
1.
2.
3.
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U kunt de vragenlijst retour zenden in de bijgevoegde antwoordenvelop. Als u na afloop van het 
onderzoek een samenvatting van de onderzoeksresultaten wilt ontvangen, kunt u dit aangeven?
 Ja, ik wil een samenvatting van de resultaten ontvangen
 Nee, ik wil geen samenvatting van de resultaten ontvangen
Hieronder is ruimte voor uw vragen en/of opmerkingen naar aanleiding van de vragenlijst.
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  Tenant questionnaire 
English version (not used)
Your personal details
Below are a number of questions about your personal situation and your home. Please circle the 
answer that applies in your case.
1. What is your gender?
A. Male
B. Female
2. What is the composition of your household?
A. Single occupant – please go to question 4
B. Couple with no children living at home – please go to question 3
C. Couple with one or more children living at home – please go to question 3
D. Single-parent family – please go to question 4
3. How many hours does your partner work outside the house in a normal working week? 
4. How many hours do you work outside the house in a normal working week? 
5. What is your age? 
6. What is your highest level of education?
A. Elementary school
B. Lower vocational education (e.g. school for domestic science, junior technical school, lower 
economic and administrative education, preparatory intermediate vocational education)
C. Lower general secondary education (extended primary education, 3 years of higher general 
secondary education, preparatory intermediate vocational education)
D. Higher general secondary education
E. Pre-university education
F. Intermediate vocational education (e.g. intermediate technical school, intermediate business 
education, intermediate professional education)
G. Higher vocational education (or higher technical education)
H. University
I. None
J. Other, please specify: 
7. What is the greatest source of income of the household?
A. Employment
B. Pension (private or state)
C. Student grant
D. Social security
8. What is your average net monthly household income?
A. Less than €500,-
B. Between €500 and €999
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C. Between €1000 and €1499
D. Between €1500 and €1999
E. Between €2000 and €2499
F. Between €2500 and €2999
G. €3000 or higher
H. Don’t know
9. To what population group do you consider you belong?
A. Dutch
B. Surinamese
C. Antillean/Aruban
D. Indonesian
E. Turkish
F. Moroccan
G. Other ‘Western’ country
H. Other ‘non-Western’ country
10. What floor do you live on?
A. On the ground floor
B. Higher than the ground floor, on the  floor
11. Are you intending to move in the next two years?
A. Yes
B. No
12. Do you have a maintenance service contract for tenants?
A. Yes, please go to question 13
B. No, please go to question 14
C. Don’t know, please go to question 14
13. Why do you have a maintenance service contract?
Home enjoyment and maintenance
The following questions are about home enjoyment, the maintenance of your home, and your experi-
ences in the last five years (or less) in relation to your current home.
Planned maintenance is maintenance that is carried out periodically in order to prevent damage in the 
future, often performed on the outside of the home and, if relevant, in communal areas.
Request for repairs is a request or complaint made by you or a member of your household that may or 
may not lead to repairs being carried out, usually in your home or, if applicable, in communal areas.
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With this question, you can select an answer that best describes your situation. If in doubt, give the 
answer that is closest to your situation. Please place a cross in the space provided.
14. How do you perceive your current living situation?
Very negative Neutral Very positive
15. How do you perceive the current level of maintenance of your home?
Very negative Neutral Very positive
16. How do you perceive the current state of planned maintenance of your home?
Very negative Neutral Very positive
17. How do you perceive the current state of maintenance of your home following requests for repairs?
Very negative Neutral Very positive
18. Would you be prepared to spend more money on better maintenance?
A. Yes
B. No
If you would like to add any extra comments on the answers you have given, please use the space below.
Question 19 is about different maintenance activities.
19. How important is maintenance to your home enjoyment, and how satisfied are you about it? Please 
place a cross in the appropriate circle. If you cannot state your level of satisfaction because you 
have had no maintenance dealings in the last five years, please place a cross under ‘NA’ (not ap-
plicable).
Not at all 
important
Very  
important NA
Very 
dissatisfied
Very 
satisfied
Maintenance of hinges and 
locks on windows and external 
doors
Maintenance of roof and 
gutters
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Not at all 
important
Very  
important NA
Very 
dissatisfied
Very 
satisfied
Maintenance of your bathroom
Maintenance of ventilation 
systems
Maintenance of heating and 
water systems
Maintenance of paving around 
the building 
Maintenance of your kitchen
Maintenance of your toilet
State of exteriour paintwork
Maintenance of drains
In cases where your home does not have the installations, features or facilities mentioned in the fol-
lowing questions, please place a cross in the NA box (not applicable) and proceed to the next question.
Not at all 
important
Very  
important NA
Very 
dissatisfied
Very 
satisfied
Maintenance of communal 
greenery in the area around 
your home
Maintenance of lighting in 
shared areas
Cleaning of shared areas
Maintenance of porches, galler-
ies, corridors, and stairways
Maintenance of lifts
Maintenance of your balcony
The maintenance of which of the 16 aspects listed above is the most important as far as your home 
enjoyment is concerned? Please give your top three.
1.
2.
3.
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If you would like to add any extra comments on the answers you have given, please use the space below.
The following questions relate to maintenance services. To what degree do you consider the aspects 
mentioned contribute to your home enjoyment, and how satisfied are you?
20. Planned maintenance of the exterior of your home (for example, paintwork, roof maintenance, and 
maintenance of street/pavement).
Has planned maintenance actually been carried out on the exterior of your home?
 Yes (in the last 3 years): fill in the columns relating to importance and satisfaction
 Yes (between 3 and 5 years): fill in the columns relating to importance and satisfaction
 No: only fill in the column relating to importance (the left-hand column)
Please place crosses as they apply to your situation. How important is this for your home enjoyment, 
and how satisfied are you?
Not at all 
important
Very  
important
Very 
dissatisfied
Very 
satisfied
Ease of obtaining information and 
making complaints
Flexibility in making appointments
Honouring of agreements in  rela-
tion to work schedule
Range of maintenance options 
available
Limited duration of maintenance 
work
Prevention of damage to personal 
property
Wearing smart and recognisable 
company clothes (those performing 
the maintenance)
Limiting the amount of debris and 
dust near the area of work, and clear-
ing it away
Limiting the amount of noise and 
and vibrations
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Not at all 
important
Very  
important
Very 
dissatisfied
Very 
satisfied
Speaking to you in your own 
language
Professionalism of maintenance staff
Courtesy of maintenance staff
The quality of the end-product of the 
maintenance
Getting the maintenance work right 
first time
Other, please specify: 
As far as planned maintenance of the exterior of your home is concerned, which of the above aspects 
are the most important for your home enjoyment? Please give your top three.
If you would like to add any extra comments on the answers you have given, please use the space below.
21. Maintenance carried out following a request (or requests) for repairs in your home (such as 
kitchen, bathroom, heating)
Have you recently made a request for or complaint about repairs?
 Yes (in the last 3 years): fill in the columns relating to importance and satisfaction
 Yes (between 3 and 5 years): fill in the columns relating to importance and satisfaction
 No: only fill in the column relating to importance (the left-hand column)
Please place crosses as they apply to your situation. How important is this for your home enjoyment, 
and how satisfied are you?
Not at all 
important
Very  
important
Very 
dissatisfied
Very 
satisfied
Ease of obtaining information and 
making complaints
Flexibility in making appointments
1.
2.
3.
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Not at all 
important
Very  
important
Very 
dissatisfied
Very 
satisfied
Honouring of agreements in  rela-
tion to work schedule
Range of maintenance options 
available
Limited duration of maintenance 
work
Prevention of damage to personal 
property
Wearing smart and recognisable 
company clothes (those performing 
the maintenance)
Limiting the amount of debris and 
dust near the area of work, and clear-
ing it away
Limiting the amount of noise and 
and vibrations
Speaking to you in your own 
language
Professionalism of maintenance staff
Courtesy of maintenance staff
The quality of the end-product of the 
maintenance
Getting the maintenance work right 
first time
Other, please specify: 
As far as requests for repairs to your home are concerned, which of the above aspects are the most 
important for your home enjoyment? Please give your top three.
If you would like to add any extra comments on the answers you have given, please use the space below.
1.
2.
3.
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Thank you for completing and returning the questionnaire.
You can return the questionnaire in the enclosed reply envelope. Please indicate whether or not you 
would like to receive a summary of the survey after it has been concluded.
 Yes, I would like to receive a summary of the results
 No, I do not wish to receive a summary of the results
Please use the space below for any questions or comments you may have in relation to the ques­
tionnaire.
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 Appendix 3 Regression analysis
A3.1 Regression analyses regarding determinants of maintenance on the exterior of buildings (n = 2978)
R R square
Adjusted R 
square
Standard error 
of the estimate
0.529(a) 0.280 0.277 1.352
 
Unstandardised  
coefficients
Standardised 
coefficients t Significance
 B Standard error Beta   
(Constant) 1.463 0.126 11.644 0.000
Tenant participation in maintenance through options 0.172 0.018 0.189 9.318 0.000
The quality of the result of maintenance 0.256 0.028 0.265 9.307 0.000
(a) Dependent variable: Evaluation of planned maintenance on the exterior of buildings
* The coefficients were restricted to have a value ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one. The explanatory 
factors indicated with ‘*’ were dropped for further analyses because of a wrong sign of the coefficient.
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
A3.2 Regression analysis regarding determinants of maintenance service quality for reactive maintenance 
inside the dwelling (n = 2946)
R R square
Adjusted R 
square
Standard. error 
of the estimate
0.609(a) 0.371 0.368 1.329
 Determinants of maintenance service quality 
Unstandardised  
coefficients
Standardised 
coefficients t Significance
B Standard error Beta   
(Constant) 1.084 0.129 8.390 0.000
Being available to answer questions and receive 
complaints
0.178 0.027 0.157 6.569 0.000
Flexibility in making appointments 0.094 0.029 0.082 3.195 0.001
Sticking to execution planning agreements 0.132 0.025 0.126 5.212 0.000
Tenant participation in maintenance through options 0.073 0.021 0.071 3.508 0.000
Limiting the time taken by the work 0.110 0.028 0.095 3.986 0.000
The competence of maintenance workers 0.063 0.031 0.055 2.067 0.039
The quality of the results of maintenance 0.193 0.029 0.189 6.558 0.000
Completing maintenance activities in a single visit 0.055 0.027 0.057 2.026 0.043
Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform 
overalls
*
(a) Dependent variable: Evaluation of reactive maintenance inside the dwelling
* The coefficients were restricted to have a value ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one. The explanatory 
factors indicated with ‘*’ were dropped for further analyses because of a wrong sign of the coefficient.
Source: Tenant questionnaire for maintenance services, Onderzoeksinstituut OTB, 2006
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 Appendix 4 Determinants of 
maintenance service 
quality
1. The quality of the result of maintenance
This determinant of service quality is reflected in a few standards. The clear-
est standards are: (1) the satisfaction of tenants regarding the result of main-
tenance; and the more general standard, (2) the client is satisfied with the 
current maintenance to his dwelling. A further distinction is made between 
maintenance of the building façade and maintenance inside the dwelling. 
There is no separate standard related to the common facilities inside the 
building. For reactive maintenance, a separate standard is included: ‘a suit-
able solution is offered to the identified problem’. Together with the usual 
maintenance condition measurements and performance measurements be-
fore and after maintenance works, this determinant of service quality seems 
to be covered adequately in the purchasing and performance measurement 
process.
2. The competence of maintenance workers
Another KWH standard is related to the question of whether the customer 
is satisfied about the process of maintenance delivery. Comparable standards 
are set up for both reactive maintenance and planned maintenance. The com-
petence of maintenance workers itself is not directly measured. However, 
maintenance workers have to make sure that the work is done ‘neatly’. For 
employees that carry out requests for repairs, this standard requires them to 
be kind, patient, helpful and professional.
3. Completing maintenance activities in a single visit
While this is considered to be one of the most important determinants by re-
spondents, it is not directly included in the KWH-label. Again, we may refer 
to the general standards concerning the satisfaction of tenants concerning 
maintenance delivery processes.
4. Avoiding damage to personal property
Problems with regard to maintenance are described in a generic standard: it 
should be clear for tenants where they can get help when they have certain 
complaints. Since this aspect is very logical and generic (not solely limited to 
maintenance processes), this service recovery measure seems to be sufficient.
5. Sticking to execution planning agreements
This determinant of service quality is directly reflected in the KWH standards, 
both for reactive and for planned maintenance. Moreover, according to the 
KWH-huurlabel, in case of deviations from the planning, the client should be 
contacted beforehand.
6. The politeness of maintenance workers
The politeness of maintenance workers is measured by several standards. 
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For planned maintenance projects, it is included in the term of delivery, ‘the 
client is spoken to kindly and the works are done neatly’. The standards are 
related to the satisfaction of customers about the way they are approached 
by maintenance workers (and the housing association). For reactive mainte-
nance, this determinant of service quality is included in the term of delivery, 
‘the client wants to be approached in a respectful way’.
7. Being available to answer questions and receive complaints
This aspect is covered in many ways by the KWH-label. It covers, for example, 
the accessibility of the housing association’s office, accessibility by phone, In-
ternet, and email, the availability of information, the accessibility of the con-
tact person for the maintenance project, and the possibilities for tenants to 
use arbitration services.
8. Limiting and tidying up litter and dust around the work site
This aspect is not directly measured by KWH. A standard that is related to this 
aspect is, ‘employees should ensure that the works are carried out neatly’.
9. Flexibility in making appointments
This aspect is included in the standard, ’when making appointments, the cus-
tomer’s preferences should be taken into account’. It is unclear how strictly 
this standard is applied, and how flexible the maintenance contractor has to 
be when making appointments.
10. Tenant participation in maintenance (availability of options)
Choices have to be given with respect to possibilities for clients to buy main-
tenance packages. If housing associations want to offer more choices, such as 
those related to colour use or different degrees of luxury, then they have to 
set their own standards.
11. Being addressed in your own language
This aspect in not included in the KWH-standards. It could be included in 
separate performance standards.
12. Limiting nuisance caused by noise and vibration
This aspect in not included in the KWH-standards. Indirectly, this will affect 
customers’ feelings about the process of maintenance. Given the fact that re-
spondents do not rate this aspect very highly, it should not be a top priority 
for housing associations.
13. Limiting the time taken by the work
This aspect is not included in the KWH-label. However, limitations for the 
time that housing associations and maintenance contractors have to react to 
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tenants’ questions and complaints are included. Moreover, if reparations turn 
out to take longer than expected, clients must be informed.
14. Having maintenance workers wear smart, uniform overalls
Clothing is not prescribed. However, for reasons of security, the housing as-
sociation has to inform its customers clearly which company will deliver the 
maintenance service. Moreover, maintenance workers must be able to give 
evidence of their identities when requested to do so by clients.
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 Appendix 5 Planned maintenance and 
reactive maintenance as 
sequential processes1
For planned maintenance, an inspector registers the actual condition of the 
building components. The registration of the actual state of maintenance 
takes place by listing the defects. Based on the desired performance of build-
ing components, which is defined in the housing association’s strategic poli-
cy, maintenance activities are (cyclically) planned in order to get or maintain 
building components at the desired level of quality. In this planning process, 
tenants may be consulted about their time-preferences. At the moment the 
maintenance is to be carried out, the maintenance contractor is given an or-
der, which includes the specifications for maintenance activities. For the ex-
act planning of maintenance activities, tenants may again be consulted to 
give their time-preferences, and sometimes even some (aesthetic) preferenc-
es about the results of maintenance. After the maintenance activities have 
been realised, performance measurements are conducted to ensure that the 
planned performance of the building components has been realised. This may 
include measurements of tenant satisfaction relating to the maintenance pro-
cess and the result. Finally, the administrative handling of the order finishes 
the procedure. The main part of planned maintenance concerns maintenance 
to the building façade.
The procedure of reactive maintenance starts with the registration of a 
specific request or complaint. Requests are assessed with regard to neces-
sity, after which orders are created. The order is given to an external main-
tenance contractor, and/or maintenance records are made for the internal 
maintenance department. After the maintenance service has been realised, 
the administration of the order finishes the procedure. Some housing associa-
tions carry out periodical tenant satisfaction measurements in order to check 
perceived quality. Unlike planned maintenance, reactive maintenance usually 
concerns the inside of dwellings.
  Based on Straub (2001).
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  De inkoop van  
onderhoudsdienstverlening 
in de Nederlandse sociale 
huursector 
Samenvatting 
Johan Hendrik van Mossel
Probleemdefinitie en onderzoeksvragen
Onderhoud is een belangrijke kostenpost van woningcorporaties. Jaarlijks 
wordt meer dan 4 miljard euro door Nederlandse woningcorporaties uitgege-
ven aan onderhoud van hun woningbezit. Onderhoud is een belangrijk on-
derdeel van de dienstverlening van woningcorporaties aan haar klanten, de 
huurders. Het overgrote deel van het onderhoud wordt echter geleverd door 
externe toeleveranciers. Voor een goede dienstverlening aan de huurders is 
het dus van belang aandacht te besteden aan de inkoop van het onderhoud 
en het management van de relaties van de woningcorporatie met leveran-
ciers.
Het doel van het onderzoek is tweeledig:
het verbeteren van het begrip van de inkooppakketstrategie van onder-
houdsdiensten zoals gevoerd door Nederlandse woningcorporaties;
het verschaffen van inzichten in ontwikkelingskansen die het woningcor-
poraties mogelijk maken om de tevredenheid van huurders met betrekking 
tot onderhoud te verhogen.
In het onderzoek zijn drie onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd:
In hoeverre beïnvloeden de verschillende typen en karakteristieken van onder-
houdsdiensten, zoals ingekocht door de Nederlandse sociale huursector, de tevre-
denheid van de huurder?
In hoeverre zijn huidige inkooppakketstrategieën van Nederlandse woningcorpora-
ties voor onderhoud gericht op de huurder?
Welke inkooppakketstrategieën faciliteren de optimalisering van de tevredenheid 
van de huurder over onderhoudsdiensten?
De onderzoeksvragen zijn uitgewerkt in de volgende deelvragen:
Wat zijn de gevolgen van de karakteristieken van de onderhoudsmarkt voor moge-
lijkheden tot optimalisatie van inkoop van onderhoud vanuit het perspectief van de 
huurder?
In hoeverre zijn inzichten van de nieuwe institutionele economie bruikbaar voor de 
analyse en ontwikkeling van de coördinatiemechanismen gerelateerd aan de relatie 
tussen de opdrachtgever en opdrachtnemer in onderhoud?
Wat zijn de gevolgen van bestaande aanbestedingsregulering en ontwikkelingen in 
de regelgeving voor de mogelijkheden tot optimalisatie van inkoop van onderhoud 
vanuit het perspectief van de finale consument?
Welke onderhoudsdiensten zijn van primair belang voor de tevredenheid van huur-
ders over onderhoud?
■
■
1.
2.
3.
■
■
■
■
[  ]
Welke aspecten van dienstverlening zijn van primair belang voor de tevredenheid 
van huurders over onderhoud, en hoe kan prestatiemeting van onderhoudsdienst-
verlening in de sociale huursector de tevredenheid van de finale consument stimu-
leren?
Welke aspecten van dienstverlening zijn bij het inkopen van component onder-
houdsdiensten belangrijk voor de tevredenheid van de finale consument, en in hoe-
verre worden deze in acht genomen bij de specificatie van deze diensten?
In hoeverre bevatten specificaties van onderhoud de aspecten van dienstverlening 
die voor de huurder van belang zijn?
De structuur van het onderzoek is weergegeven in figuur 1.
Onderzoeksaanpak
Voor de beantwoording van onderzoeksvraag 1 is een grootschalige enquête 
uitgevoerd onder huurders van woningen van Nederlandse woningcorporaties. 
Het doel van deze enquête was te achterhalen wat van belang is voor huur-
ders bij het onderhoud van hun woningen. Tevens zijn er gegevens verzameld 
over de huidige inkooppraktijk van onderhoud, door Nederlandse woningcor-
poraties. Een reeks bijeenkomsten met inkopers en managers technisch be-
heer van woningcorporaties en met ondernemers op het gebied van onder-
houdsdienstverlening is waardevol gebleken voor de verzameling van data. 
Daarnaast zijn er een serie interviews gehouden bij de genoemde actoren. Bo-
vendien heeft er een documentenanalyse plaatsgevonden bij vier woningcor-
poraties om in te zoomen op de praktijk van het specificeren van onderhoud.
In hoofdstuk 2 is aandacht gegeven aan drie zaken:
de karakteristieken van de onderhoudssector
de nieuwe institutionele economie
aanbestedingsregulering.
De karakteristieken van de onderhoudssector bepalen mede de mogelijk-
heden die de inkopende organisatie heeft voor wat betreft de inkooppak-
ketstrategie. De eigenschappen zijn onderzocht door middel van een litera-
tuurstudie, en met behulp van informatie ontleend aan bijeenkomsten met 
ondernemers uit de onderhoudsbranche. De nieuwe institutionele economie 
levert inzichten die helpen om te gaan met (negatieve) karakteristieken van 
de onderhoudsector. Tevens verschaft zij gereedschappen om de inkooppak-
ketstrategie (zie hoofdstuk 9) te optimaliseren.
De toepassing van aanbestedingsregulering is onderzocht met een litera-
tuurstudie.
Hoofdstuk 3 is voornamelijk gebaseerd op interviews met inkopers en mana-
gers technisch beheer, maar ook (adjunct-)directeuren van woningcorporaties. 
Een overzicht is gegeven van de huidige inkooppraktijk van woningcorporaties, 
en van de wijze waarop inkoop bijdraagt aan de organisatiedoelstellingen.
■
■
■
■
■
■
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In hoofdstuk 4 is door middel van een literatuuronderzoek gekeken naar 
sectoren waarbij, net zoals in de sociale huursector, ingekocht wordt voor an-
deren dan de inkopende organisatie zelf en dan vooral de finale consument. 
Wat kan vanuit de positie van de finale consument geleerd worden van retail 
en van Nederlandse gemeenten?
In hoofdstuk 5 is de impact van verschillende onderhoudsdiensten op de 
tevredenheid van huurders over onderhoud onderzocht. Dit is gedaan met be-
hulp van een schriftelijke vragenlijst. De vragenlijst is opgesteld in consultatie 
met huurders, inkopers en managers technisch beheer van woningcorpora-
ties. Het eerste deel van de vragenlijst betrof voornamelijk socio-demografi-
sche gegevens van de huurder. Het tweede deel ging in op het belang en de 
tevredenheid van huurders voor wat betreft verschillende onderhoudsdien-
sten. Tenslotte is in het derde deel aandacht besteed aan het belang van en de 
tevredenheid over aspecten van dienstverlening bij onderhoud. Voorafgaand 
aan de definitieve verzending van vragenlijsten is er een pilot uitgevoerd bij 
huurders in een woningcomplex in Den Haag. Opmerkingen en onjuist inge-
vulde vragen zijn geëvalueerd en hebben geleid tot beperkte inhoudelijke en 
lay-outtechnische aanpassingen. De respons op de uiteindelijke vragenlijst 
was 23 procent, oftewel meer dan 6000 respondenten, verspreid over het mid-
den en westen van Nederland. De resultaten van de enquête zijn samenge-
voegd met complex- en geografische gegevens over de huurders.
Op basis van de vragenlijst die gebruikt is voor hoofdstuk 5, zijn ook de 
belangrijkste conclusies voor hoofdstuk 6 getrokken. In hoofdstuk 6 is vooral 
gekeken naar het belang van verschillende aspecten van dienstverlening voor 
de tevredenheid van huurders over onderhoud. Deze aspecten van dienst-
verlening zijn gegenereerd op basis van de generieke aspecten van dienst-
verlening zoals gepresenteerd door Parasuraman et al. (1985). Onderscheid is 
gemaakt tussen planmatig onderhoud aan de buitenkant van de woning en 
onderhoud naar aanleiding van reparatieverzoeken in de woning. Conclusies 
zijn gericht op de prestatiemeting van onderhoudsdienstverlening. Door mid-
del van een documentenstudie is bekeken in hoeverre het KWH-huurlabel al 
afdoende is ter dekking van relevante aspecten van dienstverlening met be-
trekking tot onderhoud. De documentenstudie betrof de leveringsvoorwaar-
den, de standaarden en de meetpunten van het label. Twee analisten hebben 
separaat een inventarisatie verricht, waarna de discrepanties zijn bediscussi-
eerd en uiteindelijk consensus is bereikt.
In hoofdstuk 7 is gekeken naar onderhoudsdiensten, zoals ze worden inge-
kocht door woningcorporaties en rechtstreeks doorgeleverd aan de huurder. 
Onderhoud is beschouwd als component dienst (zie Axelsson en Wynstra, 
2002; en Wynstra et al., 2006). Dit hoofdstuk vormt een theoretische basis en 
een brug tussen het empirische onderzoek gepresenteerd in de hoofdstukken 
5 en 6, en een (documenten)studie in hoofdstuk 8 naar de mate waarin on-
derhoud in de inkoop daadwerkelijk als component dienst wordt behandeld. 
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Een documentanalyse is uitgevoerd naar de specificaties van een voorbeeld 
van planmatig onderhoud aan de buitenkant van de woning, te weten buiten-
schilderwerk, en van een voorbeeld van onderhoud naar aanleiding van repa-
ratieverzoeken in de woning, namelijk, reactief onderhoud van verwarming 
en waterinstallaties. Alle documenten die als onderdeel van de specificaties 
kunnen worden beschouwd, zijn geïnventariseerd voor een selectie van vier 
woningcorporaties (zes zelfstandig opererende vestigingen). Documenten die 
zijn geëvalueerd betroffen onder meer contracten, specificaties, memo’s, al-
gemene voorwaarden en condities en selectiecriteria. Geïnventariseerd is in 
hoeverre relevante aspecten van dienstverlening zijn opgenomen in de speci-
ficaties. Zes van de door de beoordelaar onderzochte documenten zijn geëva-
lueerd op consistentie en validiteit van beoordeling door twee externe recen-
senten van wie één expert en één leek.
In hoofdstuk 8 is het documentonderzoek, geïntroduceerd in hoofdstuk 7, 
verder uitgebreid met twee onderhoudsdiensten: schoonmaak van gemeen-
schappelijke bouwdelen en onderhoud van mechanische ventilatiesystemen. 
Daarnaast is in het bijzonder aandacht besteed aan de indeling en structure-
ring van specificaties, naast de inhoudelijke componenten.
Hoofdstuk 9 betreft een theoretische beschouwing van de mogelijkheden 
die Nederlandse woningcorporaties hebben om de inkoop van onderhoud te 
optimaliseren voor de tevredenheid van huurders. Bij deze beschouwing is 
veel gebruik gemaakt van theoretische gereedschappen uit de nieuwe institu-
tionele economie, geïntroduceerd in hoofdstuk 2.
Conclusies, praktijkaanbevelingen en aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek
Doelstellingen voor inkoop van onderhoud door woningcorporaties
Onderhoudsdiensten zijn belangrijk voor het beantwoorden aan de private en 
publieke doelstellingen van woningcorporaties. Onderhoudsdiensten kunnen 
bijdragen aan een hoge kwaliteit van dienstverlening aan huurders, aan de 
leefbaarheid van de wijk (en het woningcomplex), en ze kunnen een bijdrage 
leveren aan een goede financieel-economische positie van de woningcorpora-
tie. Dit promotieonderzoek is gericht op de bijdrage van (de inkoop van) onder-
houdsdiensten aan de tevredenheid van huurders. Dit sluit aan bij (Europese) 
ontwikkelingen in de sector die in toenemende mate leiden tot het centraal 
stellen van de klant.
Een gedifferentieerd inkoopbeleid kan woningcorporaties helpen efficiënt 
en effectief te zijn in hun onderhoudsuitgaven. Deze differentiatie kan gere-
lateerd zijn aan de karakteristieken van de woningcorporatie, de karakteris-
tieken van de huurders en hun voorkeuren, en aan de karakteristieken van de 
desbetreffende onderhoudsdiensten.
Karakteristieken van de woningcorporatie en haar klanten
Maatschappelijke ondernemingen zoals woningcorporaties hebben karakte-
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ristieken vergelijkbaar met zowel de private sector als de publieke sector. Ze 
opereren in een marktsituatie, maar moeten tegelijkertijd hun middelen aan-
wenden om de samenleving te dienen. Woningcorporaties moeten diensten 
leveren voor doelgroepen die speciale hulp behoeven op de woningmarkt.
De huurder heeft een kwetsbare positie als klant. In veel gevallen besteden 
de doelgroepen een hoog percentage van hun inkomen aan huur. Bovendien is 
de keuze van woningen en bijbehorende woondiensten beperkt, in het bijzon-
der in een krappe woningmarkt. Als de klant huurder is van een woningcor-
poratie, is er sprake van hoge uittredingsbarrières. Dit betekent dat de huur-
der in hoge mate afhankelijk is van de woningcorporatie voor de kwaliteit van 
de geleverde diensten. Bovendien is de keuze van diensten en attributen, of 
samenstelling van diensten, beperkt. De wet geeft bescherming aan huurders. 
Huurstijgingen zijn beperkt en bovendien kunnen huurders het beleid van de 
woningcorporatie beïnvloeden.
Afgezien van de activiteiten, uitgevoerd in commercieel, competitief ver-
band, is er beperkte externe stimulans voor efficiënte investeringen. Toch 
wordt publieke en in het bijzonder Europese aanbestedingsregulering niet 
toegepast. De actuele transparantie is daarom beperkt. De toepassing van 
transparante procedures die faire mededinging tussen kandidaat toeleveran-
ciers mogelijk maakt, is aan te bevelen.
Karakteristieken	van	de	onderhoudssector
Wat zijn de gevolgen van de karakteristieken van de onderhoudsmarkt voor moge-
lijkheden tot optimalisatie van inkoop van onderhoud vanuit het perspectief van de 
huurder?
Onderhoudsmarkten zijn, met uitzondering van de liftenmarkt, gefragmen-
teerde markten. Er zijn veel kleine bedrijven die hun diensten aanbieden. Toe-
tredingsbarrières zijn beperkt, ondanks inspanningen van onderhoudsbedrij-
ven om deze te verhogen. Door het hoge aandeel van arbeid in de kosten is 
het moeilijk de productiviteit te verbeteren. Prijs is het belangrijkste ‘order-
winning’ criterium. Dus onderhoudsbedrijven zijn bedreven in het laag hou-
den van kosten, maar niet per se in het maximaliseren van de tevredenheid 
van de huurder. Dit bedreigt de mogelijkheden voor het optimaliseren van de 
tevredenheid van de huurder. Daarom zijn mogelijk aanvullende inspannin-
gen nodig door de inkopende organisatie, de woningcorporatie, om zeker te 
zijn van de juiste combinatie van middelen en capaciteiten van dienstverle-
ners. De selectie van toeleveranciers is belangrijk, maar niet altijd voldoende. 
Wanneer de gevraagde capaciteiten niet matchen met de beschikbare capa-
citeiten op de markt van toeleveranciers, is ontwikkeling van toeleveranciers 
door de inkopende partij mogelijk nodig om alsnog de gewenste doelstellin-
gen voor huurders te kunnen bereiken.
■
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Voorts is dankzij de lage marges in de markt de capaciteit om nieuwe ont-
wikkelingen te initiëren ten behoeve van huurders beperkt. De fragmentatie 
van de onderhoudsmarkten heeft bovendien negatieve consequenties voor de 
mogelijkheden om verschillende typen en vormen van onderhoud te combi-
neren. Dit beperkt synergiemogelijkheden en het kan leiden tot meer overlast 
voor huurders doordat de werkzaamheden van onderhoudsbedrijven minder 
gestroomlijnd zijn.
Kortom, het karakter van de onderhoudsmarkten impliceert een gebrek 
aan focus op de huurder bij onderhoudsbedrijven en een gebrek aan synergie-
mogelijkheden, en daarmee worden de mogelijkheden om de inkooppakket-
strategie te optimaliseren beperkt.
Regulering	en	de	gevolgen	voor	inkoop
Wat zijn de gevolgen van bestaande aanbestedingsregulering en ontwikkelingen in 
de regelgeving voor de mogelijkheden tot optimalisatie van inkoop van onderhoud 
vanuit het perspectief van de finale consument?
De inkoopmogelijkheden zijn beperkt door de eisen die worden gesteld via de 
regelgeving. Indien de publieke controle op de sociale huursector zal groeien, 
wordt toepassing van Europese aanbestedingsregulering mogelijk verplicht. 
Voor individuele woningcorporaties zou verplichte toepassing van de regelge-
ving mogelijk leiden tot beperkingen van mogelijkheden bij inkoop. Het kan 
leiden tot hogere kosten door de uitgebreide procedures, en tot beperkte mo-
gelijkheden voor het combineren van onderhoudsactiviteiten en voor langdu-
rige en intensieve samenwerking met toeleveranciers.
Anderzijds kan de toepassing van aanbestedingsregulering helpen in de 
organisatie van een transparant inkoopproces. Voor de sector kan het een ‘ge-
dwongen’ professionalisering van de inkooppraktijk betekenen door gestruc-
tureerde procedures.
Voordat conclusies kunnen worden getrokken over de daadwerkelijke op-
timalisatiemogelijkheden voor de inkooppakketstrategie van woningcorpora-
ties, is aandacht gegeven aan de vraag wat de speerpunten voor optimalisatie 
zouden kunnen zijn. Oftewel, in de context van dit onderzoek: Wat beïnvloedt 
de tevredenheid van huurders over onderhoud?
Onderhoudsdiensten	en	voorkeuren	van	huurders
Welke onderhoudsdiensten zijn van primair belang voor de tevredenheid van huur-
ders over onderhoud?
Het belang van onderhoud voor de huurder is op twee manieren gemeten. In 
de eerste plaats is het belang gemeten door rechtstreeks aan huurders te vra-
■
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gen om het belang van verschillende onderhoudssoorten aan te geven. Daar-
naast is het belang geschat in een regressieanalyse met de algemene tevre-
denheid over onderhoud als afhankelijke variabele en de tevredenheidsscores 
over de afzonderlijke onderhoudssoorten als onafhankelijke variabelen.
Onderhoud van verwarming en waterinstallaties, en onderhoud van hang- 
en sluitwerk aan ramen en buitendeuren zijn zeer belangrijk voor de tevre-
denheid van huurders. Deze onderhoudsdiensten dragen rechtstreeks bij aan 
de fysiologische en veiligheidsbehoeften van huurders. Daarnaast zijn er on-
derhoudsdiensten die gemakkelijk kunnen worden waargenomen door huur-
ders, zoals buitenschilderwerk en onderhoud van badkamers. Terwijl deze in 
rechtstreekse scores van huurders als minder belangrijk dan gemiddeld wor-
den beschouwd, is hun impact op de tevredenheid van huurders significant. 
Deze diensten dragen bij aan behoeften van respect van huurders en aan mo-
de gerelateerde behoeften. Aan de andere kant zijn er onderhoudsdiensten 
waarvan een ontoereikende dienstverlening niet direct visueel kan worden 
herkend tot het moment van storing. Dit geldt bijvoorbeeld voor onderhoud 
van afvoer en riolering, en onderhoud van liften. De tevredenheid van huur-
ders over deze onderhoudsdiensten hangt niet significant samen met de te-
vredenheid van huurders over onderhoud in het algemeen, terwijl de scores 
in rechtstreekse metingen hoog zijn. Voor bepaalde groepen, zoals ouderen en 
gehandicapten, kan liftonderhoud rechtstreeks van invloed zijn op de fysiolo-
gische behoeften. Hierbij kan de verdieping waar de woning zich bevindt van 
invloed zijn. Voor andere groepen is liftonderhoud een luxe.
Huurders met vergelijkbare onderhoudsbehoeften kunnen verspreid zijn 
over de voorraad van de woningcorporatie. Slechts bij uitzondering is er sprake 
van een woningcomplex met een homogene populatie, bijvoorbeeld een stu-
dentenflat of een ouderencomplex. In die situaties zou er ruimte kunnen zijn 
voor een op de desbetreffende doelgroep gebaseerd onderhoudsbeleid, bijvoor-
beeld voor planmatig onderhoud aan gemeenschappelijke bouwdelen. Het 
laatste kan aangepaste specificaties of selectie- of gunningscriteria impliceren. 
Omdat onderhoud naar aanleiding van reparatieverzoeken veelal wordt gele-
verd aan individuele huurders, is het mogelijk om deze dienst aan te passen 
aan de voorkeuren van het individu. Woningcorporaties zouden de mogelijke 
prijsvoordelen die samenhangen met het bundelen van voorkeuren van huur-
ders bij de inkoop van onderhoud naar aanleiding van reparatieverzoeken in de 
woning moeten evalueren, en vergelijken met de voordelen van het anticiperen 
op individuele voorkeuren voor een gewenste invulling van dienstverlening.
Welke aspecten van dienstverlening zijn van primair belang voor de tevredenheid 
van huurders over onderhoud, en hoe kan prestatiemeting van onderhoudsdienst-
verlening in de sociale huursector de tevredenheid van de huurder stimuleren?
Het gepercipieerde belang van aspecten van dienstverlening is gemeten via 
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rechtstreekse scores door huurders en door regressieanalyses gericht op de 
impact van de tevredenheid van de aspecten van dienstverlening op de alge-
mene tevredenheid over onderhoud.
Het rechtstreeks gekwalificeerd belang van aspecten van dienstverlening is 
vergelijkbaar voor planmatig onderhoud aan de buitenkant van de woning en 
voor onderhoud naar aanleiding van reparatieverzoeken in de woning. In de 
ogen van huurders is het meest belangrijke aspect de kwaliteit van het resul-
taat van onderhoud, gevolgd door de competentie van onderhoudswerklui en 
het in-één-keer goed uitvoeren van onderhoud. Het laatste aspect impliceert 
dat de werklui hun werkzaamheden uitvoeren zonder overbodige extra werk-
zaamheden of bezoeken aan de huurder.
De regressieanalyses geven een ander beeld dan het rechtstreeks gemeten 
belang. De enige aspecten van dienstverlening die significant samenhangen 
met de algemene tevredenheid over onderhoud aan de buitenkant van de wo-
ning, zijn de kwaliteit van het resultaat van onderhoud en inspraak van huur-
ders door het geven van keuzeopties bij onderhoud. Voor onderhoud naar 
aanleiding van reparatieverzoeken in de woning geldt dat de beide gehanteer-
de meetmethoden eenzelfde beeld geven met betrekking tot de belangrijkste 
aspecten van dienstverlening.
Wanneer de fase van contracteren van een onderhoudstoeleverancier voor-
bij is, is prestatiemeting belangrijk om een hoge kwaliteit van onderhouds-
dienstverlening te verzekeren. De prestatiemeting zou moeten zijn gebaseerd 
op indicatoren, reeds gepresenteerd in de uitvoeringsbepalingen, de specifi-
caties. De meest relevante aspecten van dienstverlening zouden deel moeten 
uitmaken van de prestatiemeting om de tevredenheid van de huuder zo goed 
mogelijk te waarborgen. Dit geldt natuurlijk ook voor de eerdere fases in het 
inkooptraject.
Karakteristieken	van	de	onderhoudsdienst
Welke aspecten van dienstverlening zijn bij het inkopen van component onder-
houdsdiensten belangrijk voor de tevredenheid van de finale consument, en in hoe-
verre worden deze in acht genomen bij de specificatie van deze diensten?
Onderhoudsdiensten zijn diensten die worden ingekocht door woningcorpo-
raties van onderhoudsdienstverleners en doorgeleverd naar de huurder. Deze 
diensten worden componentdiensten genoemd en kunnen een (grote) impact 
hebben op de finale consument. Hiermee moet rekening worden gehouden bij 
het specificeren van de dienst. Deze impact kan zich uiten via het proces van 
dienstverlening en via de uitkomst van de dienstverlening. Verschillen in de 
karakteristieken van de dienst vanuit het perspectief van de finale consument 
zouden bij de specificatie aandacht moeten krijgen. De urgentie die veelal ge-
paard gaat met onderhoud naar aanleiding van reparatieverzoeken binnens-
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huis vraagt om een andere aanpak in de dienstverlening. Daarnaast voelen 
huurders zich persoonlijk meer verantwoordelijk voor onderhoud dat bin-
nenshuis plaatsvindt, dan voor onderhoud in meer publieke ruimten. Het lijkt 
erop dat huurders voor onderhoud naar aanleiding van reparatie verzoeken 
in de woning, meer dan voor planmatig onderhoud aan de buitenkant van de 
woning de behoefte hebben aan een gevoel van controle over de interacties 
die gepaard gaan met de dienstverlening.
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat componentdiensten onvoldoende worden her-
kend als zodanig door inkopers, wat leidt tot inadequate specificaties met 
daarin onvoldoende aandacht voor de esentiële aspecten van dienstverlening.
Optimalisering	van	de	inkooppakketstrategie
In hoeverre zijn inzichten uit de institutionele economie bruikbaar voor de analyse 
en ontwikkeling van de coördinatiemechanismen gerelateerd aan de relatie tussen 
de opdrachtgever en opdrachtnemer in onderhoud?
In hoeverre bevatten thans gebruikte specificaties van onderhoud de aspecten van 
dienstverlening die voor de huurder van belang zijn?
Welke inkooppakketstrategieën faciliteren de optimalisering van de tevredenheid 
van de huurder over onderhoudsdiensten?
Het inkoopproces bestaat uit verscheidene stappen die kunnen worden geno-
men door woningcorporaties, de inkopende organisatie, om een goede dienst-
verlening veilig te stellen:
Specificaties
Selectiecriteria (geschiktheidseisen)
Gunningscriteria
Het contract als middel om de relatie tussen de woningcorporatie en de 
dienstverlener te organiseren
Contractgerelateerde stimulansen.
Ad 1. Specificaties
Specificaties bepalen de dienst die wordt geleverd en de wijze waarop deze 
dienst correspondeert met de klantvoorkeuren. Ze zijn het juiste gereedschap 
om alle relevante aspecten van dienstverlening die een woningcorporatie ge-
realiseerd wil zien gedurende de uitvoering van het contract uiteen te zetten. 
Uit de uitgevoerde documentenstudie kan geconcludeerd worden dat thans 
niet alle belangrijke aspecten van dienstverlening worden meegenomen in de 
specificaties.
Sommige aspecten van dienstverlening zijn dermate belangrijk dat ze al 
aandacht verdienen in de selectiefase. In die situatie moeten woningcorpora-
ties zich verzekeren van de benodigde middelen en capaciteiten van de toele-
verancier om de gevraagde kwaliteit te kunnen bieden.
■
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Specificaties worden door woningcorporaties thans veelal opgezet via 
throughput-indicatoren. Via inspecties kunnen de resultaten van throughput-
indicatoren meestal zonder problemen worden gemeten, indien de woning-
corporatie op de hoogte is van de uitgevoerde activiteiten. Incidenteel worden 
functionele – of output – indicatoren gebruikt. Voor het gebruik van output-
indicatoren is het belangrijk dat de woningcorporatie goed op de hoogte is 
van de potentiële en beoogde bijdrage van onderhoud aan haar strategische 
doelstellingen. Het voordeel van het gebruik van outputindicatoren is dat het 
onderhoudsbedrijf, meer dan in het geval van throughput-indicatoren, de mo-
gelijkheid krijgt om processen te optimaliseren. Indien dit strookt met de ca-
paciteiten van onderhoudsbedrijven (en met die van woningcorporaties in het 
opstellen van de juiste indicatoren), is het een interessante mogelijkheid voor 
optimalisatie van de onderhoudsdienstverlening. Voorwaarde is een goede 
dekking van de essentiële aspecten van dienstverlening. Het in-één-keer goed 
uitvoeren van onderhoud is bijvoorbeeld een outputcriterium dat kan worden 
gebruikt (met een zekere gevoeligheidsmarge) en dat effectief de service voor 
huurders kan verbeteren. Deze prestatie-eis kan worden gecontroleerd via 
ad random toetsen bij huurders. Echter, indien prestaties niet meetbaar zijn, 
of indien het onderhoudsbedrijf niet de capaciteiten heeft om met een beter 
ontwerp of een betere oplossing te komen dan de woningcorporatie zelf, is 
het gebruik van throughput-indicatoren aan te bevelen.
Indien onderhoudsbedrijven de relevante capaciteiten hebben, kunnen 
ze mogelijk waarde toevoegen aan specificaties. Woningcorporaties kunnen 
echter ook hun eigen capaciteiten verbeteren in het optimaliseren van spe-
cificaties. De samenstelling van de inkoopfunctie beïnvloedt de kwaliteit van 
specificaties. Voor onderhoudsdiensten die een grote impact hebben op tevre-
denheid van huurders, is het waarschijnlijk aan te bevelen ze in te laten ko-
pen door een inkoopteam waarvan front-office medewerkers deel uitmaken. 
Beslissingsondersteunende systemen kunnen helpen om kennis over voor-
keuren van huurders op het gebied van de dienstverlening op te slaan en te 
gebruiken.
Er lijkt ruimte voor verbetering van de structuur van specificaties. Er wor-
den veel verschillende documenten gebruikt voor het specificeren van de ge-
wenste dienst. Dit leidt tot duplicatie, mogelijke onvolledigheid en soms zelfs 
tegenstrijdigheid, en op zijn minst een gebrek aan transparantie, wat de na-
volging van specificaties niet stimuleert. Bovendien verkleinen transparante 
specificaties de kans op moral hazard door dienstverleners. De informatie-
asymmetrie wordt minder groot en daardoor wordt de kans kleiner dat ze in-
adequate diensten verlenen.
Thans zijn specificaties in veel gevallen de verantwoordelijkheid van pro-
jectleiders. De verantwoordelijkheid ligt dus op het operationele niveau. Ge-
zien de groei in omvang van woningcorporaties is er op bedrijfsniveau geen 
overzicht meer over de toegepaste specificaties en daarmee over het daadwer-
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kelijke niveau van dienstverlening. Er lijkt daarom behoefte aan meer trans-
parantie. Algemene voorwaarden kunnen worden gebruikt om het niveau van 
dienstverlening vast te stellen voor wat betreft de aspecten die gelijk zijn voor 
alle onderhoudsdiensten.
Raamcontracten kunnen worden gebruikt voor aspecten die verschillen 
tussen onderhoudsdiensten en/of toeleveranciers, maar gelijk zijn voor wo-
ningcomplexen en doelgroepen huurders. Wanneer de relevante kritische 
prestatieindicatoren voor de inhoud van deze documenten worden vastgelegd 
op bedrijfsniveau, kan de kwaliteit van dienstverlening gewaarborgd worden 
op een hoger niveau in de organisatie. Tenslotte kan in samenwerking met 
projectleiders, die bij uitstek over lokale informatie beschikken, invulling wor-
den gegeven aan contracten en/of opdrachten. Deze contracten kunnen dus 
ook bij uitstek de aspecten bevatten die verschillen tussen woningcomplexen 
en groepen huurders.
Hieraan gerelateerd is op het bedrijfsniveau van de woningcorporaties het 
huidige strategisch (voorraad) beleid primair gericht op fysieke aspecten. Een 
strategisch beleid dat ambities heeft op het gebied van bewonerstevreden-
heid, zou ook bewonersvoorkeuren op het gebied van onderhoudsdienstverle-
ning moeten behelzen.
Ad 2 en 3. Selectiecriteria en gunningscriteria
Indien woningcorporaties besluiten om onderhoudsdiensten bij externe toe-
leveranciers in te kopen, dan is de selectie van leveranciers essentieel om zo-
veel mogelijk zeker te zijn van de juiste middelen en capaciteiten. In de huidi-
ge Nederlandse praktijk van woningcorporaties worden selectiecriteria en in 
het bijzonder gunningscriteria maar zeer beperkt gebruikt. Bekende partijen 
die worden vertrouwd en die lokaal zijn gevestigd, worden bij herhaling uit-
genodigd om werken uit te voeren. Dit kan interessante andere partijen uit-
sluiten die de kwaliteit van dienstverlening aan huurders kunnen verhogen, 
en/of ook kosten zouden kunnen verlagen.
Sommige aspecten van dienstverlening kunnen worden beschouwd als een 
minimumeis. Ontoereikende naleving leidt tot ontevreden huurders. Door het 
gebruik van selectiecriteria kunnen de capaciteiten van kandidaat toeleveran-
ciers worden getoetst op het kunnen voldoen aan dergelijke eisen. Dit is in het 
bijzonder interessant voor onderhoudsdiensten die een grote impact hebben 
op de tevredenheid van huurders, zoals buitenschilderwerk, onderhoud van 
hang- en sluitwerk aan ramen en buitendeuren (eengezinswoningen) en voor 
het onderhoud van gemeenschappelijke bouwdelen (meergezinswoningen) en 
het onderhoud van badkamers. Vooral de kwaliteit van menselijke middelen 
is een cruciaal aspect, door de hoge mate van interactie die gepaard gaat met 
bepaalde onderhoudssoorten die belangrijk zijn voor huurders. In het verle-
den uitgevoerde succesvolle projecten kunnen een goede indicatie geven van 
de kans op succesvolle toekomstige projecten. Succesvol, in dit kader, is een 
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project met tevreden huurders. Slechts potentiële toeleveranciers die aan de 
criteria voldoen blijven kandidaat voor het project. Vanwege het risico dat te 
weinig potentiële toeleveranciers kunnen voldoen aan bepaalde criteria en 
vanwege de administratieve last die gepaard gaat met elk criterium, is het aan 
te bevelen om het totaal aantal toe te passen criteria te beperken.
Terwijl selectiecriteria zijn gerelateerd aan de vakkundigheid van potenti-
ele toeleveranciers, zijn gunningscriteria gerelateerd aan de geboden onder-
houdsoplossing. Voor gunningscriteria geldt dat de tevredenheid van huurders 
het best is gewaarborgd met het gebruik van het criterium ‘de economisch 
meest voordelige aanbieding’ ten opzichte van de prijs alleen. Het is het 
meest in het belang van huurders dat de essentiële aspecten van dienstverle-
ning deel uitmaken van de gunningscriteria, met inbegrip van de bijbehoren-
de gewichten. Echter, alleen aspecten van dienstverlening die meetbaar zijn 
en die objectief vergeleken kunnen worden in deze fase van het proces, kun-
nen mogelijk kwalificeren als gunningscriteria. De mate waarin onderhouds-
bedrijven bereikbaar zijn voor het beantwoorden van vragen van huurders en 
voor het behandelen van klachten kan een goed gunningscriterium zijn. Een 
ander aspect van dienstverlening dat mogelijk goed toegepast kan worden als 
gunningscriterium, is de mate van flexibiliteit die een onderhoudsdienstver-
lener heeft bij het maken van afspraken met huurders.
Ad 4. Het contract als middel om de relatie tussen de woningcorporatie en de 
dienstverlener te organiseren
De vorm van samenwerking tussen woningcorporaties en onderhoudsbedrij-
ven kan bepalend zijn voor het succes ervan en daarmee uiteindelijk voor de 
kwaliteit van dienstverlening aan huurders.
Een hoge mate van complexiteit van specificaties is een reden voor nau-
we samenwerking met dienstverleners. Zonder nauwe samenwerking kan 
het risico voor een gebrek aan aansluiting tussen de verwachte en werkelijke 
uitkomsten van dienstverlening aanzienlijk zijn. Dit wordt ten eerste veroor-
zaakt doordat begrensde rationaliteit ervoor zorgt dat specificaties incom-
pleet of niet-optimaal kunnen zijn. Daarnaast kan begrensde rationaliteit van 
de kant van de toeleverancier ervoor zorgen dat een andere dienst geleverd 
wordt dan verwacht wordt. Beide kunnen zorgen voor negatieve consequen-
ties voor de tevredenheid van de huurder over de dienstverlening.
Een ander argument voor nauwe samenwerking is een hoge mate van spe-
cificiteit van middelen, bijvoorbeeld menselijke middelen in de vorm van ken-
nis, die wordt ingezet voor de opdracht. Deze specificiteit van middelen groeit 
normaal gesproken als gevolg van (intensieve) samenwerking met dienstver-
leners. Hoe langer een onderhoudsdienstverlener heeft gewerkt met bepaalde 
woningcomplexen van een woningcorporatie, hoe groter de kans op toege-
wijde middelen, oftewel middelen die specifiek voor dat doel zijn. Het onder-
houdsbedrijf leert de karakteristieken van de huurders en de karakteristie-
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ken van de degradatieprocessen van de bouwdelen kennen, en heeft hiervoor 
unieke oplossingen ontwikkeld. Met andere woorden, eerdere succesvolle sa-
menwerking is een economische stimulans voor samenwerking (met dezelfde 
dienstverlener) in de toekomst. Deze kan echter ook de effectieve concurren-
tie uithollen.
Ten slotte zou men moeten overwegen wat de kerndoelstellingen zijn van 
de organisatie. Wanneer tevredenheid van huurders een kerndoelstelling is, 
moet bijvoorbeeld onderhoud aan hang- en sluitwerk, een prioriteit zijn voor 
de woningcorporatie. Het kan dan aan te raden zijn om samen te werken met 
dienstverleners voor het organiseren van de dienstverlening, om de eventuele 
risico’s te beperken. Dit kan de vorm aannemen van nauwe samenwerking, of 
zelfs verticale integratie. Voor minder belangrijke onderhoudsdiensten is de 
investering in nauwe samenwerking minder de moeite waard.
Het beperken van opportunisme
Opportunisme is een andere factor die de kwaliteit van dienstverlening op 
een negatieve manier kan beïnvloeden. Wanneer een woningcorporatie een 
informatienadeel (informatie asymmetrie) heeft vergeleken met het onder-
houdsbedrijf, kan monitoren effectief zijn in het reduceren van de kans op 
opportunisme. Acties ter ontwikkeling van de toeleverancier (‘supplier deve-
lopment’) kunnen effectief zijn in het reduceren van risico’s gerelateerd aan 
kwaliteit, leveringszekerheid en prijs. Relatief laagdrempelige acties zijn bij-
voorbeeld het verhogen van verwachtingen ten aanzien van leveranciers, het 
geven van regelmatige terugkoppeling naar toeleveranciers over hun presta-
ties, en het erkennen van toeleveranciers. Meer drastische acties zijn het trai-
nen van personeel, het verschaffen van investeringskapitaal, en het plaatsen 
van eigen personeel bij de toeleverancier. Het geven van de mogelijkheid van 
het inbrengen van kennis en ervaring van leveranciers ten aanzien van speci-
ficaties, leidt tot transactiespecifieke investeringen en het vermindert de ver-
leiding van opportunisme.
Ad 5. Contractgerelateerde stimulansen
Ofschoon contractgerelateerde stimulansen niet gemakkelijk te implemente-
ren zijn voor onderhoudsdienstverlening, en slechts kunnen functioneren in 
combinatie met een vorm van monitoren, kan het instrument waardevol zijn. 
Vanwege het gebrek aan mogelijkheden voor inkopers om de kwaliteit van le-
vering bij voorbaat te controleren (in tegenstelling tot bij de inkoop van veel 
producten), kan prestatiestimulering van dienst zijn. Een van de mogelijkhe-
den die een woningcorporatie heeft om de neigingen tot opportunisme van 
toeleveranciers te beperken, is het gebruik van prijspremies achteraf, gecom-
bineerd met monitoren.
■
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